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SUMMARY: Petr challenges the Missouri statute requiring the 
·consent of a parent or approval of the juvenile court before an 
unemancipated minor may obtain an abortion. 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Petrs are two corporations operat-
ing abortion clinics in Kansas City and St. Louis and two physi-
V\t>+ ef~rly pres~"~~o/ 




where. They brought this suit as a facial challenge to several 
Missouri statutes enacted together as part of a comprehensive 
scheme to regulate, and allegedly discourage, abortions. After a 
trial on the merits, the District Court (Hunter, W.O. Mo.) held 
that several of the provisions were unconstitutional but that 
others were valid. 1 One of the provisions held unconstitutional 
was that requiring parental or judicial consent before a minor 
may obtain an abort ion. 
~CAS reversed in part and affirmed in part.2 On the issue of 
1The DC decided petrs' challenge to the following provisions: 
1) A requirement that abortions be performed only by phy-
sicians. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.020. Found constitutional. 
2) A requirement that abortions performed after the 
twelth week of pregnance be performed in a hospital. Mo. 
Rev. Stat. §188.025. Found unconstitutional. 
3) A requirement of parental or judicial consent before 
minors may obtain an abortion. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028. 
Found uncon st i tut ional. 
4) Regulation of abortion of fetuses found to be viable. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030. Found unconstitutional. 
5) Imposition of a detailed informed consent warning pro-
cedure. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.039. The court found uncon-
stitutional the requirement of a 48 hours waiting period 
between the informed consent warning and the abortion, 
the requirement that the informed consent warning also be 
given to parents of minors seeking abortions, and several 
of the substantive requirements of the warning. 
6) A requirement of a pathology report on the aborted 
fetus. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.047. Found constitutional. 
7) Recordkeeping and reporting reequirements. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §188.052. Found constitutional. 
8) Regulatioo of counseling provided at "abortion facili-
ties." Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.063. Found unconstitutional. 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
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consent for minors' abortions, the court in large part reversed 
r--------
the DC decision. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028(1) provides: 
"No persoo shall knowingly perform an abortioo upon a 
pregnant women under eighteen years unless: ------ ________. . 
(1) The attending physician has secured the informed 
written consent of the minor and ooe parent or guard-
ian; or 
(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending phy-
sician had received the written informed consent of 
the minor; or 
(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-
consent to the abortion by court order pursuant to 
subsection 2 of this sect ion . . . ; or 
(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abor-
tion by court order, and ..• the minor is having the 
abortion willingly in compliance with subsection 3 of 
this section. 
Subsection 2 sets out the procedure to be followed in obtaining 
judicial consent for the abortion. The minor must petition the 
juvenile court either for "majority rights for the purpose of 
consenting to the abortion," in which case the minor can give 
consent herself, or for a judicial determination that the abor-
tion is in the best interests of the minor. Subsection 3 pro-
vides that a minor cannot be forced to undergo an abortion 
2The court of appeals reversed the DC holding of unconstitu-
tionality in regard to two provisions: §188.030 (regulation of 
abortion of viable fetuses), and §188.028 (parental or judicial 
consent) (reversed in part). It also reversed the DC's holding 
that §188.047, requiring pathology reports, was valid. The court 
remanded for consideration the DC holding that §188.025, requir-
ing hospitalization after the twelth week, was unconstitutional, 
and its holding that §188.052, requiring certain reports, was 
valid. On remand, the district court conducted additional 
factfinding and once again found the hospitalizatioo requirement 
invalid and the reporting requirement valid. The court of ap-
peals affirmed those findings. 
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against her consent unless a court orders the abortion as neces-
sary to preserve the woman's life. 
The court of appeals noted that a blanket requirement of 
parental consent was declared unconstitutional in Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52 (1976). This Court later deter-
mined that a statute requiring the consent of a parent or of a 
court was unconstitutional because it allowed the court to block 
the abortion even after it had determined that the minor was suf-
ficiently mature to make her own decision. ~ellotti v. Baird, 
\ 
433 u.s. 622 (1979) [Bellotti II]. The DC held §188.028 invalid 
because it believed the law would allow the juvenile court to 
deny permission for an abortion upon "good cause" even if the 
minor were sufficiently mature. The court of appeals construed 
the Missouri statute differently, however. It held that the law 
would allow the juvenile court to deny permission only if it 
found that the minor was not sufficiently mature to make her own 
choice. Under that interpretation, the law is valid. 
The CA went on to discuss other parts of §188.028. First, 
it held that the requirement of notice to the minor's parents in 
all cases was unconstitutional insofar as it required notice to 
the parents even if the juvenile court determines that the minor 
is mature or that it is in her best interest to have an abortion. 
The court found that this question was left open in~L. v. 
Matheson, 450 u.s. 398 (1981), but believed that the answer was 
dictated by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, joined by 
Justice Stewart. 3 The court also held that the law was not 
c -- ----
Footnote(s) 3 will appear on following pages. 
~· ,,, .. 
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overinclusive or ~derinclusive, that the use of the term "eman-
cipated" did not render the statute void for vagueness, and that 
the statute protects the minor's anonymity and allows for a suf-
ficiently prompt judicial determination. 
CONTENTIONS: Petrs contend that the CAB decision is direct-
ly contrary to Danforth and Bellotti II. The statute here held 
valid contains the same two provisions found fatal to the Massa-
chusetts law in Bellotti II: it allows a court to deny permis-
sion to a mature minor and it requires parental notification in 
every case. Similar provisions were held invalid by CA7 in Wynn 
v. Carey, 5B2 F.2d 1375 (CA7 197B), and by several other courts. 
CAB avoids this result by rendering a "tortured construction of 
§1BB.02B" to make it consistent with the Bellotti II require-
ments. 
DISCUSSION: Petrs contentions are somewhat ~usual. First 
of all, petrs ignore the CAB holding striking down the 
requirement that the juvenile court notify the minor's 
Missouri. J 
parents 1n 
every case. Next, they argue that the CAB construction of the 
statute to make it conform to the requirements of Danforth and 
Bellotti II is incorrect. Contrary ~o the CAB interpretation of 
3cAB noted that three Justices would have held the parental 
notification statute involved in Matheson unconstitutional on its 
face and that Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, clearly 
indicated thay they would hold invalid a law which required pa-
rental notification even if the minor was found to be mature or 
the court determined that notification was not in her best inter-
ests. 450 u.s., at 420. 
In this case, CAB held that the notification requirement was sev-
erable and its invalidity did not require the invalidation of the 
remainder of §1BB.02B. 
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the statute, petrs maintain that the law d~es not require the 
juvenile court to allow a mature minor to give consent herself 
and is in that respect invalid. Thus their argument is not with 
statute as interpreted by CAB, but with the harsher interpreta-
tion they give to the law themselves. Unless a state court de-
cides that the CAB interpretation is wrong, it is hard to see 
what petrs have to complain about. 
Ordinarily, I would recommend denial, but the underlying 
issue in this case--the validity of the parental or court consent 
provisions--is before the Court in three other petitions involv-
ing the Akron, Ohio, abortion ordinance. Akron v. Akron Center 
for Reproductive Health, Nos. Bl-746, Bl-B54 and Bl-1172. In 
Akron, CA6 held that a similar, although not identical, consent 
requirement was invalid. That court made several additional 
holdings which conflict with parts of the CAB decision in this 
• 0 
case not challenged by petr. (The last CAB opinion in this case 
was filed on November 30, 19Bl, so there may still be a petition 
from the state raising some of the issues presented in Akron.) 
The Court has called for a response in Bl-1172, the cross-petn of 
the Akron Center for Reproductive Health. I recommend calling 
for a response in this case and considering it along with the 
Akron petitions. 
I recommend CFR. 
There is no response. 
February lB, 19B2 Holzhauer Opns in petn 
·. 
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
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ASS'N OF KANSAS CITY Federal/Civil 
NOTE: This is a cross-petition to Planned Parenthood 
Timely 
Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, No. 81-1255. Please make 
reference to the Preliminary Memorandum in that case. 
SUMMARY: Petrs. challenge of the invalidation of Missouri's 
statutory requirements that (1) every abortion performed 
subsequent to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a 
hospital: (2) a second physician attend the performance of an 
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abortion of a "viable fetus": and (3) a tissue sample be taken of 
every abortion and submitted to a qualified pathologist for a 
pathology report. Petrs also contend that the DC erred in 
calculating its award of attorney's fees. 
FACTS: In June 1979, Missouri enacted a comprehensive 
statute dealing with abortion. Resps--two corporations operating 
abortion clinics and two physicians who regularly perform 
abortions in the clinics and elsewhere--filed suit in the W.o. 
Mo., challenging as unconstitutional 9 sections of the new law. 
However, only the following 3 sections are involved in this 
cross-petition. 
Section 188.025 provides that "[e]very abortion performed 
subsequent to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy shall be performed 
in a hospital." Section 188.030.3 provides that an abortion of a 
"viable unborn child"--a fetus at that stage of development when 
its life "may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by 
natural or artificial life support systems"--"shall be performed 
only when there is in attendance a physician other than the 
physician performing or inducing the abortion who shall take 
control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born as 
a result of the abortion." 1 This section also requires the 
physician performing the abortion to take all reasonable steps to 
preserve the life and health of the unborn child, provided that 
he can do so without posing an increased risk to the life and 
1other subsections of § 188.030 prohibit any abortion of a 
"viable unborn child" unless necessary to preserve the life or 
health of the mother, and also require the performing physician 
to use the technique most likely to preserve the life of the 
unborn child unless that technique will endanger the mother. 
•. < 
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health of the mother. Criminal penalties are imposed for 
violations of the section. Finally, § 188.047 requires that a 
"representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion" 
be sent to a certified pathologist, who must prepare a "tissue 
report" to be filed with the state and the facility in which the 
abortion was performed. 
The DC (J. Hunter) found the first two of these provisions 
unconstitutional, but upheld § 188.047 (requiring the pathology 
report). Of the 5 other provisions challenged by resps at trial 
(they had abandoned their challenge to one provision prior to 
trial), the DC upheld two, struck down two in their entirety, and 
invalidated portions of the fifth. Nevertheless, the DC awarded 
resps $19,279 in attorney's fees, which was apparently based on 
the full amount of time resps' attorneys had spent on the case. 
HOLDING BELOW AND CONTENTIONS: The CAS affirmed in part and 
reversed in part, holding unconstitutional all 3 provisions at 
issue here. 
1. Second Trimester Hospitalization Requirement: The DC had 
found the requirement that abortions be performed in a hospital 
after the first trimester of pregnancy to be unconstitutional for 
two reasons. First, the requirement did not reasonably relate to 
protection of maternal health because the "dilation and 
evacuation" method of abortion (D&E} could be performed safely 
outside a hospital up until the 18th week of pregnancy; and, 
since only one Mo. hospital allows use of the D&E method in the 
second trimester, the effect of the hospitalization requirement 
was to render the D&E method virtually unavailable. Second, 
since no Mo. hospital will admit a woman under 18 without 
parental consent, the requirement permitted parents to veto a 
- 4 -
minor's decision to have an abortion, contrary to Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976). The CA rejected this 
second rationale, saying that "the fact that private entities 
(i.e., the hospitals) impose additional requirements without the 
State's sanction or insistence cannot affect the statute's 
constitutionality." The CA said that the proper inquiry was 
whether the requirement (1) creates a substantial interference 
with and imposes a direct burden on the woman's decision to have 
an abortion; and (2) if so, is reasonably related to protection 
of the woman's health. Because it found the record inadequate to 
decide these questions, it remanded to the DC. 
On remand, the DC found that (1) the D&E procedure was the ____....._,_ ( _...., 
safest post-12 week abortion technique currently available, even 
when performed outside of a hospital; (2) only one Mo. hospital 
performs second trimester D&E procedures; (3) the D&E procedure 
in a hospital is significantly more expensive than the same 
procedure performed in an outpatient facility; and (4) the second 
trimester hospitalization requirement results in fewer second 
trimester abortions being performed than if hospitalization was 
not required. On the basis of these findings the CA held that 
the requirement unconstitutionally burdened a woman's decision to r,_ ________ _, 
seek an abortion because it was not reasonably related to 
maternal health. 
Petrs contend that this decision conflicts with Roe v. Wade, 
410 u.s. 113, 163 (1973), which indicates that the state's 
interest in protecting the health of the mother after the first 
trimester of pregnancy justifies state regulation "as to the 
facility in which the procedure is to be performed, that is, 
whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other 
- 5 -
place of less-than-hospital status." (The CA found that Roe was 
not dispositive because it was decided before the D&E procedure 
became widely-used and accepted.) Moreover, in Akron Center for 
( 
Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (CA6 1981), 
petitions for cert pending, Nos. 80-746, 80-854, & 80-1172 (all 
"straight-lined" with the instant case on the April 16 Conference 
List) , the court held on virtually identical evidence that a 
similar hospitalization requirements was cqrrstitutional. The 
Akron decision relied heavily on Gary-Northwest Indiana Women's 
Services v. Bowen, 496 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. Ind. 1980), aff'd 
summarily, 451 U.S. 934 (1981) (with 3 Justices stating they would 
NPJ), which addressed in particular the impracticality of 
retreating from Roe's "bright-line test" to rules under which the 
constitutionality of second trimester regulation fluctuate with 
every change in statistics concerning the availability of 
abortions and the safety of new abortion techniques. The CAB 
should have considered itself bound by this Court's summary 
affirmance in Gary-Northwest. 
2. Pathology Reports. The DC upheld the requirement of 
pathology reports on the ground that it was rationally related to 
the state's interest in regulating standards of medical care. 
However, theCA held the requirement unconstitutional because it 
increased the cost of abortion by $10-$40 (thereby burdening the 
decision to abort): Mo. does not require submission of tissue to 
a pathologist following other medical procedures: and there was 
no showing that there were unique medical complications 
associated with abortion that necessitated a pathology report in 
every case. While in individual cases a report may be useful (to 
indicate possible fetal disorders, among other things), there is 
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no reason why physicians should not be able to use their own 
professional judgment about whether such a report is required, as 
they would do in connection with every other surgical procedure. 
Petrs contend that the requirement is rationally related to 
the state's interest in preserving maternal health, and point out 
that the decision below conflicts with Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. 
Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978}, ~ppeal dismissed, 439 u.s. 8 
(1978}, aff'd, 599 F.2d 193 (CA7 1979}. 
3. Requirement That a Second Physician Attend the Abortion 
of a Viable Fetus. The DC struck down this requirement as 
overbroad, because it requires a second doctor even when the 
fetus has no reasonable chance of survival, such as when D&E is 
the only safe procedure for the woman. The CA agreed, finding 
that the requirement significantly increased the costs of 
abortion, thereby decreasing its availability, and was not 
justified in cases where a D&E procedure was used. 
Petrs contend that the decision flies in the face of an 
"overwhelming factual record" indicating that D&E should never be 
the procedure of choice at a sufficiently late date in the 
pregnancy that the fetus would be viable. The decision also 
conflicts with Roe, supra, at 163-164, which says that the 
state's compelling interest in potential life justifies a 
proscription against abortion after "viability," except when 
necessary to preserve the mother's life or health. Obviously 
this interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring the 
presence of a second physician to preserve and care for the 
potential human life. 
4. Attorney's Fees. The CA held that resps were entitled to 
the full award of attorney's fees even though they prevailed on 
.. 
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only some issues. Petrs contend that this approach conflicts 
with decisions in other circuits, which hold that the award 
should reflect the extent to which the party prevailed. E.g., 
Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (CAl 1978); Hughes v. 
Repko, 578 F.2d 483 (CA3 1978); Morton v. Charles Cty. Bd. of 
Educ., 373 F. Supp. 394, 411 (D.Md. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 871 
(CA4 1974); Batiste v. Furnco Construction Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 
451 (CA7 1974); Schaeffer v. San Diego Yellow Cabs, 462 F.2d 
1002, 1008 (CA9 1972). 
Resps (petrs in No. 81-1255) have filed a "waiver of the 
right to respond," in which they actually state their position on 
the cross-petition. They point out that the issues presented in 
the cross-petition are similar to those pending before the Court -in Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of 
/ 
Akron, etc., Nos. 80-746, 80-854, & 80-1172, and maintain that 
the record is more qomplete in this case than in Akron. Thus, if 
the Court is inclined to grant plenary review in Akron it should 
also grant the cross-petition. 
DISCUSSION: All of the issues relating to the 
constitutionality of the abortion statute are substantial, and 
there is a conflict on two of the issues. Moreover, as petrs 
point out, there seems to be tension between the CAS decision and 
the language of Roe v. Wade; and arguably the CA's conclusion 
that the hospitalization requirement is unconstitutional was 
foreclosed by the summary affirmance in Gary-Northwest, supra. 2 
Footnote(s) 2 will appear on following pages. 
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In all, I recommend that the Court grant the petition, 
possibly in conjunction with Akron, No. 81-1172, which likewise 
concerns the constitutionality of a second trimester 
hospitalization requirement. Since there is a CA conflict 
concerning the calculation of attorney's fees, I recommend that 
the Court review this issue along with the other questions. 
There is a "waiver of the right to respond" with a statement 
of resps' position, and also an amicus brief from the City of St. 
Louis urging a grant. 
April 8, 1982 Rosenblum Opns in petn 
2The petr in Akron, supra, No. 81-1172, makes a decent 
argument that the factual situation in Gary-Northwest was 
sufficiently different from that in Akron and this case that the 
summary affirmance is not binding. See the Preliminary 
Memorandum in 81-1172. 
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ABSENT NOT VOTI NG 
G D 
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. ....... !~ ............. . 
lfp/ss ll/22/S2 
MEMO TO FILE (?k.t?_:-~~~ 
Sl-1255 and Sl-1623 Planned Parenth~od v. Ashcroft (M o) 
Planned Parenthood, a clinic (Reproduction Health 
Services), and a couple of doctors, sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the Missouri abortion statute as 
revised following Danforth. It is not easy to identify the 
"winner", although t.tl.'is'state prevailed on what appear to be 
most of the major issues. This memo, dictated only to aid 
my memory will review - summarily - the opinion of CAS by 
Chief Judge Lay. In doing so, I follow by subject matter 
CAS's disposition of the issues.* 
S d T ' t I(H ' t 1 ' t ' "' R ' t I. econ r1mes er osp1 a 1za 1on equ1remen • 
Section 1SS.025 requires that second and third trimester 
abortions be performed in a hospital. The DC had 
invalidated this requirement. It had noted that the D&E 
*At the beginning, CAS summarizes its disposition of the 








method was available in Missouri in only one hospital. ~ 
Moreover, the DC noted that no hospital would admit a woman~ 
fr-~G-
~ 
under lS without parental consent, and therefore parents 
were given the power to veto minor women's decisions with 
respect to second and third trimester abortions. 
Parental Consent for Hospitalization 
CAS noted that, unlike the statute in Danforth, 
the new statute does not require parental consent (is this ---
true even for immature minors?). In rejecting the DC's 
position, CAS noted that the unavailability of hospitals was 
not state action, but was the action of "private entities". 
Moreover, CAS thought that the DC's position would "force 
reevaluation of every health-based second trimester 
regulation", and that the state interest was both concern 
for the mother's health and viability of the fetus. 
Because of inadequate findings by the District 
----==---
Court, CAS remanded on the hospitalization requirement. 
noted that "the central issue is the 
nonhospitalized D&E and hospitalized methods". In 
concluding this portion of its opinion, CAS said: 
"In sum, we find that the district court 
failed to properly analyze the 
hospitalization requir~ent. On remand, it 
should ~ determJn~f the regulation 
create s su s t an £ial interference with and 
imposes a direct burden on the woman's 
decision eo have an a5ortion. If it does, 
the district court should evaluate whether 
the hospitalization requirement is justified 
by a compelling state interest~ i.e., whether 
it is reasonably related to the woman's 
health. Missouri bears the burden of 
justifying the restriction." A-66 
' ,. 
(J~~-
II. Parental or Court Consent for Minors.~~~ 
This section makes it a crime to per!~,~ ~ 
abortion on a minor (under age lS) unless (i) the ~~ 
has obtained written consent of the minor and one pare~~ ~J~ 
guardian; or (ii) the minor is emancipated and the physic~~~ 
has informed consent; or (iii) the minor has been granted ~~ 
the right to self-consent to the abortion by a court order, 
obtained by procedure prescribed in the statute; or (iv) the 
minor has been granted con~ by court order. See brief of 
respondents cross petitioners, p. 5. 
CAS began its discussion of this issue by quoting 
the paragraph from my Bellotti II opinion that outlined 
requirements with respect to consent. 
The DC had invalidated this provision because it 
was viewed as allowing a state court unbridled discretion. 
Also the statute had not dealt with emancipation properly. 
CAS construed §1SS.02S differently. It ruled that a court 
could not deny the minor's petition unless it found that 
"the minor was not emancipated and was not mature enough to 
make her own decision and that an abortion was not in her 
best interests". These are my Bellotti II requirements. 
CAS buttressed its holding in this respect by reliance on 
H.L. v. Matheson. See AGS-69. 
In discussing Matheson CAS noted that it had gone 
off on a "standing" issue. But here the plaintiff was not a 
young woman seeking abortion. Rather, they were 
corporations and physicians seeking to provide abortion 
.. . 
services, and that these plaintiffs had shown that some of 
their respective patients included mature minors. 
Interestingly, the plaintiffs in this case (the 
primary petitioners who lost on major points below} argue 
that CAS had no authority to interpret the statute as it 
did, contending that the plain language was otherwise. 
CAS then noted that this case presented "the case 
left open __ in Matheson: whether it is constitutionally 
permissible to require mature or 'best interest' minors to 
notify their parents prior to a court hearing in which they 
seek judicial consent". A70 Again relying on my Bellotti 
II opinion, CAS states that it "advances persuasive reasons 
for conlcuding that parental notice is unduly burdensome in ---cases involving mature or 'best interest' minors." 443 - ...... ,. u.s., at 642-64S. 
Planned Parenthood challenged several other 
provisions of §1SS.02S. These do not appear substantial to 
me - at least at present. The usual vagueness argument is 
made. It also is said that the procedure does not assure 
anonymity. Despite these arguments, CAS concluded that "the -
judicial consel}J; 12.!:9Vision" is constitutional. But CAS 
---------- - ---= n:ft"t:a;:a ....... -
agreed with Planned Parenthood that "the notice provisions 
4. 
found in subsection 1SS.02S.2(2} are impermissible and must~· 
be set aside." 
In sum, the judicial consent, construed, was 
sustained, but - in accord with Bellotti II, the requirement 
of parental notification was invalidated. 
. ' 
5. 
"' III. Restrictions on Abortion1fter Viability (A73) 
CAB first reversed the DCs holdi~g that all of 
these restrictions were void for vagueness. I do not think 
issue. we granted cert on the vagueness 
Second Doctor Requirement (~:Jt8 ~~~~<J 
CAB affirmed the DC's decision that this unduly 
burdened the woman's right. The state agreed that there was 
a financial burden, but argued that under Harris and Maher 
that this was a private rather than public matter. I agree 
with CAB that these cases were misconstrued by Missouri. 
Thus, there certainly was a state imposed burden that could 
be justified only by a showing of compelling state interest. 
The interest relied upon by the state was the 
importance of making sure, where a second trimester abortion 
vt.-~~~ 
is performed, that_the fetus wil~t survive~_CAB affirmed 
the DC in co~uding that the state failed to show that a 
second doctor's opinion was necessary. 
CAB discussed the D&E procedure, and the conflict 
of Dr. Crist's testimony with that of all other doctors.* 
~ 
*My recollection is that Dr. Crist was a party in the Akron ~ 
case. He testified that he used D&E successfully on women 
pregnant as much as 2B weeks. His testimony was 
contradicted by every other physician, the prevailing view 
being that a fetus could not survive D&E abortion. I'd like 
to find some way to check up on Dr. Crist. My guess is that 
he is a professional witness. 
IV. 
~~~ ~-
Informed Consent ~ ~~JV- ~  
Danforth held that a state may r~quire "informed 
consent" even in the first trimester. Danforth, 42S u.s., 
at 64-67. But Danforth limited this as follows: 
~ 
"The giving of information (to the patient as 
to just what would be do~e~as to its 
consequences [may be required]. To ascribe 
more meaning than this might well confine the 
attending physician in an undesired and 
uncomfortable straightjacket in the practice 
of his profession." At 67. 
Section 1SS.039.2(3} goes well beyond Danforth. 
It requires that the woman be informed of the "probable 
anatomical and psychological characteristics of the unborn 
child", and subsection (4} provides that she must be 
informed of "the immediate and long range physicial dangers 
of abortion and psychological trauma". 
The DC held this unduly burdensome, and CAS 
affirmed. 
In so doing, CAS said that the DC properly 
concluded that "the abortion decision is one to be made by a 
woman and her physician", and that the state's interest is 
adequately served when the woman's decision is made with 
"full knowledge of its nature and consequences". Danforth, 
42S u.s., at 67. 
h "-.. A - - .1. ". , , I .6• J ~ ~ • ~1 - . .J._ ... ' A Physician Must Advise f.v ~~-~-
Section 1SS.039.1 requries that the "attending 
physician" inform the woman of the information specified in 
the statute. Both the DC and CAS sustained this ... . 




nonphysicians are capable of informing the patient, and that 
requiring the physician to do it creates scheduling problems 
and increased costs. My tentative view is that a qualified 
person other than a physician could give this information. 
I think a state could require the licensing of such persons, 
such as practical nurses are licensed.* ~~ ~ 
;.,~. 
v. Pathological Reports 
Section 1BB.047 requires that sample of the tissue 
removed must be submitted to a certified pathologist, who 
must file a report with the state divison of health. 
CAB invalidated this provision, holding that the 
decision whether to obtain pathological reports should be 
left to the physician. CAB noted that Missouri "does not 
require submission of tissue to a pathologist following 
other medical procedures". A94 
*In the subsection discussing advice by the physician (p. 
A91), CAB refers to the 4B hours waiting period prescribed. 
It appears to sustain this as valid, although the discussion 
at this point in the opinion is very brief. 
. 
' 
In invalidating this requirement, CAS reiterated 
that "Missouri law requries that all abortions be peformed 
by physicians". A96* 
* * * 
CAS's opinion is long and rambling, and not 
altogether clear. I hope we can find some way to prevent 
courts from having to make the multiplicity of judgments 
such as those addressed by the DC and CAS in this case. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
*CAS's op1n1on is so long I may have missed it, but I find 
no full discussion of the requirement that only physicians 
may perform first trimester abortions. My guess is that the 
Court will hold specially trained persons other than 











TO: Jim DATE: Nov. 22, 1982 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Abortion Cases 
I have now read the briefs you were good enough to 
select for me, including also the brief by the American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. As I am sure 
you have found, the number of issues in these cases is a bit 
overwhelming. I have not tried to sort out which ones we 
granted, or whether we took them across the board. 
A primary objective of the Court at this time, as 
I see it, is to enunciate principles or standards that would 
afford clearer guidance to state legislatures and limit the 
flow of litigation into the Courts. The professors' brief 
with respect to the major issues, suggests rather positive 
standards, and emphasizes the undesirability of •balancing". 
These have appeal, but they also probably permit abortions 
for adult women during the first trimester quite literally 
"at will". In view of the fees charged (see the Virginia 
case), there always will be licensed physicians who will 
make enormous profits out of what have been described as 
•abortion mills". I am not at all sure the professors' brief 
fairly states some of our holdings. Perhaps the SG goes too 
far the other way. 
I now summarize, Jim, tentative views on several 
of the major issues in these cases: 
Informed Consent Requirement 
Danforth recognized that this is not an undue 
burden per se. The Akron provision is unduly burdensome 
because it imposes extensive requirements as to exactly what 
a physician must advise the woman as a predicate to her 
•informed• consent. 
As to the consent requirement with respect to 
minors who are neither mature not emancipated, I joined 
Matheson in holding that parental consent of at least one 
parent is a valid requirement except where the minor is 
mature or emancipated or an independent decision-maker finds 
that a non-consented abortion is in the best interests of 
the minor. In Akron, apparently Ohio law would require the 
juvenile court to notify the parents. Under my opinions in 
Bellotti II and Matheson, this would be invalid. 
24 Hours Dela~(Akron)/48 Hours(Missouri) 
Although I do not recall (without checking) a 
court decision on this issue, I doubt that an arbitrary 
delay - even with an emergency provision - would meet our 
standards. This normally can be left to the physician, 
provided there is some assurance that the physician will 
adequately inform the woman. With respect to immature 
minors, there should be time to assure informed consent. We 
have never considered the extent of a doctor's 
responsibility in determining whether a minor is mature. I 
suppose a state validly could require with respect to minors 
'· .. 
3. 
of tender age {under 15) that an independent decision maker 
determine maturity and best interest issues. Such a 
requirement inevitably would produce some delay. 
Second Trimester Abortions 
My recollection is that Roe drew no bright line, 
referring only to approximate stages in the development of a 
fetus. In Akron, respondents argue that •early second 
trimester abortions are safely performed (even in] 
outpatient clinics, and CA6 apparently would invalidate any 
•arbitrary line between trimesters•. 
The American College seems to agree, relying on 
the argument that •medical knowledge (since Doe] has 
progressed dramatically•, particularly in the use of D&E 
procedures. Yet, the evidence in the Missouri case 
persuaded CAB {and possibly the DC also) that D&E procedure 
invariably destroys the fetus. Thus, in view of the 
compelling state interest once viability exists a state 
lawfully could insist that the decision as to viability be 
made by a physician. 
As the College brief relies on •current medical 
knowledge•, it would appear that it agrees a qualified 
physician is the only person likely to possess such 
knowledge, and therefore the viability decision cannot be 
delegated to a less qualified person. 
4. 
Free Standing Clinics 
A major issue, in view of the extensive use of 
clincis and the apparent unavailability of hospitals willing 
to do abortions, is what sort of facilities - if any - would 
be lawful. 
I am favorably inclined toward the views in the 
amicus brief of the College. See pages 23, 24. I 
particularly like footnote 65 on p. 24 that describes the 
College's standards for "free standing surgical facilities" 
as requiring them to •maintain the same surgical, 
anesthetic, personal (maybe this is personnel) standards as 
recommended for hospitals." Clearly, I would think, clincis 
should be regulated and approved by state law, and 
periodically inspected. 
It is not clear whether the College would require 
this type of clinic for first trimester abortions. The 
record - or perhaps one of the briefs - has the full text of 
the College's standard as to abortions. Take a look, and 
identify (or xerox) anything helpful. 
* * * 
Jim, I have dictated the foregoing summary of 
tentative views. When we go into Conference on three cases, 
involving three different sets of regulations, it will be 
helpful to have a somewhat similar summary from you, 
identifying the issue and the case. Where we differ, we can 





To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim 
Re: Abortion Cases 
Mo. and Akron apparently require JCAH-licensed "hospitals." No 
- - ---r <....... __ _ 
one has indicated in the briefs what standards the JCAH imposes, and 
the JCAH's requirements are unavailable to me. You may want to ask 
h. '. -
the clinics in the Mo. and Akron cases whether they ever tried to 
comply with the law and whether their clinics were denied 
certification. 
I have heard from someone that once saw the JCAH regulations 
that they impose very minimal requirements. If that is the case, 
the Court should know exactly what "burden" they impose before they 
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§ 32.1-123 CODE OF VIRGINIA § 32.1-125.1 
ARTICLE 1. 
Hospital and Nursing Home Licensure and Inspection. 
§ 32.1-123. Definitions.- As used in this article unless a different meaning 
or onstruction is clearly required by the context or otherwise: 
1. "Hos.eJtal"means any facility in which the primary function is the provision 
of diagnos1s,o f treatment, and of medical and nursing services, surgical or 
nonsurgical, for two or more nonrelated individuals, including hospitals known 
by varying nomenclature or designation such as sanatoriums, samtariums and 
general, acute, short-term, long-term, outpatient and maternity hospitals; 
2. "Nursinp- home" means any facirtty or any identifiable component of any 
facility in which the primary function is the provision, on a continuing basis, of 
nursing services and health-related services for the treatment and inpatient care 
of two or more nonrelated individuals, including facilities known by varying 
nomenclature or designation such as convalescent homes, skilled care facilities, 
intermediate care facilities, extended care facilities and infirmaries. 
3. "Nonre/ated" means not related by blood or marriage, ascending or 
descending or first degree full or half collateral. (Code 1950, § 32-298; 1964, c. 
54; 1973, c. 477; 1979, c. 711.) 
§ 32.1-124. Exemptions. - The provisions of §§ 32.1-123 through 32.1-136 
shall not be applicable to: (1) a dispensary or first-aid facility maintained by any 
commercial or industrial plant, educational institution or convent; (2) an · 
institution licensed by the State Mental Health and Mental Retardation Board; 
(3) an institution or portion thereof licensed by the State Board of Welfare; (4) 
a hospital or nursing home owned or operated by an agency of the 
Commonwealth or of the United States government; and (5) an office of one or 
more physicians or surgeons unless such office is used principally for 
performing surgery. (Code 1950, § 32-298; 1964,_c. 54; 1973, c. 477; 1979, c. 711.) 
§ 32.1-125. Establishment or operation of hospitals and nursing homes 
prohibited without license; licenses not transferable. -A. No person shall 
own, establish, conduct, maintain, manage or operate in this Commonwealth any 
hospital or nursing home unless ~uch hospital or nursing home is licensed as 
provided in this article.' 
B. No license issued hereunder shall be assignable or transferable. (Code 1950, 
§ 32-299; 1979, c. 711.) 
§ 32.1-125.1. Inspection of hospitals by State agencies generally.- As used 
in this section: 
A. "Hospital" means a hospital as defined in§ 32.1-123 or 37.1-1 of the Code. 
B. "Inspection" means all surveys, inspections, investigations and other 
procedures necessary for a state agency or a division or unit thereof to perform 
m order to carry out various obligations imposed on such agency by applicable 
State and federal laws and regulations. 
State agencies shall make or cause to be made only such inspections of 
hospitals as are necessary to carry out the various obligations imposed on each 
agency by applicable State and federal laws and regulations. Any on-site 
inspection by a State agency or a division or unit thereof that substantially 
complies with the inspection requirements of any other State agency or any 
other division or unit of the inspecting agency charged with making similar 
inspections shall be accepted as an equivalent inspection in lieu of an on-site 
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Sl-1255 Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft (Missouri) 
Conference 12/16/S2 
CJ absent due to illness. 
This memorandum summarizes the votes on the issues 
before us. 
Issue No. 1 - Abstention. 
Affirm: S-0. 
Issue No. 2 - Parental Notification and Consent 
Divided vote - 4-4. 
Voting to reverse: WJB, TM, HAB and JPS 
Voting to affirm: BRW, LFP, WHR, SO'C 
Note: CAS construed the Missouri statute to re-
quire an independent decision-maker, expressly relying on my 
opinion in Bellotti II. 
* * * 
Sl-1623 Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood 
Issue No. 1 - Hospitalization in JCAH Hospitals 
Affirmed 5-3 
A vote to affirm in this case sustains CAS holding 
of invalidity. 
Voting to affirm: WJB, TM, HAB, LFP and JPS. 
Voting to reverse: BRW, WHR and SO'C 
2. 
Issue No. 2 -Pathologist's Report 
CAS held this requirement invalid. 
Reversed: 6-2 (several tentative). 
Voting to reverse: WJB (tentative), BRW, TM (ten-
tative), LFP (tentative), WHR, and SO'C. 
Voting to affirm: i.e., invalidate the require-
ment. HAB and JPS 
Note: I would not be surprised to see WJB and TM 
change their votes on this issue. I also was tentative. 
Issue No. 3 - Second Physician's Opinion - Invalidated by 
CAS 
Reversed 5-3. 
Voting to reverse (to sustain the requirement) 
BRW, LFP, WHR, JPS and SO'C. 
Voting to affirm: WJB; TM and HAB. 
Note: HAB feels strongly about this issue. He 
thinks that sustaining the second physician requirement is 
"flatly contrary to Bolton". But Bolton involved only first 
trimesters. Here the requirement exists only when the fetus 
is viable and the state's interest is at its strongest. 
* * * 
Issue No. 4 - Attorney's Fee 
All vote to Hold for my opinion in Hensley. 
lfp/ss 02/01/83 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Jim and Mark DATE: Feb. 1, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-1255 and 81-1623 Ashcroft 
I have reviewed Ashcroft, and return my edited 
copy to Jim herewith. 
As you predicted, this is somewhat easier to deal 
with than Akron. Yet, apart from the hospitalization issue, 
none of our positions is entirely easy to defend. 
Only with respect to the "second physician" issue 
have I suggested consideration of a significant changes in 
your draft. I started out to do a rider, and went on to put 
on paper my thoughts as to the best arguments supporting 
validity. Feel free to edit or rewrite or blend in with 
your draft. 
I have some trouble with the first few pages of 
the draft, Jim, as we are dealing with four issues and al-
though there is repetition in restating these, there may be 
room for some clarification. Read these over with this con-
cern in mind. 
If you should be able to put this in a second 
draft that satisfies both of you before I leave after lunch 
on Thursday, I will take it with me for our long weekend. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 





TO: .. DATE: Feb. 2, 1983 
FROM: Powell, Jr. ,:·.,. .:· 
Ashcroft 
" •t: 
Unless we have used it in the section dealing with 
the "second physician", I would like to add the following 
from~, at p~ .~;; l63: ~,,~ .. 
"With respect to the state s important and 
J.egitimate interest in potential life, the 
'compelling' ~oint is at viability. This is 
so because the fetus then presumably has the 
capability of meaningful life outside the 
mother's womb." 
may well be that !{ CJ 
lfp/ss 02/28/83 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Jim DATE: Feb. 28, 2983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
81-1255 Ashcroft 
Thank vou for qivinq me the opportunity to review 
the first printed draft on Sunday. 
I have done some editing of language, and raised a 
minor question or two in the marqin. 
Attached hereto is a stylistic revision for page 
12. The rather long sentence b~ginninq: "We thi.nk this 
minor burden • • • ," is a bit awkward. 
Take a look at page 15. The sentences in the text 
ao not seem to flow as smoothly as most of the opinion. 
Perhaps the third sentence (before exercising ••• ) should 
precede the second sentence ("The Court ••• "). I don't 
feel strongly about this. 
In one of my opinions, either Matheson or possiblv 
Bellotti II, I indicated that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decision-maker" who need not be a judqe. 
What would you and Mark think of adding a note saying, in 
effect, that since Missouri has provided for a judicial 
decision-maker, we need not consider whether a qualified and 
independent non-judicial decision-maker would be appropri-
ate, citing what was said in one of my opinions? 
On Saturday when you and Mark raised the denial of 
. . 
> 









described the abortion procedures (decision?) as "unique". 
Would it not be desirable to include a reference to this in 
Akron? I think the emphasis on the "stressful" nature of 
the decision, with both amotional and physical consequences, 
contributes to the uniqueness. Moreover, in view of the 
long history of state regulation, exclusively of 
abortions,and the stronq views held by various religions, it 
would be irrational indeed to conclude that abortions could 
not be classified differently from other surgical proce-
dures. They have been viewed as unique since the founding 
of the republic - and before. 
r ... F.P., Jr. 
ss 
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JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hprmu <!JltUrl qf tq~ ltmub .itatts 
Jl'asltittgbm. ~. <!J. 2ll.;i'l~ 
March 4, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1255) Planned Parenthood of Kansas City v. Ashcroft 
No. 81-1623) Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood of Kansas City 
Dear Lewis: 
In due course, I shall be writing a parti~ dissp~t .. in these 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iUFtntt <!Jo-n:rt o-f tlft ~tb .itah.-
-a.Jringhnt. ~. <If. 2ll.;i~~ 
May 5, 1983 
Re: No. 81-1255) Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft 
No. 81-1623) Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me. 
Sincerelyy 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.§nvumt cqcurl cf flrt ~1trit~ ~tafts­
~fri:ngtcn, :!9. cq. 2{!~)1,~ 
May 6, 1983 
Re: 81-1255) Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas 




John Ashcroft, et al. v. Planned Parenthood 
Association of Kansas City, et al. 
Please add my name to your opinion in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~upum~ <!):ouri: of t4~ ~niub' .:%tattg 
'JI'¥lfittghtn. ~. <!):. 2llgt'!~ 
March 7, 1983 
Re: 81-1255 and 81-1623 - Planned 
Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft 
Dear Lewis: 
Although I expect to join Parts I thru IV of 
your op1n1on, I do not agree with the analysis in 
Part V and therefore shall await further writing. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
•' 
CHAMBER S OF 
~uvrtmt <!l4t1td d tqt .,nittb ,jbttt% 
'~lhtHftittgton, ~. <ll· 211,;;,.~ 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
March 7, 1983 
No. 81-1255 Planned Parenthood Association of 
Kansas City v. Ashcroft 
No. 81-1623 Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood 
Association of Kansas City 
Dear Lewis, 
In due course, I will circulate something 
concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
J;u.prttttt <Q:qurt qf tlft ~tb J;ta.tts 
jihtsftin:gton. ~. <!J. 20gt'l$ 
March 7, 1983 
Re: Nos. 81-1255 & 81-1623 Planned Parenthood 
Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft 
Dear Lewis: 
I will await Sandra's writing in this case. 
Sincerely, / 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.§u:pumt <!fcurl cf tqt ~tlt .§tlttta 
'maafringhm. ~. <!f. 2.0,?)}~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL 
May 25, 1983 
Re: Nos. 81-1255 and 81-1623 - Planned Parenthood 
Association of Kansas City, Missouri v. 
Ashcroft and Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood 
Association of Kansas City, Missouri 
Dear Harry: 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
JUSTICE JOHN .PAUL STEVENS 
.:§upumt (!Jqurl qf tltt ~nihl .:§taftg 
~ag.ftin:ghm. ~. QI. 20,?~$ 
June 1, 1983 
Re: 81-1255 - Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft 
81-1623 - Ashcroft v. Planned Parenthood 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me in your opinion. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.i'u.p:rtuU Clf®ri of tlt't 'J'ttittb .itattg 
JTa.sfrington. ~. Clf. 20~~~ 
June 1, 1983 
/' 
Re: No. 81-1255, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Mo. v. 
Ashcroft, AG of Mo. 
81-1623, Ashcroft, AG of Mo. v. Planned Parenthood 




Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 06/03/83 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Jim DATE: June 3, 1983 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Ashcroft 
After a rereading of the opinions below on the 
"second physician" issue {that I had not reread since 
preargument), and again reading HAB' s dissent, I do not 
believe proposed Rider A - as you and I have draf~t - is 
/' 
quite fair. As a means of focusing my own thinking {and 
so you can check it), I dictate this memo. 
The DC invalidated the second physician 
requirement as overbroad, devoting only a paragraph to it 
{A 26). Its findings included: "D&E may be the procedure 
of choice, even after viability, in cases in which there 
are positive contraindications to the use of saline or 
prostaglandins installation"; "no chance of fetus 
survival" when D&E is used; and, the concluding sentence: 
"the attendance of a second physician during an abortion 
procedure which holds no possibility of fetal survival 
does not further [the state's] interest." 
The finding relied on by HAB is that D&E "may be 






apparently only in cases in which the woman's health 
requires this because it might be endangered by the "use 
of saline or prostaglandins installation". We would 
agree, if the woman's life is endangered by methods other 
than D&E. Thus, the question seems to be whether there is 
substantial evidence that during the third trimester D&E 
may be required in the interest of the mother's health? 
A footnote cites, without quoting, the testimony 
of "Doctors Robert Crist for plaintiffs and Richard 
Schmidt for defendants". It seems to me that HAB's 
opinion correctly states the DC' s holding (p. 6), 
concluding that "in some cases maternal health 
considerations will preclude the use of procedures that 
might result in a live birth • [the second doctor in 
such circumstances] "is superfluous". 
CA 8 quoted Dr. Crist as testifying that "D&E 
may be the best medical procedure at 28 weeks" because 
there were "contraindications" to the use of other 
methods. (A 80) CA8 does state that "Missouri points to 
testimony by other physicians that do not or would not use 
D&E at this stage, and therefore the evidence indicates 
that "the question is one in which medical opinions may 
differ". 
l ~ '•'t . ' 
3. 
If I am reading the foregoing correctly, it 
seems to me that our rider A needs substantial revision. 
Sadly, I don't think we can hang HAB directly with Dr. 
Crist's testimony, as he does not mention him at all. He 
simply latches on to the findings of the two courts below, 
and relies on the "two court" rule. 
You are far more familiar with all of this, Jim, 
than I am. Unless I am mistaken or have overlooked 
something important, it seems to me we must refocus our 
response on this aspect of the two physician issue. CA8 
concedes that medical opinions differ. At best, this is 
the ultimate finding of fact below. This entitles us to 
do two things: (i} show, as you have devastatingly 
(subject to a comment below} that on the plaintiff's side 
the only "differing view" is that of Dr. Crist, whereas 
the other view is that few if any physicians ever use a 
D&E during third trimester; 
contradictory evidence, with 
and ( i i} 
the great 
given this 
weigh f of it 
contrary to Dr. Crist's views, the state's interest in 
protecting a viable fetus justifies the second physician 
requirement even though there may be the rare case where a 
doctor may think honestly that D&E is required for the 





My one qualification about Dr. Crist's testimony 
is the possible ambiguity in his long answer to the 
question in the middle of the page (A 130) . I believe, 
however, that your reading of this testimony (at least 
that reprinted in the appendix) is correct. The final 
question and answer on p. 131 was as follows: 
ss 
Q. And do you believe that as a general 
principle • where there is an abortion there 
should never be a live fetus? 
A. That is correct." 
















I would appreciate your advice as to how to frame 
the position of the Court and the Justices in the above 
case. 
In terms of the judgment, I have a ~ourt on every 
issue. On the hospitalizatlon issue, the dissenters are 
Justices White, Rehnquist and O'Connor. On the remaining 
three issues in Ashcroft, only the Chief has joined me. I 
have a judgment concurred in by White, Rehnquist and 
O'Connor . .,~, •. \i ~--·" 
,f; It seems a bit a.wkward for me to be saying, 
in those three sections that "the Court holds" or that 
"we" make some decision. I understand that HAB, in his dis-
sent in Ashcroft refers to my opinion as "Justice Powell's 
opinion". ,, 
··I. I am now making some changes in this case, but 











To : ,The Chief Justice 
Justice Brennan 




Justice Rehnquis t 
Justice Stevens 
,; l'om: Justice 0 'Connor 
Circulated : 
2d Ot<~tf . Rac1rculated-.----
SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES . --L-U~ 
Nos. 81-1255 AND 81-1623 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
81-1255 v. 
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
MISSOURI, ET AL. 
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
81-1623 v. 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
[June 15, 1983] 
JuSTICE O'CONNOR, with whom JusTICE WHITE and Jus- , 
TICE REHNQUIST join, concurring in part in the judgment and 
dissenting in part. 
For reasons stated in my dissent in No. 81-746, Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health and in No. 81-1172, 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Akron, I believe 
that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement im-
posed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the 
limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming arguendo 
that the requirement was an undue burden, it would never-
theless "reasonably relate[] to the preservation and protec-
81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION 
2 PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 
tion of maternal health." Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 , 163 
(1973). I therefore dissent from the Court's judgment that 
the requirement is unconstitutional. 
I agree that second-physician requirement contained in 
§ 188.030d is constitutional because the State possesses a 1 
compelling interest in protecting and preserving fetal life, 
but I believe that this state interest is extant throughout 
pregnancy. I therefore concur in the judgment of the Court. 
I agree that pathology-report requirement imposed by 
§ 188.047 is constitutional because it imposes no undue bur-
den on the limited right to undergo an abortion. Because I 
do not believe that the validity of this requirement is contin-
gent in any way on the trimester of pregnancy in which it is 
imposed, I concur in the judgment of the Court. 
Assuming arguendo that the State cannot impose a paren-
tal veto on the decision of a minor to undergo an abortion, I 
agree that the parental consent provision contained in 
§ 188.028.2 is constitutional. However, I believe that the 
provision is valid because it imposes no undue burden on any 
right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. I con-
cur in the judgment of the Court on this issue. 
I also concur in the Court's decision to vacate and remand 
on the issue of attorney's fees in light of Hensley v. 
Eckerhart,- U.S.- (1983). 
CHAMeERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. F>OWELL, JR. 
..Bu,rtmt <qourt ltf tltt ~tb .i'tatts 
"lt\\frington. ~. <!}. 21lbi~~ 
June 14, 19S3 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases held for City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive 
Health Center, Inc., No. Sl-746: Planned Parenthood Assn. of 
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. Sl-1255: and 
Simopoulos v. Virginia, No. Sl-1S5. 
No. Sl-17S2, City of Virginia v. Nyberg 
In 1973 the municipal hospital commission of Virginia, 
Minnesota, enacted a resolution proscribing the use of mu-
nicipal hospital facilities for all abortions except those 
necessary to save the life of the mother. Appellees, physi-
cians and staff members at the municipal hospital, brought 
suit. The DC ordered appellant to make the facilities 
available for use by physicians who wished to perform abor-
tions. 361 F. Supp. 932 (Minn. 1973). CAS affirmed, 495 
F.2d 1342 (1974), and we dismissed an appeal and denied 
cert. 419 u.s. S91 (1974). 
In 19SO appellant filed a motion for relief of judgment 
under Rule 60(b), arguing that the prior holding had been 
undermined by our decisions in Maher v. Roe, 432 u.s. 464 
(1977): Poelker v. Doe, 432 u.s. 519 (1977): Harris v. 
McRae, 44S u.s. 297-rl9SO): and Williams v. Zbaraz, 44S u.s. 
35S (19SO). The DC denied relief, and CAS affirmed. 
First, this is not a proper appeal. No statute was 
invalidated, and a resolution of a hospital commission would 
not appear to be a "statute" under Sl254. I therefore will 
vote to dismiss the appeal. 
On the merits, I think CAS's decision is correct. CAS 
distinguished Poelker as holding only that a municipality 
need not fund or provide abortion services that otherwise 
are unavailable. Here the city is not being required to 
fund abortions, hire doctors who perform abortions, or oth-
erwise subsidize abortion services: the injunction only pre-
cludes it from preventing physicians from performing paid 
abortions. I see no conflict requiring our attention. 
Moreover, this is not a good case to consider this type of 
2. 
issue. The case was decided in the early 1970's, and arises 
now as a motion for relief from judgment. 
My vote is to dismiss and deny. 
There are two motions by a lawyer named Alan Ernest, 
one to file an amicus brief on behalf of the Legal Defense 
Fund for Unborn Children, the other to represent children 
unborn and born alive. I will vote to deny these motions. 





.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR . 
.hprtmt a+ottrt of tltt ~tb' .italte 
-asJringbnt. J. (If. 21lp'l~ 
June 14, 1983 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
Re: Cases held for City of Akron v. Akron Reproductive 
Health Center, Inc., No. 81-746: Planned Parenthood Assn. of 
Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, No. 81-1255: · and 
Simopbulos v. Virginia, No. 81-185. 
No. 82-151, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 
710 Pension Fund v. Janowski 
This case actually was a hold for Hensley v. Eckerhart, 
No. 81-1244, but was listed as also a hold for Planned Par-
enthood v. Ashcroft, No. 81-1255 (in which there was an at-
torney's fee issue). 
Petr is a pension fund. In 1976 the Fund was amended 
in light of ERISA. Resps are two participants in the Fund 
who brought a class action alleging that certain of the 
amendments deprived them of vested benefits. The DC disap-
proved most of the amendments. It then awarded $142,000 in 
attorney's fees to plaintiffs, an amount based on a multi-
plier of 2 (i.e., double the base amount of hours times 
rates) • 
CA7 affirmed in part and reversed in part. On the 
issue of attorney's fees, CA7 stated that courts consider 
several factors in deciding whether to award fees under 
ERISA: the degree of bad faith, the ability of the parties 
to pay fees, whether an award will deter other potential 
violators of the law, the amount of the benefit, and the 
relative merits of the parties' positions. CA7 noted that 
"[u]nfortunately, the district court did not justify its 
decision to award attorney's fees in terms of these specific 
guidelines." (App. 16a.) 
CA7 nonetheless found "sufficient analysis" to permit 
affirmance, concluding "that this award is justified because 
the litigation benefited a substantial group of Fund partic-
ipants and that the award is necessary to enable aggrieved 
parties to invoke the power of the court when pre-ERISA 
benefits are in danger." (Id., at 18a.) As to the amount 
of the award, the court observed: "Because the award was 
.. 
based on several factors, only one of which was whether 
Janowski was the prevailing party, nothing in our decision 
requires recomputation of the amount awarded." (Id.) 
2. 
Judge Fairchild dissented on the fees issue: "I am 
also of the opinion that the allowance of attorneys' fees 
should be reduced. The implied accrual formula ••• appears 
to be the most significant victory of the class members be-
fore the district court, and we are reversing that part of 
the decision.• (Id., at 20a.) 
Initially, there is an additional issue raised in the 
petition. Petrs allege that resps failed to allege injury-
in-fact and therefore lack standing. Resps reply that the 
statute expressly provides a right to sue to those who are 
covered by an unqualified plan. No conflict is alleged, and 
I believe resps are correct . (I also would note that we 
already have denied cert in Janowski v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters Local 710 Pension Fund, No. 82-37, in 
which resps here sought review of the merits of CA7's deci-
sion.) There is no reason to review this issue. 
As to the attorney's fees issue, if this were a suit 
under Sl988 or another statute providing for fee awards to 
"prevailing parties," it would be a clear GVR in light of 
Hensley. A question arises as to whether the Hensley analy-
sis applies in an award of fees under S502(g) of ERISA, 
which states that "[i]n any action under this subchapter by 
a participant ••• the court in its discretion may allow a 
reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either par-
ty." In my view, Hensley is apposite even though ERISA is 
not a "prevailing party" fee statute. 
The DC took its guidance from "prevailing party" cases, 
and indeed stated: 
"It is the prevailing party, not the wholly 
successful party, which is entitled to rea-
sonable attorney's fees, in our opinion •••• 
Unless some claims were made recklessly or in 
bad faith, we do not believe that the attor-
ney's fees for the prevailing plaintiffs 
should be based on the number of motions or 
issues on which they were successful. Other-
wise, the fixing of reasonable fees would be 
reduced to a tabulation of minutiae rather 
than compensation for the general results 
achieved." (App. 4la.) 
This makes clear that the issue in Hensley is also raised 
here. In view of Judge Fairchild's dissent pointing out 
that the plaintiffs had been reversed on the most important 
issue, I think the amount of fees should be reassessed in 
light of Hensley. 
I will vote to GVR in light of Hensley. 
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The second of these cases comes to us on 
~ ~ g~ 
r ~ to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. It in-
volves four provisions of a Missouri statute that comprehen-
sively regulates the performance of abortions. 
The first of these is a hospital requirement sub-
stantially similar to that in Akron. For the reasons stated 
in that case,J'we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
that the Missouri requirement is invalid. 
A second provision requires minors to secure pa-
rental or judicial consent before obtaining an abortion. 
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of this require-
ment. We agree and affirm its judgment. 
A third provision requires a partholgy report for 
each abortion performed. The Court of Appeals invalidated 
~a-~f..-.~ 
this requirement. We Gis~ ~a" ana ' reverse the judgment. 
Finally, a fourth provision requires the presence 
of a second physician;fauring abortions performed after the 
fetus has become viable. The role of the second physician 
is to preserve the life of the fetus - where this may be 
possible. 
f/sftcllcFT --- 2. The ,ourt of Appeals Revertfiele~s invalidated this ' 
p~ 
--? <J! As was made clear in Roe, /a fter viability of the 
fetus,/ the state has a compelling interest in preserving its 
life. We think the Court of Appeals erred in invalidating 
the second-physician requirement ;fand we reverse its judg-
ment. 
* * * 
The views of the Justices, however, have diverged 
(/)A-
considerably ~ the issues in this case. 
Parts III, IV, and V of my opinion were joined 
only by the Chief Justice. 
Justice Blackmun has filed an opinion concurring 
with respect to the hospital requirement ~but dissenting on 
the other three issues. His opinion is joined by Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. 
Justice O'Connor has filed an opinion dissenting 
from the judgment on the hospitalization issue ~but concur-
ring in the judgment on the other three issues.~ She is 
joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. 
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Anoth~l copy of page proof of 
NOTE shy abus as approved to will be released, as is 
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pared b~ ~eup, WhiCh has now tee of the reader. See 
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f'b :1- HENRY C. LIND 
Reporter of D ecisions. 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD A:s::;vv.~.ATION OF KANSAS 
CITY, MISSOURI, INC., ET AL. v. ASHCROFT, ATTOR-
NEY GENERAL OF MISSOURI, ET AL. 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
No. 81-1255. Argued November 30, 1982-Decided June 15, 1983 * 
Missouri statutes require abortions after 12 weeks of pregnancy to be per-
formed in a hospital(§ 188.025); require a pathology report for each abor-
tion performed (§ 188.047); require the presence of a second physician 
during abortions performed after viability(§ 188.030.3); and require mi-
nors to secure parental consent or consent from the juvenile court for an 
abortion (§ 188.028). In an action challenging the constitutionality of 
these provisions, the District Court invalidated all provisions except 
§ 188.047. The Court of Appeals reversed as to §§ 188.028 and 188.047 
but affirmed as to §§ 188.030.3 and 188.025. 
Held: Section 188.025 is unconstitutional, but §§ 188.047, 188.030.3, and 
188.028 are constitutional. 
--- 655 F. 2d 848, affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and re-
manded; 664 F. 2d 687, affirmed. 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to 
Parts I, II, and VI, concluding that the second-trimester hospitalization re-
quirement of§ 188.025 "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's constitu-
tional right to obtain an abortion." City of Akron v. Akron Center of Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, at--. Pp. 4--5. 
JUSTICE POWELL, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, concluded in Parts III, 
IV, and V that: 
*Together with No. 81-1623, Ashcroft, Attorney General of Missouri, 
et al. v. Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc ., 
et al., also on certiorari to the same court. 
11 PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 
Syllabus 
1. The second-physician requirement of § 188.030.3 is constitutional as 
reasonably furthering the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives 
of viable fetuses. Pp. 5-9. 
2. The pathology-report requirement of§ 188.047 is constitutional. On 
its face and in effect, such requirement is reasonably related to generally 
accepted medical standards and furthers important health-related state 
concerns. In light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examina-
tion can have, the small additional cost of such an examination does not sig-
nificantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. Pp. 9-14. 
3. Section 188.028 is constitutional. A State's interest in protecting im-
mature minors will sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either 
parental or judicial. And as interpreted by the Court of Appeals to mean 
that the juvenile court cannot deny a minor's application for consent to an 
abortion "for good cause" unless the court first finds that the minor was not 
mature enough to make her own decision, § 188.028 provides a judicial al-
ternative that is consistent with established legal standards. See City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at--. Pp. 
14-17. 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, joined by JUSTICE WHITE and JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST, concluded that: 
1. The second-physician requirement of§ 188.030.3 is constitutional be-
cause the State has a compelling interest, extant throughout pregnancy, in 
protecting and preserving fetal life. P. 2. 
2. The pathology-report requirement of § 188.047 is constitutional be-
cause it imposes no undue burden on the limited right to undergo an abor-
tion, and it~ validity is not contingent on the trimester of pregnancy in 
which it is imposed. P. 2. 
3. Assuming, arguendo, that the State cannot impose a parental veto on 
a minor's decision to undergo an abortion, the parental consent provision of 
§ 188.028.2 is constitutional because it imposes no undue burden on any 
right that a minor may have to undergo an abortion. P. 2. 
POWELL, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered the opinion 
of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, and VI, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and BRENNAN, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, and an 
opinion with respect to Parts III, IV, and V, in which BURGER, C. J., 
joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined. 
O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part in the judgment and dis-
senting in part, in which WHITE and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. 
81-1255# Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City, MO. v. 
Ashcroft {Jim) 
LFP for the Court 
1st draft 3/4/83 
2nd draft 6/7/83 
3rd draft 6/10/83 
Joined by CJ 
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HAB concurring in part and dissenting in part 
1st draft 5/17/83 
2nd draft 5/19/83 
3rd draft 5/23/83 
4th draft 6/10/83 
Joined by WJB, TM, JPS 
SOC concurring in part and dissenting in part 
1st draft 5/5/83 
2nd draft 6/13/83 
Joined by BRW, WHR 
But this is a recent change of policy by the ACOG and was not 
uncontroversial. See 4 Record 799-800. While the change was in 
part a judgment made after a cost-benefit analysis, it was also 
meant to encourage routine identification of fetal parts before the 
woman leaves the abortion facility: "Current clinical tenets 
recommend that the uterine contents be submitted for a pathologist' 
review; however, this approach does not place enough emphasis on the 
necessity for proper examination of the tissue at the time of the 
abortion procedur itself." Rubin, Fatal Ectopic Pregnancy After 
Attempted Legally Induced Abortion 4 (April 2, 1979) (presented 
annual EIS conference, U.S. Department 
Welfare, Public Health Service, Center 
Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). 
And "[t]he risk of ectopic pregnancy has been 
with increasing age, higher-order gravidity, black ~ 
races, and low socio-economic groups." Rubin, Fatal Ectopic 
Pregnancy After Attempted Legally Induced Abortion (April 2, 
1979) (paper presented at annual EIS conference, u.s. Department 
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Center 
~ for Disease Control) • An abortion followed by a pathology report 
f1 may be the one valua e opportunity a poor woman has to discover 
serious health problems, and she and the State both certainly 
have a strong and immediate interest in assuring that the 
abortion is performed properly. Without abortion procedures that 
conform to generally accepted medical standards, legalized 
abortion may not offer the poor many of the benefits that the Roe 
right was meant to fo~ter. 
~ ~The dissent suggests that §188.047 is infirm because it 
does not require microscopic examination, but that misses the 
point of the regulation, which is that someone other than the ~ 
~ performing clinic~wil~~~~e an independent medical judgmen~  
d ~k1 the tissue. See ri. 3, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a 
~ pathologist) · ¥ l~ok t Lt gLOssly .••• The 
Footnote continued on next page. 
1;:~~~~ 
/1J /1s the testimony in the Distr' t Courtm ~~a~~~e~s~c·J~eQar, medical opinion 
'-11 J/1.- /k.o {-
remai~ from unanimous on th-;i:s~~~~;;::L See 3 Record 623, 4 
1\ 
Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847. In this 
case, for example, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely experienced 
abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist 
examination after each of the 60,000 abortions performed under his 
direction at the New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. 
He considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's 
report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or 
for that matter from any other surgical procedure which involved the 
erence 1s I wouldn't just be saying that, I would be putting ~ 
down an official diagnosis and putting my name on it, which woul 
make me professionally liable for the accuracy of that 
inter retation." M_o_r_eoye.t:.,J it is reasonable for the State to 
ssume that an independent pathologist is much more likely to 
perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. 
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 {1981) {"To 
the pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and 
microscopically for the primary purpose of establishing a , ---
diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy."} {emphasis added) . - In any 
case, in changing its policy, the ACOG found that the policies of 
clinics varied as to the need for microscopic examinations: 
No consensus exists regarding routine microscopic \ 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case. The 
committee surveyed a representative sampling of 
institutions around the country. Information was 
received from experienced clinicians in 29 institutions 
in all regions of the country concerning their policies 
on the examination of presumed products of conception. 
Nearly two-fifths {38 percent) of the respondents made 
microscopic examination of the tissue discretionary, 
while slightly more than half {55 percent) stated that 
a microscopic examination was performed in all cases. 
ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 
{June 27-28, 1980). Thus, the dissent appears be critical of the 
State for not taking away all discretion of the clinic in sending 
tissue to a pathologist when it takes away some. 
6. 
removal of tissue from the human body." App. 143-144. See also 
App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges)~ 5 Record 798-799 (testimony 
of Dr. Schmidt). 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health 
and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's 
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that 
I~·~ 
State subordinate its interest in health to minimize ';t:;cost 
abortions.t ~Even in the early weeks of pregnancy, "[c~ertain 
regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's exercise 
of her right to decide to have an abortion may be permissible where 
justified by important state health objectives." City of Akron, 
ante, at 11. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 80-81. In light of the 
substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination can have, we 
think the small~~eAa~ cost of a tissue examination does not 
significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The 
estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, 
14/By disregarding the considered judgment of the Missouri 
legislature, the dissenting opinion seems to suggest that because 
some voices in the medical profession do not agree with the 
State's judgment that a pathologist's examination is necessary in 
all cases, the State's requirement is unconstitutional. Post, at 
2-3. But this Court has never suggested that a State's abortion 
regulations must conform in every detail to the recommendations 
of the ACOG or the National Abortion Federation. The medical 
profession is not the only guardian of the citizens' health. A 
State is obligated to protect its citizens against unethical 
practices, and for courts making difficult constitutional 
decisions in this area, a legislature's factfindings and reports 
can be a persuasive and helpful supplement to the medical 
community's views with respect to the need for and reasonableness 
of abortion regulations. 
n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unanimously' upheld Missouri's 
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in 
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource 
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and 
IS 
7. 
judgment," 428 U.S., at 81. We view the requirement for a pathology 
report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this 
point. 
RIDER A 
JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion would hold invalid the statute 
on the mere possibility that Missouri courts might not find any 
exception for emergency situations. Post, at 8-9. But as JUSTICE 
MARSHALL stated in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, U.S. (1983), 
"[w]e will not strain to reach a constitutional question by 
speculating that the [state] courts might in the future interpret" a 
statute is a questionable manner. Id., at __ (citing Ashwander v. 
TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
I JUSTICE BLACKMON's dissenting opinion would hold §188.030.3 
I I 
unconstitutionally overbroad because a fetus cannot survive a D&E 
abortion after viability. Post, at 6-7. It assumes that D&E is the 
"method of choice for some women who need post-viability abortions." 
6. The sole record support for this assumption appears to 
be the testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician called by 
See 2 Record 427, 438. This method G~£taiHly may be 
the choice for those who select Dr. Crist as their physician. He 
indicated that, "as a general principle," "[t]here should not be a 
live fetus," id., at 435, and "that the abortion patient has a right 
not only to be rid of the growth, called a 
also has a right to a dead fetus," id., at 
could survive a D&E abortion, id., at 433. 
fetus in her body, but 
-/...e-~tf 
431--even though~ one 
None of the other 
witnesses at trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and 
defendants, indicated~ use of D&E late in a pregnancy after 
viability. See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 
2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; 
would never perform D&E after 26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost 
"inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest 
up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 
weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to 
childbirth at 24 weeks); 8 Record 33, 78-81 (Dr. Willard Cates) (16 
weeks latest D&E performed). There ~~physicians with 
1\ 
Dr. Crist's expressed total disinterest in preserving fetal life, 
2. 
and who perform third-trimester abortions with no regard to the 
State's compelling interest in preserving fetal life when this is 
possible without endangering the health of the mother. Yet, the 
dissent's overbreadth argument, based primarily on Dr. Crist's 
views, is without other support in the record. 
As all third-trimester abortions are subject to the 
requirements of §188.030.2, D&E should not be used when the fetus is 
viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and 
when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to the 
woman's life or health. The dissent points to nothing in the 
~f-~~~ 
reco::_dt however, ~-4-ntiiaate ehet D&E will ever be the method that 
poses the least risk to the woman in situations where there are 
compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after 
viability. It appears therefore that the premise of the dissent's 
factual assumption that D&E is the method of choice in the third 
trimester has no basis in the record. Nor does the dissent identify 
medical literature that supports this assumption. Cf. American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin 
No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate 
for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to 
20 weeks); App. 79-80. The dissenters thus point to no support for 
their assumption that "maternal health considerations will preclude 
the use of procedures that might result in a live birth" after 
viability. Post, at 6. 
RIDER B 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of 
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall 
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by 
arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed 
in hospitals or in some other facility, §188.047 requires the 
pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State 
Division of Health •••• " Seen. 2, supra. The pathologist also is 
required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility 
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced." Thus, 
Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well 
as almost all other surgeries performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination 
by the performing doctor. The narrow question before us is whether 
the State also may require the tissue removed following an abortion 
performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be submitted to a 
pathologist. We believe that it can. 
On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important 
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12. As the 
Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly 
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in 
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders." 655 
F.2d, at 870. U) As rule, it is good medical practice to submit all 
tissue to the examination of a pathologist. Z
11
This is particularly 
important following abortion, because questions remain as to the 
2. 
long-range complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent 
pregnancies. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.)~ 
Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent 
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology 
101A pathological examination is designed to assist in the 
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or 
other precancerous growths, and a variety of other problems that 
can be discovered only through a pathological examination. The 
general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. 
See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 
1982)~ National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion 
Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards 
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing)~ 
Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae 
in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF 
standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting 
"minimum standards"). 
I/ ~ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's 
trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" 
should examine "all tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic 
operations." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 
13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG standards also state as a 
general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a 
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 
1982). The dissent, however, relies on the recent modification 
of these standards as they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides 
an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a 
pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue 
permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change in policy was 
controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. ACOG 
found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it 
recognized--on the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions--
that in a majority of them a microscopic examination is performed 
in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, 
Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980). 
3. 
reports, in concert with abortion complication reports, provide a 
statistical basis for studying those complications. Cf. Planned 
Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion is 
as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination~ This 
~~~ ... ;.~~ ... 
argument 4.-qno.~s the fact that Missouri requires a pathologist--not 
J 
the performing physician--to examine . tissue after almost every type 
of surgery. Although this requirement is in a provision relating to 
surgical procedures in hospitals, many of the same procedures 
included within the Missouri statute customarily are performed also 
in outpatient clinics. No reason has been suggested why the 
prudence required in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in 
such a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose stricter 
I I 
standard" on 
.I ~ ;;.1 - 12. 
clinics performing abortions than on hospitals.t As 
' ' A-A-..J-a I I I (i ~~~ 
J.Z. iThe professional views that the ~laintiffs find to ('~,,.,~ . 
support their position do not disclose whether consider a tion was 
given to the fact that there has been measure of serious abuse 
in some abortion clinics. It is lclear 1 that a State reasonably . 
could conclude that a pathology ~equirement is more net essary in , 
~ , ti.e.M:: clinics than in gener 41 hospi tals;:-part-icularly with ; ----. 
/~ .~ ·r~~ t~ abortions. There is ,~ant evidence tha t abortion 
1 
~ ~ has been a surgical procedure associated with a ~~incidence of 
questionable practices. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 
641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to 
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics)~ Planned Parenthood 
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-Times of Chicago, in a series 
of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices 
in abortion clinics, including the failure to obtain proper 
pathology reports. ~ See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago Sun-
Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). 
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" 
the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the 
additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests 
that we disregard the interests of the "woman on welfare or the 
unemployed teenager. •• Post, at 4. But these women may be ~ 
most likely to seek the least expensive clinic available. ~·~ CJ 
Footnote continued on next page. 
1"''11. 
4. 
the testimony in the District Court indicates, medical opinion is 
not unanimous on this question. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 
II 
798-800, 845-847; n. J , supra. But there is substantial support for 
Missouri's requirement. In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard 
Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testified 
that he requires a pathologist examination after each of the 60,000 
abortions performed under his direction at the New York Center for 
Reproductive and Sexual Health. He considers it "absolutely 
necessary to obtain a pathologist's report on each and every 
specimen of tissue removed for abortion or for that matter from any 
other surgical procedure which involved the removal of tissue from 
the human body." App. 143-144. See also App. 146-147 (testimony of 
Dr. Keitges}; 5 Record 798-799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt}. l
13 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health 
"[t]he risk of ectopic pregnancy has been associated with l 
increasing age, higher-order gravidity, black races, and low 
socio-economic groups." Rubin, Fatal Ectopic Pregnancy After 
Attempted Legally Induced Abortion (April 2, 1979} (paper 
presented at annual EIS conference, U.S. Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, Center for Disease 
Control}. s the standards of medical practice in such clinics 
may not be the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a 
pathologist's examination of tissue is particularly important. 
13 ~The dissent suggests that §188.047 is infirm because it 
does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that 
misses the point of the regulation, which is that someone other 
than the performing clinic should make an independent medical 
judgment on the tissue. See n !~j , supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. 
Pierre Keitges, a pathologist}. It is reasonable for the State 
to assume that an independent pathologist is ~ more likely to ~ 
perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. 
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981} ("To 
the pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and 
microscopically for the primary purpose of establishing a 
diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy."} (emphasis added}. 
5. 
and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's 
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that a 
State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent 
the cost of abor~ven in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the 
woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an abortion may be 
permissible where justified by important state health objectives." 
City of Akron, ante, at 11. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 80-81. In 
light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination 
can have, we think the cost of a tissue examination does not 
significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The 
estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, 
n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unani~ously upheld Missouri's 
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in 
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource 
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and 
---~th cons.ide-red judgment of the Missour · 
legislature, lEhe dissenting opinion seems to suggest that cause 
some voices in the medical profession do not agree with e 
State's judgment that a pathologist's examination i ecessary in 
all cases, the State's requirement is unconstit 'onal. Post, at 
2-3. But this Court has never suggested th a State's abortion 
regulations must conform in every deta' o the recommendations 
of the ACOG or the National Aborti ederation. The medical 
rofession is not the only gua an of the citizens' health. A 
tate is obligated to pro its citizens against unethical 
practices, and for c s making difficult constitutional 
decisions in thi rea, a legislature's factfindings and reports 
can be a p~ asive and helpful supplement to the medical 
communi s views with respect to the need for and reasonableness 
of rtion regulations. 
~ k- Uk~~. w~~~ 
H-tt> ~ ~~/9-C{J~ ~NA-P (..cA./~ 




judgment," 428 U.S., at 81. We view the reqriirement for a pathology 
report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. 




lfp/ss 06/04/83 Ashcroft Alternative Language Rider AA 
ASHALT SALLY-POW 
There is agreement that no fetus can survive a D&E. Thus, 
as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this 
procedure after viability is subject to the requirements 
of §188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. The courts 
below, in conclusory language, found that D&E is the 
"method of choice for some women who need post-viability 
abortions". Post, at 6. No scholarly writing supporting 
this view is cited by those courts or by the dissent. 
Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testimony of 
Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas. His testimony, 
t.-1.4 ~c.~ 
if nothing else, is remarkable. He is a member of the 
/\. 
National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion 
providers and people interested in the pro-choice 
2. 
movement". Record, 415-416. He supported the use of D&E 
on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In 
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure 
than other methods. See 2 Record 427-428. His 
disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his 
agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only 
to be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but 
also has a right to a dead fetus". Id., at 431. He also 
agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to 
protect the fetus, if it can be saved", id., and finally 
that "as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a 
live fetus", Id., at 435. Moreover, contrary to every 
other view, he thought a fetus could survive a D&E 
abortion, id., at 433-434. None of the other physicians 
who testified at the trial, those called both by the 
. . -·· 
3. 
plaintiffs and defendants, considered that~ use of D&E 
after viability was indicated • 
7. The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting 
opinion agrees, post, at 6-7, that here is no ~e€ie~ justifica-
, §188.030.3 is overbroad. 
I ~,1
} =d, u:.: 865. Accordingly, for 
f' bility is subject to the requirements of §188.030.2. See id., at 
I 1 9;-~~~~499-G -
865, and n. 28. L!Hus, ~ is ne~ ~ be USQdAwhen the fetus is via-
ble; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and 
when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to the 
~
woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (seme physicians testified 
-- 1\ 
they would not use D&E in third trimester); American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E 
less than or similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 
weeks); App. 79-80. 
The sole record support for the lO\ier ~u-rts' findings "'that D& 
is the "method of choice for some women who need post-viability 
abortions," post, at 6, appears to be the testimony of Dr. Robert 
Crist, a physician called by plaintiffs and a member of the National 
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and peo-
ple interested in the pro-choice movement," Record 415-416. Dr. 
Crist ceneieered---4 t gees mee~e~.J.- pr~~~~ ~on a 28-week 
""' 
pregnancy and in some circumstances considered it a better procedure 
than other methods. See 2 Record 427-428. But he also was of the 
2. 
philosophy "that the abortion patient has a tight not only to be 
of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right t a 
dead fetus,• id., at 431, that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention o~ 
trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," id., and that, 'as 
a general principle," "[t]here should not be a live fetus," id., t 
435--even though _he thought a fetus could survive a D&E abortion, 
id., at 433-434. None of the other witnesses at trial, those cal ed 
both by the plaintiffs and defendants, indicated~ use of D&E 
~r viability. J See 1 Record 21 (lim~ing use of D&E to- under 18 
weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 
weeks; would never perform D&E after 26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost 
"inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest 
up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 
weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to 
childbirth at 24 weeks); 8 Record 33, 78-81 (Dr. Willard Cates) (16 
----------
weeks latest D&E performed). As all thfrd=trl mester abortions are 
the requirements of both 
be used in Missouri when 
§188.030.1 and §l8~tl.2, D&E 
the fetus is vja~e; when other 
are more likely to preserve its life; when alternative pro-
do not pose a greater risk to the woman's life or health; 
and when the abortion is not necessary to preserve the 
-M-1,.1 ~ 




enough to show that D&E ~imes· the method of choice , ~ ~ 
hat no fetus-. wi1.-l survive a o-&:s-a.oort-:ion. ~ecause Dr. Crist appar 
ntly perfor ed all his abortions in Kansas / 2 Record 334, 368, 42 , 
~ ~ ~lr"L 7' 
hich does not hav~ a statute similar ~ §188.030.1 and §188.030.2 
because he did not make clear that the D&E abortions he had pe -
.. _ If _ / .. ..J--






emergency s1tuations, there 1 
evidence that D&E will ever be the method that poses the 
least risk to the woman in those rare situations where there are 
3. 
compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after viabi i-
~--~~-y. Moreover, even if there are such instances, it is not at all 
clear that they would justify invalidating §188.030.3.~The Distr ct 
Court also relied on the testimony of Dr. Schmidt~ ~t Afis testim 
~ ccJ1'ia._w 
is enlightening on the relevance of aftY finding that a D&E aborti 
'llb . . ~~~. w1 e necessar 1n : 
Q. Is there any reason that you can give us for the at-
tendance of a second physician for an abortion on a viable 
fetus by method of D&E. 
A. No. 
Q. There is no possibility of survival, is there? 
A. No. Mr. Susman, can I add to that just a moment? 
Q. Certainly. 
A. To get that in focus, to me this is not a practical 
point. I simply do not believe that the question of via-
bility comes up when D&E is an elected method of abortion. 
Because, again, we are talking about well along in second 
t:_rimes : er, not early trimest;..er. (' ~~4<* •2 ·~•t) 
Q. Doctor, there has been prior testimony of D&E being 
performed at those stages when contraindication exists for 
the other alternatives. 
A. Well, okay. There very well may be, but I personally 
cannot conceive a significant practical po i nt. - It 
may e 1mportant legally, u from a med1ca stan point, 
that doesn't bother me. (~.,.;~-~e.d ) 
,___ /.1.~ -~--- -
Recor9- S36-~1. G~n-~eorr~radtctory evidence, the State's 
1\ 
protecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physic' 
requirement even though there may be the rare case where a doctor 
may think honestly that D&E is required for the mother's health. 
Legislation n~e-~not~mm~~very conceivable contingency. 
 
I ' '! (~ 
RIDER B 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of 
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall 
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by 
arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed 
in hospitals or in some other facilit~§l88.047 requires the ~~ 
pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State 
Division of Health ...• " Seen. 2, supra. The pathologist also is 
required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility 
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced." Thus, 
Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well 
as~ all other surger~ performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination 
by the performing doctor. The narrow question before us is whether 
the Stat~a~~·~~ require the tissue removed following an abortion 
performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be submitted to a 
pathologist. We believe that it can. 
On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important 
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12. As the 
Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly 
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in 
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders." 655 
..... 
10 
F 2d t 87o. t. • ' a As rule, it is good medical practice to submit all 
" tissue to the examination of a pathologist.t 11 This is particularly 
important following abortion, because questions remain as to the 
2. 
long-range complications Gf aeortioft~ and their effect on subsequent 
pregnancies. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); 
Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent 
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology 
10 
t A pathological examination is designed to assist in the 
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or 
other precancerous growths, and a variety of other problems that 
can be discovered only through a pathological examination. The 
general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. 
See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
• (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 
1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion 
Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards 
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing); 
Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae 
in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF 
standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting 
"minimum standards"). 
lit 
ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's 
trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" 
should examine "all tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic 
operations." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 
13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG standards also state as a 
general rule that, for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a 
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 
1982). The dissent, however, relies on the recent modification 
of these standards as they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides 
an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a 
pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue 
permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change in policy was 
controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. ACOG 
found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it 
recognized--on the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions--
that in a majority of them a microscopic examination is performed 
in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, 
Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980). 
3. 
reports, in e a 
statistical 




not the perfoJ ~ry 
type of surge1 _ ~ ... vv.J.::il.On 
relating to surg1cal procedures in hospitals, many of the same 
procedures included within the Missouri statute customarily are 
performed also in outpatient clinics. No reason has been suggested 
why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally 
appropriate in such a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to 
impose stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing 
'1. abortions than on hospitals.i As the testimony in the District 
/J.. )~~J / 
laintiffs find t-64 
whether consideration 
e~QQ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-a~~~~~~~ee~~~~~~~eo~­
wi-tb a~ d..e.r.We :i-nQ..id"DCQ....O~\:IQs.ti-o.;}a-bl:e pr-aeticQ&;,. See 
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979} (Bellotti II} 
(minors may resort to "incompetent or unethical" abortion 
clinics}; Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 
52, 91, n. 2 (1976} (Stewart, J., concurring}. The Sun-Times of 
Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread 
questionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including 
the failure to obtain proper pathology reports. See "The 
Abortion Pro~i t ers," Chicago Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 
1978}. ~ 
In sugges ing that we make from a "comfortable perspective" 
the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the 
additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests 
that we disregard the interests of the "woman on welfare or the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
Court indicates, medical opinion is not unanimous on this question. 
See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847; n. 2, supra. 
But there is substantial support for Missouri's requirement. In 
this case, for example, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely experienced 
abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist 
examination after each of the 60,000 abortions performed under his 
direction at the New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. 
He considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's 
report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or 
for that matter from any other surgical procedure which involved the 
removal of tissue from the human body." App. 143-144. See also 
App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges); 5 Record 798-799 (testimony 
of Dr. Schmidt) .1 13 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health 
and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's 
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that a 
unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But these women may be those 
most likely to seek the least expensive clinic available. As the 
standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be the 
highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's 
examination of tissue is particularly important. 
13 ~k..~~~ 
:!The dissent suggests that §188. 04 7 is ~infirm because it I 
does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that _ ~ 
misses the point of the regulatiop~ w~ is tbatj someone other 
than the performing clinic 9A9Yld~ake an indepen ent medical ~~ 
judgment on the tissue. See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. u--
Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is reasonable for the State 
to assume that an independent pathologist is more likely to 
perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. 
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To 
the pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and 
microscopically for the primary purpose of establishing a ---
diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added). 
'. 
5. 
State subordinate its interest in health to minimize to this extent 
the cost of abortions. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the 
woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an abortion may be 
permissible where justified by important state health objectives." 
City of Akron, ante, at 11. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 80-81. In 
light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination 
can have, we think the cost of a tissue examination does not 
significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The 
estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, 
n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's 
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in 
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource 
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and 
•4 
judgment," 428 U.S., at 81. We view the requirement for a pathology 
report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this 
issue. 
February 1, 1983 
ASHl GINA-POW 
Rider A page 9 
In Roe the Court recognized as compelling the 
interest of a state in the life of a viable fetus: " ... the 
state in promoting its interest in the potentiality of 
human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even 
proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in 
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the 
1 i fe or health of the mother." Roe at 16 5. Several of 
Missouri's statutes undertake this regulation. Post 
viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary 
to preserve the life or the health of the mother. Mo. 
Rev. Stat. §188.030.1. The state also forbids the use of 
procedures fatal to the viable fetus unless alternative 
procedures pose a greater risk to the health of the 
mother. See~' §188.030.2. The statute at issue here 
is §188.030.3 that requires the attendance of a second 
physician at the abortion of a viable fetus. The Court of 
Appeals invalidated this requirement, agreeing with the 
District Court. 
The plaintiffs (respondents here on this issue) urge 




that this second-physician requirement is an aberration of 
the traditional doctor-patient r ela t ionsh ip, and is 
impractical, unnecessary, burdensome and costly. No other 
Missouri statute requires two physicians in attendance for 
any other medical or surgical procedure, including child 
birth or delivery of a premature infant. These are not 
insubstantial arguments, and we view the issue as a close 
one. 
Our cases repeatedly have held, however, that the 
state's interest in the potential life of a fetus is 
compelling. It therefore has substantial discretion in 
the type of regulations it may adopt with respect to 
abortions that are permissible after viability. See Beale 
v . Do 1 e , 4 3 2 U . S • 4 3 8 , 4 4 5-4 4 6 ( 19 7 7) ; Roe v . Wade , 410 
U.S. 113, 165 (1973). The fetus is uniquely vulnerable at 
this stage, and as recognized in Roe the abortion decision 
no longer is solely one to be made between the mother and 
her physician. Roe 410 u.s. at 166. 
Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician 
"shall take control of and provide immediate medical care 
for a child born as a result of the abortion". Moreover, 
the statute requires that ths physician "be in attendance" 
during the abortion and "take all reasonable steps in 
3. 
keeping with good medical practice to preserve the 
life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that 
it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health 
of the woman". Section 188.030.3. Seen. 4 supra. It is 
clear from these provisions that Missouri has made a 
judgment that there are some physicians primarily 
interested in performing abortions when desired by the 
woman, and that there may be tension between this interest 
and the state interest in protecting the potential life of 
an unborn child. * 
* It is a matter of common knowledge that over the past 
decade numerous physicians have specialized in abortion 
practice, and clines solely devoted to this practice have 
been opened in cities across our country. As evidenced by 
the description of the type of clinic before the Court in 
Bellotti I (citation), some of these clinics fairly may be 
described as "abortion mills" in which a woman's demand 
often is honored with little or no counseling. Moreover, 
many such clinics lack facilities adequate to deal with 
the problems and risks attended upon abortions when there 
may be close questions as to viability. (Jim: If you and 
Mark think this is a proper and useful no~we should add 
a cross-reference to the footnote in S imopoulos on the 
Boston-type clinic). 
4. 
All of the expert testimony at trial, both by 
witnesses called by the plaintiffs and the defendants 
(with one exception)**, agreed that the use of the 
dilation and evaucation procedure (D & E) after viability 
is usually fatal to the fetus. The presence of a second 
physician could be a safeguard against the unproper use of 
this procedure. 
** The one exception was the testimony of Dr. Robert 
Crist. Although his testimony is not entirely 
unambigious, it can be read as approving the use of the D 
& E procedure at times close to if not after viability. 
He also expressed the belief that honoring the wishes of 
the woman may be more important than protecting the 
potential life of a unborn child. (Jim: The AG of 
Missouri suggests this - see p. 41. We should, of course, 
check exactly what Dr. Crist said and my guess is this 
will require some revision of what I have just dictated, 
if not its omission). 
5. 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument relied on by the 
plaintiffs is that the presence of a second physician is 
not required for any other medical or surgical procedure, 
including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. 
The answer given by the state to this argument, in effect, 
is that abortion are unique. In other situations the 
patient's primary interst is in preserving his or her own 
health. Exception to this, of course, are childbirth and 
where an infant must be delivered prematurely. Yet, in 
these situations, the mother and physician are essentially 
of one mind. Having carried the fetus to the time of 
delivery, the mother ardently desires that it be born 
safely and healthy. She also naturally hopes to survive 
herself in good health. Thus, there rarely if ever is a 
conflict of interests between the principal actors. The 
situation is different with respect to the woman who on 
her own initiative seeks an abortion. This is a surgical 
procedure she may desire for no health reason and solely 
to avoid childbirth To be sure, if told that the fetus 
is or may be viable, this may determine many mothers who 
otherwise would like to have an abortion. But it does not 
deter all mothers and the state's assumption that some 
physicians will accord primacy to the wishes of the woman 
r' 
6. 
cannot be viewed as unreasonable. After all, the states 
interest is compelling and this necessarily supports the 
right of a state to impose some burdens on the woman's 
choice following v iabi 1 i ty of the fetus. We therefore 
believe the second physician requirement "has both logical 
and biological justifications," id. at 163, and bears a 
reasonable relationship to the state interest. We reverse 
the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
, .. 
RIDER A 
7. The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting 
opinion agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justifica-
tion for a second-physician requirement whenever D&E is used because 
no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 
655 F.2d, at 865. Accordingly, for them, §188.030.3 is overbroad. 
There is agreement that a fetus generally cannot survive a D&E abor-
tion. But as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this proce-
dure after viability is subject to the requirements of §188.030.2. 
See id., at 865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in 
conclusory language, found that D&E is the "method of choice for 
some women who need post-viability abortions." Post, at 6. No 
scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by those courts or 
by the dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testi-
mony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas. His testimony, 
if nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the 
National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers 
and people interested in the pro-choice movement." 2 Record 415-
416. He supported the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into 
the third trimester. In some circumstances, he considered it a bet-
ter procedure than other methods. See 2 Record 427-428. His disin-
terest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agreement "that 
the abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of the growth, 
called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a dead fetus." 
Id., at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of 




that "as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus," 
id., at 435. Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a 
fetus could survive a D&E abortion. Id., at 433-434. None of the 
other physicians who testified at the trial, those called both by 
the plaintiffs and defendants, considered that~ use of D&E after 
viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E to 
under 18 weeks): 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E 
up to 17 weeks: would never perform D&E after 26 weeks): 4 Record 
787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability): 7 Record 52 
(D&E safest up to 18 weeks): id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E 
past 20 weeks): id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equiva-
lent to childbirth at 24 weeks): 8 Record 33, 78-81 (Dr. Willard 
Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently Dr. Crist prac-
ticed only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a state having no 
statutes comparable to §188.030.1 and §188.030.2. It is not clear 
whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations im-
posed by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when 
there were "contraindications" against the use of any of the proce-
dures that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory opin-
ion was limited to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record 
evidence that D&E ever will be the method that poses the least risk 
to the woman in those rare situations where there are compelling 
medical reasons for performing an abortion after viability. If 
there were such instances, they hardly would justify invalidating 
§188.030.3. 
~ ~. ,, 
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in a footnote, the District 
Court cited--with no elaboration--or. Schmidt. His testimony, re-
fleeting no agreement with Dr. Crist, is enlightening. 
Q. Is there any reason that you can give us for the at-
tendance of a second physician for an abortion on a viable 
fetus by method of D&E. 
A. No. 
Q. There is no possibility of survival, is there? 
A. No. Mr. Susman, can I add to that just a moment? 
Q. Certainly. 
A. To get that in focus, to me this is not a practical 
point. I simply do not believe that the question of via-
bility comes up when D&E is an elected method of abortion. 
Because, again, we are talking about well along in second 
trimester, not early trimester. 
Q. Doctor, there has been prior testimony of D&E being 
performed at those stages when contraindication exists for 
the other alternatives. 
A. Well, okay. There very well may be, but I personally 
cannot conceive that as a significant practical point. It 
may be important legally, but from a medical standpoint, 
that doesn't bother me. 
3. 
d.:o~ 
4 Record 836-837 (emphasis added). Given that Dr. Crist's sohisma~ 
~ testimony is wholly unsupported, the State's compelling interest 
in protecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physician require-
ment even though there may be the rare case when a physician may 
think honestly that D&E is required for the mother's health. Legis-




The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an 
open one, and adhere to the views that they expressed in Bellotti 
II. Post, at 10-11. But those views have never been adopted by a 
majority of this Court, while a majority have expressed quite 
differing views. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981}: 
Bellotti II, 443 u.s. 622 (plurality opinion}. 
'·' 
RIDER B 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of 
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall 
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by 
arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-
20.030{3){A)7 {1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed 
in hospitals or in some other facility, §188.047 requires the 
pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State 
Division of Health ..•• " Seen. 2, supra. The pathologist also is 
required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility 
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced." Thus, 
Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well 
as from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination 
by the performing doctor. The narrow question before us is whether 
the State lawfully also may require the tissue removed following an 
abortion performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be 
submitted to a pathologist. We believe that it can. 
On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important 
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12. As the 
Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly 
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in 
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders." 655 
' } ~ 
2. 
ao 
F 2d t 870.1 • ' a As a rule, it is good medical practice to submit all 
II 
tissue to the examination of a pathologist.! This is particularly 
important following abortion, because questions remain as to the 
long-range complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. 
See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.)~ Levin, et al., 
Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 
J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert 
!0 
~ pathological examination is designed to assist in the 
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or 
other precancerous growths, and a variety of other problems that 
can be discovered only through a pathological examination. The 
general medical utility of pathological examinations is clear. 
See, e. g., American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
(ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 
1982) ~ National Abortion Federation (NAF), National Abortion 
Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards 
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing)~ 
Brief of the American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae 
in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF 
standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting 
"minimum standards"). 
11 7ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's 
trial recommended that a "tissue or operative review committee" 
should examine "all tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic 
operations." ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 
13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG standards also state as a 
general rule that, for . all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a 
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 
1982). The dissent, however, relies on the recent modification 
of these standards as they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides 
an "exception to the practice" of mandatory examination by a 
pathologist and makes such examination for abortion tissue 
permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change in policy was 
controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. ACOG 
found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it 
recognized--on the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions--
that in a majority of them a microscopic examination is performed 
in all cases. ACOG, Report of Committee on Gynecologic Practice, 
Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980). 
3. 
with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for 
studying those complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion is 
as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination. This 
argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a pathologist--
not the performing physician--to examine tissue after almost every 
type of surgery. Although this requirement is in a provision 
relating to surgical procedures in hospitals, many of the same 
procedures included within the Missouri statute customarily are 
performed also in outpatient clinics. No reason has been suggested 
why the prudence required in a hospital should not be equally 
appropriate in such a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to 
impose stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing 
abortions than on hospitals.1 1 ~As the testimony in the District 
12. 
)The professional views that the plaintiffs find to 
support their position do not disclose whether consideration was 
given to the fact that not all abortion clinics, particularly 
inadequately regulated clinics, conform to ethical or generally 
accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 
641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to 
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood 
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-Times of Chicago, in a series 
of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices 
in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to obtain 
proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago 
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, 
that a State reasonably could conclude that a pathology 
requirement is necessary in abortion clinics as well as in 
general hospitals. 
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" 
the judgment that a State constitutionally can require the 
additional cost of a pathology examination, the dissent suggests 
that we disregard the interests of the "woman on welfare or the 
unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But these women may be those 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
Court indicates, medical opinion is not unanimous on this question. 
See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847; n. 2, supra. 
But there is substantial support for Missouri's requirement. In 
this case, for example, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely experienced 
abortion practitioner, testified that he requires a pathologist 
examination after each of the 60,000 abortions performed under his 
direction at the New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. 
He considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's 
report on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abortion or 
for that matter from any other surgical procedure which involved the 
removal of tissue from the human body." App. 143-144. See also 
App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges); 5 Record 798-799 (testimony 
of Dr. Schmidt) .1 13 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's health 
and the comparatively small additional cost of a pathologist's 
examination, we cannot say that the Constitution requires that a 
most likely to seek the least expensive clinic available. As the 
standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be the 
highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's 
examination of tissue is particularly important. 
~ 
~The dissent appears to suggest that §188.047 is 
constitutionally infirm because it does not require microscopic 
examination, post, at 4, but that misses the point of the 
regulation. The need is for someone other than the performing 
clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue. 
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a 
pathologist) • It is reasonable for the State to assume that an 
independent pathologist is more likely to perform a microscopic 
examination than the performing doctor. See H. Cove, Surgical 
Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the pathologist, 
abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically 
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of 
intrauterine pregnancy.") (emphasis added). 
5. 
State subordinate its interest in health to · minimize to this extent 
the cost of abortions. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the 
woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an abortion may be 
permissible where justified by important state health objectives." 
City of Akron, ante, at 11. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 80-81. In 
light of the substantial benefits that a pathologist's examination 
can have, we think the cost of a tissue examination does not 
significantly burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The 
estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, 
n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's 
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest in 
protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a resource 
that is relevant to decisions involving medical experience and 
.~ 
judgment," 428 u.s., at 81. We view the requirement for a pathology 
report as comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this 
issue. 
f 
lfp/ss 05/30/83 Ashcroft Footnote B 
ASHFNB SALLY-POW 
The dissenting opinion relies on medical opinion 
that does not agree with the state's judgment that 
examination by a pathologist is necessary following almost 
all surgical procedures. Medical opinion, however, is far 
from being unanimous on this question. Moreover, the 
professional views expressed do not disclose whether 
consideration was given to the fact that there has been a 
measure of serious abuse in some abortion clinics. See n. 
, supra. In this case, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely 
experienced abortion practitioner, testified that he 
requires a pathologist examination after each of the 
60,000 abortions performed under his directionat the New 
York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He 
2 0 
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a 
pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue 
removed for abortion or for that matter from any other 
surgical procedure which involved the removal of tissue 
from the human body". App. 143-144. See also App. 146-
147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges): 5 Record 798-799 
(testimony of Schmidt). In weighing the balance between 
protection of a woman's health and the comparatively small 
additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot 
say that the Constitution requires that a state 
subordinate its interest in health to minimize the cost of 
abortions. The evidence in this case indicates charges 
for first-trimester abortions range from ______ to ______ , 
whereas the additional cost for the health protective 
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lfp/ss 05/30/83 Ashcroft - Footnote A 
ASHFNA SALLY-POW 
The dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun would 
hold that the Missouri requirement for a pathology 
examination is a burden on the woman's right of 
constitutional proportions. It argues that the physician 
performing the abortion is as qualified as a pathologist 
to make the examination. The dissent, in advancing this 
argument, ignores the fact that Missouri requires a 
pathologist - not the performing physician - to examine 
tissue after almost every type of surgery. Although the 
this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical 
procedures in hospitals, many of the same procedures 
included within the Missouri statute customarily are 
performed also in outpatient clinics. No reason has been 
2. 
suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should 
not be equally appropriate in such a clinic. 
Inddd, a state reasonably could conclude that 
this health precaution is more necessary in outpatient 
clinics than in general hospitals - particularly with 
respect to abortions. There is abundant evidence that 
abortion has been a surgical procedure associated with a 
high incidence of questionable practices. See Bellotti 
II, 443 U.S., at 641, n. 21 (minors may resort to 
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Danforth, 
428 U.S., at 91, n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-
Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports, 
disclosed widespread questionable practices, in abortion 
clinics, including the failure to obtain proper pathology 
reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers", Chicago Sun-Times 
. ' 
' ,, . 
3. 
{Special Reprint 1978). The additional cost of a 
pathology examination, modest compared to other medical 
charges {see, e.g., Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, at 
______ ), is justified by the state's interest in 
protecting the health of the mother. 
f ..• 
lfp/ss 05/30/83 Ashcroft - Footnote A 
ASHFNA SALLY-POW 
The dissenting opinion by Justice Blackmun would 
hold that the Missouri requirement for a pathology 
examination is a burden on the woman's right of 
constitutional proportions. It argues that the physician 
performing the abortion is as qualified as a pathologist 
to make the examination. The dissent, in advancing this 
argument, ignores the fact that Missouri requires a 
pathologist - not the performing physician - to examine 
tissue after almost every type of surgery. Although the 
this requirement is in a provision relating to surgical 
procedures in hospitals, many of the same procedures 
included within the Missouri statute customarily are 





suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should 
not be equally appropriate in such a clinic • 
..uuJ._ l 
Indae, a state reasonably could conclude that 
" 
this health precaution is more necessary in outpatient 
clinics than in general hospitals - particularly with 
respect to abortions. There is abundant evidence that 
abortion has been a surgical procedure associated with a 
high incidence of questionable practices. See Bellotti 
II, 443 u.s., at 641, n. 21 {minors may resort to 
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Danforth, 
428 U.S., at 91, n. 2 {Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-
Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports, 
disclosed widespread questionable practices, in abortion 
clinics, including the failure to obtain proper pathology 
reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers", Chicago Sun-Times 
3. 
(Special Reprint 1978). The additional cost of a 
pathology examination, modest compared to other medical 
charges (see, e.g., Simopoulos v. Commonwealth, at 
______ ), is justified by the state's interest in 
protecting the health of the mother. 
lfp/ss 05/28/83 Rider A, p. 8 {Ashcroft} 
ASH8 SALLY-POW 
"[a]ll tissue surgically 
removed, with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, 
adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall be examined by 
. 'I 
a pathologist, either on the premises or by arrangement 
outside of the hospital". 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
20.030{3} {A}7 {1977}. With respect to 
requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue 
report with the State Division of Health, " See, n. 2, 
supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a 
copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in 
which the abortion was performed or induced". 
The questio~- is whether the foregoing ~\o~'\ 
l~-~u ~ ~ <.i) 1 requirementJ i unconstitutionally burdenk a woman's abortion 
'd, 
decision. We hold that ~ d~not. H i~eac= 
i~quired in 
its filing is 
2. 
required only for abortions this routine act would hardly 
) 
assume unconstitutional proportions. Even in the early 
weeks of pregnancy "[c]ertain requirements that have no 
significant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to 
decide to have an abortion may be permissible where 
\\ 
justified by important state health objectives. City of 
I\ 
Akron, ante, at 11. See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80-81 (1976). We think it clear 
that the additional requirement that the pathologist's 
report be filed can have "no significant impact" on the 
woman's right. Or, putting it differently, the abortion 
decision is not unconstitutionally burdened. 
!I •, 
lfp/ss 06/02/83 Rider A, p. {Ashcroft) 
ASHA SALLY-POW 
Note to Jim: 
Although I would deemphasize and remove from the 
text the change of opinion by ACOG, we should recognize -
preferably in a note - that the dissent relies on the 
recent modification of its standards, providing that a 
pathological examination is a permissive rather than a 
mandatory safeguard. The ACOG found that no "consensus 
exists regarding routine microscopic examination of 
aspirated tissue in every case", though it recognized- on 
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions that in a 
majority of them a microscopic examinatio;ts performed in 
all cases. {citation) 
lfp/ss 06/04/83 Ashcroft Alternative Language Rider A 
ASHALT SALLY-POW 
There is agreement that no fetus can survive a D&E. Thus, 
as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this 
procedure after viability is subject to the requirements 
of §188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. The courts 
below, in conclusory language, found that D&E is the 
"method of choice for some women who need post-viability 
abortions". Post, at 6. No scholarly writing supporting 
this view is cited by those courts or by the dissent. 
Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testimony of 
Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas. His testimony, 
if nothing else, is remarkable. He is a member of the 
National Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion 
providers and people interested in the pro-choice 
2. 
movement". Record, 415-416. He supported the use of D&E 
on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In 
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure 
than other methods. See 2 Record 427-428. His 
disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his 
agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only 
to be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but 
also has a right to a dead fetus". Id., at 431. He also 
agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to 
protect the fetus, if it can be saved", id., and finally 
that "as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a 
live fetus", Id., at 435. Moreover, contrary to every 
other view, he thought a fetus could survive a D&E 
abortion, id., at 433-434. None of the other physicians 
who testified at the trial, those called both by the 
/ . 
. . ,. ~ 
3. 
plaintiffs and defendants, considered that~ use of D&E 
after viability was indicated. 
/ 
. ' 
lfp/ss 06/04/83 Rider No. 2 (Ashcroft) 
ASH2 SALLY-POW 
Apparently Dr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record 
334, 368, 428, a state having no statutes comparable to 
§188.030.1 and §188.030.2. It is not clear whether he was 
familiar with Missouri law. Nor did he explain the 
circumstances when there were "contraindications" against 
the use of any of the procedures that could preserve 
viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited 
to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record 
evidence that D&E ever will be the methods that poses the 
least risk to the woman in those rare situations where 
there are compelling medical reasons for performing an 
abortion after viability. If there were such instances, 
they hardly would justify invalidating §188.030.3. 
/ 
t .... ·. 
,, 
2. 
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in a footnote, 
the district court cited - with no elaboration - Dr. 
Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agreement with Dr. 
Crist, is enlightening. 
(here copy Q and A from p. 3 of Jim's note) 
4 Record 836-837. Given that Dr. Crist's schismatic 
testimony is wholly unsupported, the state's compelling 
interest in protecting a viable fetus justifies the 
second-physician requirement even though there may be the 
rare case when a physician may think honestly that D&E is 
required for the mother's health. Legislation need not 
accommodate every conceivable contingency. 
RIDER C 
The dissenters~the issue here is an open one, and 
1\ 
adhere to the views that they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 
~ ~A'C~·~.,4--~ a.-L·fctk:J4 
10-11 • ..!Pfiose views wera cJQaH.y not tag sziewe e£ a majority of this 
.1\ " 
::::t :£_;=~:;::A~:=::;n ~ 





JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting 
uncon titutionally overbroad becau a fetus cannot survive a D&E 
viability. Tse ;~l~~u~o~ 
~~~~~~~~~~~t$A;~~~~~~~~~~~~~~that D&E 
post-viability 
by plaintiffs. See 
~~~In 
~p~~~~~~._ testified that he never "es eny 
~ ~ 
i~eRt~H ofAprotec~ the fetus after an abortion, that an 
abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of her pregnancy but 
II '" to a dead fetus, and that as a general principle, in the case of · 
-.L..J-~-.- ~4...11 l»t..L L. • .d..tJ. ~ ..._, 
abortion, there should never be a live fetus. Id., at 431-435. ~~zr 
~ ~~·~ 
None of the other witnesses at trial, ~ those called~ by the ~ 
plaintiffs and Lho!l'e call~&- ey t:he defendants, indicated ~ use of 
D&E late in a pregnancy after viability~ uReer ~ eirc~mst:enc~~. ~ 
See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks): 2 Record 
381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks: would 
never perform D&E at 26 weeks): 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" 
to use D&E after viability): 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 
weeks): id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 weeks): id., 
at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to childbirth at 24 
weeks): 8 Record 33, 78-8 Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E 
dissenters are willing to build their 
Missouri law. 
I 
e dubious finding that D&E is the 
clear! erroneous to 
3 is overbro 
abor~e~ect to the 
requirements of §188.030.2, D&E etrnAot be used when the fetus is 
viable; when other methods are more likely to preserve its life; and 
when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to the 
woman's life or health. ~Jrhe dissent points to nothing in the 
record to indicate that D&E will ever be the method that poses the 
>-- ~
least risk to the woman in !!2!1:. situation ioA--whie~ there are 
compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion after 
viability. J "\ the dissent does ~ euQA acknowledge the 
that may arise and force the performing physician 
9r ~as, ehe er acitri premise of the dissent's ~ly- S"l:lspeet factual 
~ assumption that D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester 
~/ 
r;;; 
a~ i• ~~&eft has no basis in the record. 
~~-- ~~~ l1c.J f" 
l medical literature give &Re 4~QRters support fe ~ 
'\ J\ ,.. 




~ Cf. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) 
(mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation 
abortions up to 20 weeks); App. 79-80. he dissenters thus point to 
no support for ~ssumption that "maternal health considerations 
will preclude the use of procedures that might result in a live 
birth" after viability. Post, at 6. 
lfp/ss 06/02/83 Rider~Ashcroft) 
A 
ASHCROFTX SALLY-POW 
LfrThere may well be few physicians with Dr. Crist's 
expressed total disinterest in preserving fetal life, and 
who perform third-trimester abortions with no regard to the 
state's compelling interest in preservingfetal life when 
this is possible without endangering the health of the 
mother. Yet, the fact that there are such physicians 
illustrates the reasonableness of the state's requirement of 
the presence of a second physician after viability. The 
dissent's overbreadth argument, based on primarily on Dr. 
Crist's views, is without other support in the record. 
lfp/ss 05/30/83 Ashcroft Footnote B 
ASHFNB SALLY-POW 
The dissenting opinion relies on medical opinion 
that does not agree with the state's judgment that 
examination by a pathologist is necessary following almost 
all surgical procedures. Medical opinion, however, is far 
from being unanimous on this question. Moreover, the 
professional views expressed do not disclose whether 
consideration was given to the fact that there has been a 
measure of serious abuse in some abortion clinics. See n. 
, supra. In this case, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a widely 
experienced abortion practitioner, testified that he 
requires a pathologist examination after each of the 
60,000 abortions performed under his directionat the New 





considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a 
pathologist's report on each and every specimen of tissue 
removed for abortion or for that matter from any other 
surgical procedure which involved the removal of tissue 
from the human body". App. 143-144. See also App. 146-
147 (testimony of Dr. Keitges); 5 Record 798-799 
(testimony of Schmidt) . In weighing the balance between 
protection of a woman's health and the comparatively small 
additional cost of a pathologist's examination, we cannot 
say that the Constitution requires that a state 
k U-::v ~k.tJ 
subordinate its interest in health to minimize the cost of 
/\ 
abortions. The evidence in this case indicates charges 
for first-trimester abortions range from ______ to ______ , 
whereas the additional cost for the health protective 
tissue examination ranges from to ----
job 06/02/83 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the exception of 
such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, shall 
be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by 
arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977). With respect to abortions, whether performed 
in hospitals or in some other facility, §188.047 requires the 
pathologist to "file a copy of the tissue report with the State 
Division of Health •... " Seen. 2, supra. The pathologist also is 
required to "provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility 
or hospital in which the abortion was performed or induced." Thus, 
Missouri appears to require that tissue following abortions, as well 
as almost all other surgeries performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological examination 
by the performing doctor. The narrow question before us is whether 
the State (maYralsol require the tissue removed following an abortion 
performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to be submitted to a 
pathologist. b . h . Maa. ;t:s We el1eve t at 1t can. 
On its face and in effect, §188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] important 
health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 12. As the 
Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are clearly 
"useful and even necessary in some cases," because "abnormalities in 
the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal disorders." 655 
F.2d, at 87o.l
10
As rule, it is good medical practice to submit alJL 
Footnote(s) 1 will appear on following pages. 
·. 
tissue to the examination of a pathologist~-The standards of the 
merican College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists {ACOG) at the 
t.vt-U....~ 
time of the District Court's trial stated i-n r~eJ!c:f ~ to · "staff 
"" 
activit[ies that] are recommended in some form for all obstetric-
gynecologic services": 
The purpose of a tissue or operative review committee 
is to make certain that the highest possible surgical 
standards are maintained by the hospital staff members. 
This is accomplished by a continuing review of all the 
surgical procedures performed in the hospital,~n t~e 
h~spit~. For this purpose, pathologic examination should 
be performed on all tissue removed at obstetric-
gynecologic operations. 
J ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 {4th ed. 
1974). The current ACOG standards state for all surgical services 
performed on an ambulatory basis: "Tissue removed should be 
2. 
submitted to a pathologist for an examination." ACOG, Standards for 
Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 {5th ed. 1982) {emphasis adde~ 
This is particularly important following abortion, because questions 
~aA,I-1:> 
~a~t the long-range complications of abortions and their effect on 
su,bsequent pregnancies , Tn. See App. 72-73 {testimony of Dr. 
lOlA pathological examination is designed to assist in the 
detection of fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or 
other re o s rowths, and a variety of other problems that 
can be-atscovere through a ~athological examination. The 
A pathological examination~ is clear. See American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists {ACOG), Standards for 
Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 {5th ed. 1982); National 
Abortion Federation {NAF) , National Abortion Federation Standards 
6 {1981) {compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member 
facilities to remain in good standing); Planned Parenthood of ]~ 
Metropolitan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for 
Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of First Trimester · 
Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10; Brief of the American Public 
Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-
1172, at 29, n. 6. 
{,.....- JvM OG 5'~ •n 




Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abortion 
with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). 
Recorded pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication 
reports, provide a statistical basis for studying those 
complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danfor~, 
428 u.s. 52, 81 (1976). \. 
7 
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing th~ abortion is i ,, 
as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination.~ ( Such 
arguments must have been persuasive to the ACOG and National 
Abortion Federation, for they recently have created for abortion an 
f 
1 "exception to the practice" of submitting aspirated tissue to a 
pathologist for examination. See ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed.) . 1~ 
.I 
J(~This argument ignores the fact that Missouri requires a 
pathologist--not the performing physician--to examine tissue 
after almost every type of surgery. Although this requirement is 
in a provision relating to surgical procedures in hospitals, many 
of the same procedures included within the Missouri statute 
customarily are performed also in outpatient clinics. No reason 
has been suggested why the prudence required in a hospital should 
not be equally appropriate in such a clinic. Indeed, there may 
be good reason to impose stricter standards on clinics performing 
abortions than on hospitals. See n. 3, infra. 
ILJ The professional views that the plaintiffs find to 
support their position do not disclose whether consideration was 
given to the fact that there ha~ b~en a measure of serious abuse 
in some abortion clinics. ~t ~t is clear that a State 
reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is more 
necessary in outpatient clinics than in general hospitals--
particularly with respect to abortions. There is abundant 
evidence that abortion has been a surgical procedure associated 
with a high incidence of questionable practices. See Bellotti v. 
Baird, 443 u.s. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (minors may re~ort to 
"incompetent or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood 
of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) 
(Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-Times of Chicago, in a series 
of special reports, disclosed widespread questionable practices 
in abortion clinics, including the failure to obtain proper 
pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago Sun-
Footnote continued on next page. 
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FIRST DRAFT: Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 
Nos. 81-1255, 81-1623 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
These cases present several issues relating to state 
regulation of the woman's fundamental right to decide 
whether to have an abortion: (i} whether the State of 
Missouri may require that every abortion subsequent to the 
first twelve weeks of pregnancy be performed in a 
hospital~ (ii} whether the State may require that a tissue 
sample be taken of every abortion and submitted to a 
qualified pathologist for an examination and report~ (iii} 
whether the State mav require the attendance of a second 
physician b. i 
... ·~ j--. -~ - ~ IJ \.-\ 
Jt ·-
abortion of a viable ~~ and (iv ) whether the State's 
at the 
"" 
parental consent statute is consistent with this Court's 
prior decisions. 1 
vV r /A s ..L<- ,..., fl, ~ . 
~ rv • 1The petition also raises issue whethe~n )Yf on award of attorneys' fees, made pur uant to 42 u.s.c. r IYV" §1988, should be proportioned to ref ect accurately the 
, /'v)l 
1 
-~ extent to which plaintiffs prevailed. Beoause t':his hJ.gue \t'p' a~tf'- '1, i~al t-a the OllQ prQiteRtee il'i HeRsley u Eckerhart, 





On June 29, 1979, the Governor of e·he State ~ 
~ . $" .. abort1on. The next day, pla1nt1ffs--Planned Parenthood of 
A " 
Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two doctors that perform 
(~··~s')--
abortions, and an abortion clinic--filed a complaint in 
.1\ 
the District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
challenging, as unconstitutional, several sections of 
~~ 
taose- A s ta tutes. The sections relevant here include 
§188.025, providing that abortions after twelve-weeks 
~ must be performed 
1\ 
a.,. 
in l\.hospital f ; 2 §188.047, 
requiring a pathology report after every abortion; 3 
~~b-f-w2~~ 
§188.030, req~~~~~as~~·~~ after viability; 4 and 
1\ 
2Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.025 provides: "Every abortion 
performed subsequent to the first twelve weeks of 
pregnancy shall be performed in a hospital." 
3Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.047 states: 
A representative sample of tissue removed at the time 
of abortion shall be submitted to a board 
eligible or certified pathologist, who shall 
file a copy of the tissue report with the state 
division of health, and who shall provide a copy 
of the report to the abortion facility or 
hospital in which the abortion was performed or 
induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record. 
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.3 provides: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
§188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 5 
An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be 
performed or induced only where there is in 
attendance a physician other than the physician 
performing or adducing the abortion who shall 
take constrol of and provide immediate medical 
care for a child born as a result of the 
abortion. During the performance of the 
abortion, the physician performing it, and 
subsequent to the abortion, the physician 
required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with 
good medical practice, consistent with the 
procedure used, to perserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it 
does not pose an increased risk to the life or 
health of the woman. 
5Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028 reads: 
1. No person shall knowingly perform an 
abortion upon a pregnant woman under the age of 
eighteen years unless: 
(1) The attending physician has secured the 
informed writ ten consent of the minor and one 
parent or guardian; or 
(2) The minor is emancipated 
attending physician has received the 
written consent of the minor; or 
and the 
informed 
(3) The minor has been granted the right to 
self-consent to the abortion by court order 
pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and 
the attending physician has received the 
informed written consent of the minor; or 
(4) The minor has been granted consent to 
the abortion by court order, and the court has 
given its informed written consent in accordance 
with subsection 2 of this section, and the minor 
is having the abortion willingly, in compliance 
with subsection 3 of this section. 
2. The right of a minor to self-consent to 
an abortion under subdivision (3) of subsection 
1 of this section or court consent under 
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section 
may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
(1) The minor or next friend shall make an 
application to the juvenile court which shall 
Footnote continued on next page. 
assist the minor or next friend in preparing the 
petition and notices required pursuant to this 
section. The minor or the next friend of the 
minor shall thereafter file a petition setting 
forth the initials of the minor; the age of the 
minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are 
deceased and no guardian has been appointed, any 
other person standing in loco parentis of the 
minor; that the minor has been fully informed of 
the risks and consequences of the abortion; that 
the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient 
intellectual capacity to consent to the 
abortion; that, if the court does not grant the 
minor majority rights for the purpose of consent 
to the abortion, the court should find that the 
abortion is in the best interest of the minor 
and give judicial consent to the abortion; that 
the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have 
private counsel, that the court should appoint 
counsel. The petition shall be signed by the 
minor or the next friend; 
(3) A hearing on the merits of the 
petition, to be held on the record, shall be 
held as soon as possible, within five days of 
the filing of the petition .... At the hearing, 
the court shall hear evidence relating to the 
emotional development, maturity, intellect and 
understanding of the minor; the nature, possible 
consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; 
and any other evidence that the court may find 
useful in determining whether the minor should 
be granted majority rights for the purpose of 
consenting to the abortion or whether the 
abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
(4) In the decree, the court shall for good 
cause: 
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights 
for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; 
or 
(b) Find the abortion to be in the best 
interests of the minor and give judicial consent 
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for 
so finding; or 
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the 
grounds on which the petition is denied; 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~t. t 1\ DlS r1c 
hospitalization requirement; 
minors' consent provision; and §188.030, the provision 
..£:)<~1- ~ 
~upheld §188.047, the pathology requirement. 6 The Court 
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the District 
Court's judgment with respect to §188.028, 
upholding the requirement that a minor secure parent~! o ~~ 
~~-- T'¥ JJ 1- ~~.4·' =-!! 
judicial consent to an a~ortion,A and . •rJitb r;es;pect - to 
bu-~~-~~~~~ 
I{ §188.047, i'fl _.e-Ue.g.t- i.nualidati~ the pathology 
requirement. The District Court's judgment with regard to 
the second-physician requirement was affirmed, and the 
case was remanded for further proceedings and findings 
3. If a minor des ires an abortion, then 
she shall be or ally informed of and, if 
possible, sign the written consent required by 
section 188.039 in the same manner as an adult 
person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion 
may be performed against the will of a minor 
pursuant to a court order described in 
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section 
that the abortion is necessary to per serve the 
life of the minor. 
6see 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701. The District Court 
awarded attorneys' fees for every hour claimed by the 
plaintiff's attorneys. 
6. 
relating to the second-trimester hospitalization 
requirement. 655 F.2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, 
the District Court reaffirmed its,( ~elus~on that 
the r second-trimester hospitalization requirement 
was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed this 
judgment. 664 F.2d 687, 691. 
We granted certiorari, u.s. (1982), to 
resolve the conflict in the Courts of Appeals on the 
hospitalization requirement7 and because the other issues 
presented are i~t questions of federal law that 
should be settled .. by tMs Cocrrt. We now affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals invalidating the Missouri 
hospitalization requirement and upholding the parental 
consent requirement, but reverse the judgment holding 




7 See Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. 
City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (CA6 1981), rev'd in part & 
aff'd in part, ___ U.S. ___ (1983). Many states require 
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions. See Brief 
for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae 4 n. 1 
(listing ~ 23 states) • 
8The judgment as to the attorneys' fees issue is 
vacated and remanded in light of our decision in Hensley 
v. Eckerhart, u.s. (1983). 
7. 
II 
The Court today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., u.s. (1983), has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state 
statutes regulating abortion procedures, and that 
discussion need not be repeated here. With these 
principles in mind, we turn to the ~ statutes at issue 
here. 
A 
In City of Akron, we held invalid a hospitalization 
requirement for second-trimester abortions. The ordinance 
there required doctors to perform such abortions in 
general hospitals or facilities accredited by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals or by the 
American Osteopathic Association. u.s., at The 
~ 
~(.L . h f '1' . A requirements t at a ac1 1 ty must meet lR Ala•otFf 
~~1-<J .t..c 
to constitute a hospita~ id., at ==='~,.{ similar to 
~ ~, ~-.~~- · q LV~~ 
those required ~ Aneed 
~~ ~~"" .. 
11
:--
9Missour i d~s not define the term "hos~i tal" in 
J,.r statutory pro is ions regulating abort ions,. aRe WQ oan 
/.( ~~~nk¥-~~~~ that · has its common meaning of a general, 
~~ acute-care facility. Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.015(2) 
~;- (defining "abortion facility" as a "clinic, a physician's 





aey dif~ . . 10 in--1§.1:1 e---t ,.10 de :f i rn t 1 o tTS • What is 
important for our purposes 1 require all is that both aws 
second-trimester abortions to be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 
~ ~ ~J2li:D2s-l T~ ' the s'tatute here does not require extended 
analysis, because it imposes burdens similar to those 
found to interfere h to decide to with the woman's rig t 
ASH GINA-POW n abortion in City of ro Ak n and is 1 ikewise not 
RIDER A page 8 
81-1255 and 81-1623 - Ashcroft v. Missouri 
In short, Section 188.025 imposes on a woman's abortion 
decision requirements we found to ~e in Cit~ of 
'\ 
Akron. For the reasons stated in that case at some length, 
we agree with the Court of Appeals that this statute is 
invalid. 
Note to Jim: The only purpose of the foregoing is to save a 
few lines, and to avoid using language that possibly may be 
viewed as different. 
~~ 9. 
1-o~~ 
~~ ~- J'~-~ 
cJHf 
~~~-~~~~ 
Appeals that §188.025 cannot be upheld. ~ ~ 
~t-6, 
B 
Missouri clearly views the life of a viable fetus as 
important and the protection of that life as a compelling 
interest. The State proscribes post-viability abortions 
except when necessary to preserve the health or lives of 
pregnant women. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.1. It also 
precludes the use of procedures fatal to the viable fetus 1 
unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk to the 
health of the mother. See id., §188.030.2. 
It is clear that the cost of a second physician in 
attendance at the abortion of a viable fetus would be a 
direct burden upon the availability and delivery of such 1 
abortion services. After viability, however, the 
compelling interest of the State in potential human life 
is paramount, authorizing the proscription of abortions 
not necessary to maternal life and health. Because it has 
the power to preclude, it necessarily has much discretion 1 
in regulating the effectuation of abortions that it does 
allow. See Beal v. Doe, 432 u.s. 438, 445-446 (1977): Roe 
v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113, 165 (1973). 
10. 
Plaintiffs argue that this second-physician 
requirement is an aberration of the traditional doctor-
patient relationship, and is impractical, unnecessary, and 
burdensome. No other Missouri statute requires two 
doctors in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including for childbirth or for the delivery of 
a premature infant. Requiring two doctors to be present 
strains medical resources and places an enormous financial 
burden directly upon the woman seeking to terminate the 
pregnancy. 11 
11Plaintiffs also argue that the statutory provision 
is overbroad, because no viable fetus can survive a D&E 
procedure. The District Court found D&E to be the 
"procedure of choice" after viability and that D&E 
"carries no chance of fetal survival." 483 F. Supp., at 
694. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the District 
Court's finding of fact as to the chances of fetal 
survival is not clearly erroneous and that "[t]here is no 
error in the district court's factual conclusion that for 
some patients and physicians, D&E is the method of choice 
even after viability is possible." 655 . F.2d, at 865. We 
disagree, however, with both courts' legal conclusion that 
the second-physician requirement is overbroad. The Court 
of Appeals did not reach the issue whether a State could 
require a second physician when there is some possiblity 
the fetus may survive, see id., at 866 & n.30, but 
nonetheless held §188.030.3 unconstitutional. As the 
Court of Appeals noted, however, the choice of D&E after 
viability is subject to the requirements of §188.030.2. 
See id., at 865 & n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be used when 
the fetus is viable and other methods are more likely to 
preserve its life but not pose a greater risk to the 
woman's life or health. Moreover, the experts in the 
District Court disagreed whether D&E should ever be used 
after viability. See 655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29. It is 
arguable that the coincidence of situations in which there 
are both compelling medical reasons for an abortion after 
viability and the risk-based choice is D&E may be rare. 
In this case, however, the District Court's failure to 
Footnote continued on next page. 
11. 
Plaintiffs' objections, however, fail to take into 
account the state's compelling interest in the life of the 
unborn and his uniquely vulnerable status given his 
mother's immediate needs. The abortion decision at this 
stage in the pregnancy is no longer "primarily" a medical 
decision between the mother and her physician, and "'the 
usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional,'" Roe, 
410 U.S., at 166, that are available to protect the woman 
are not adequate, in Missouri's reasonable judgment, to 
protect the viable fetus. By definition, this statute 
applies to the fetus capable of independent life. The 
State is entitled to preserve and nurture that potential 
life and, when successful, actual life. 
We believe that it is reasonable for the State to 
assume that the concern of the abortionist is not, 
generally, with the health and well-being of the fetus, 
but with the health and desires of his patient, the 
mother. The second doctor will provide immediate medical 
make any findings that would permit us to judge the 
frequency of post-viability abortions by the D&E procedure 
renders plaintiffs' overbreadth challenge unpersuasive. 
12. 
care for the child when born, and his presence may help 
the doctor performing the abortion to reduce the trauma 
inflicted upon the fetus. Moreover, certain procedures 
that are almost certainly fatal to the fetus may not be 
necessary to protect the health or 1 i fe of the woman . 12 
In those situations where fatal procedures are not 
mandated, it is necessary, if Missouri's compelling 
interest in the life of the fetus is to have any meaning, 
that the State have someone present to scrutinize the 
choice of the procedures used. 
We recognize that a preservable human life may not 
often be possible as a result of an abortion, but we also 
know that abortions should not often be performed after 
v iabi l'i ty, and then only for serious medical reasons . 1 3 
12At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that 
viability is possible, the fetus is sufficiently large 
that it must be dismembered, and the skull must be 
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See 
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 
655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29. 
13There is no clearly expressed exception on the 
face of the statute for the performance of an abortion of 
a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. 
It is possible that emergency circumstances might well 
warrant the same. The last clause of §188.030.3 qualifies 
at least the last part of the provision with the phrase 
"provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the 
life or health of the woman." It may be that this clause 
would not require a second doctor where it was simply not 
possible. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 407 n.l4 
Footnote continued on next page. 
/ 
13. 
The State legitimately, however, may choose to be prepared 
for those rare instances of live birth. We believe the 
second-doctor requirement "has both logical and biological 
justifications," id., at 163, and bears a very close 
relationship to the compelling State interest in 
protecting the lives of viable unborn children. Thus, in 
requiring a second physician to be in attendance at the 
abortion of a viable fetus, Missouri has acted precisely 
within the principles set forth in Roe and reaffirmed 
today in City of Akron. 
c 
The most vulnerable State regulations are those that 
apply to adult women during the first trimester~ 
lfp/ss 02/01/83 
ASH13 SALLY-POW 
provision on its face, by imposing a 
"""- -, , =-her t ion _tj_s sue by 
~ A, P-~shcroft) --~~ 
Section 188 047 . . 
. , requiring a pathology report 
after every 
abortion, is such 
a regulation. 
The question is whether in 
view of the state 
interest, the requirement 
unduly burdens a 
woman's abortion decision. 





state, Missouri requires "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, 
with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, 
hernial sacs, and prepuces, shall be examined by a 
pathologist, either on the premises or by arrangement 
outside the hospital." See 13 CSR 50-20.030 (1977). 
Although Missouri apparently does not require pathology 
reports in all procedures, or in all surgical operations 
outside of a hospital, "not all distinction between 
abortion and other procedures is forbidden." Bellotti v. 
Baird (Bellotti I), 428 u.s. 132, 149 (1976). Section 
§188.047, on its face and in 
(/1,_..1 ~~ 
effect, reasonably enco~r~ 
~~s~~d 1\ 1/tL-~~ rna ternal health . 14 ~H osocr i 
1\ 
14The District Court noted that several medical 
experts testified that pathology should be done in every 
case of abortion. See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 49. 
Moreover, the standards for abortion services of the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
state that for all abortions: 
Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure 
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to 
the patient's release from the facility. If 
villi or fetal parts are not identified with 
certainty, the tissue specimen must be sent for 
further pathologic examination, and the patient 
must be alerted to the possibility of an ectopic 
pregnancy. 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 54 (5th 
ed. 1982). The standards of the National Abortion 
Federation, whose members include the institutional 
plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: 
All tissue must be examined grossly at the time 
of the abortion procedure by a physician or 
Footnote continued on next page. 
15. 
argues that the requirement of a pathological examination 
1/1-~~~ -ti:2 ~ 
~w4±± a~±p ~wre the detection of fatal ectopic 
pregnancies, uterine perforations, hydatritaforme moles or 
other precancerous growths, and a variety of other 
problems that can only be discovered through a 
pathological examination.!\ may be justified in 
is the one 
affects the reproductive capabilities of patients. There 
~ ~ {-<J 
are still some questions t;o be .a~~ a.eot~-t the long-
~ ~ 
range complications of abortions and their effect on 
11-~ ~LI-~ 
subsequent pregnancies. ~ recorded pathology reports, in 
\ 1\ 
concert with abortion complication reports, should provide 
a statistical basis on which to study 
trained assistant and the results recorded in 
the chart. In the absence of visible fetal 
parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low 
power microscope for the detection of villi. If 
this examination is inconclusive, the tissue 
should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology 
laboratory for microscopic examination. 
those 
National Abortion Federation, National Abortion Federation 
Standards 22 (1981). See Brief of the Amercican Public 
Health Association as Amicus Curiae 29 n. 6 in Nos. 81-
185, 81-746 & 81-1172 (supporting the National Abortion 
Federation standards for nonhospital abortion facilities 
as constituting "minimum standards"). 
16. 
complications. 15 
Plaintiffs contend that the additional cost of a 
tissue examination is unduly burdensome; that the 
requirement of an examination by a pathological cannot be 
justified under traditional medical cost/benefit analysis; 
that such an examination in every case is simply 
unnecessary and serves no rational purpose; and is 
duplicative of the gross examination the performing 
physician makes in every case. Indeed, plaintiffs note, 
§188.047 does not specify whether the pathologist must 
make a microscopic examination16 and does not impose any 
time limits within which the examination must be 
conducted, thereby obviating somewhat the reasons for the 
examination. We need not, however, balance the costs and 
benefits to determine whether §188.047 is constitutional. 
We agree with the District Court that "the Court has not 
been shown that the increase in cost per abortion 
15section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report 
be sent to the State's division of health. 
16state regulations, however, state: ' "All reports 
shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If 
fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an 
accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed 
with the Division of Health." 13 CSR 50-151.030. 
17. 
procedure resulting from the required tissue examination 
will constitute an undue burden on a woman seeking an 
abortion." 483 F. Supp., at 699-700. The estimated cost 
of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services 
is $19.40 per abortion performed. 17 pathology 
clearly are useful: Pathologists may discover 
somet · in a close case that is out of the ordinary and 
not be not iced by the per forming doctor 
pathology requirement, like the recordt eeping 
requirements upheld in Planned Parenthood of Central 
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 u.s. 52 (1976), "can be useful 
to the State's interest in protecting the health of its 
female citizens, and may be a resource that is relevant to 
decisions involving medical experience and judgment," id., 
at 81. 18 
J~~J 
As an empir~ -j u9~me"ftt, "we see no legally 
~a-
testimony in the District Court that the 
additional cos of pathology would range from $10.00, for 
a gross exami at ion, to $40.00, in cases where multiple 
microscopic xaminations of the tissue were necessary. 
See 483 F. S pp., at 700 n. 48. 
18The noted that "[t]he added 
requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception 
for public health officers, and for retention for seven 
years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and 
persuade us in our determination of the constitutional 
limits." 428 u.s., at 81. Missouri provides for 





icant impact or consequence on the abortion decision 
or n the physician-patient relationship." See id., at 
requirement may have some impact on 
's limited resources, but we are not persuaded th 
D 
~ 
It is r that the State's special concern for 
~~~~~4A•~ 
 will not support a State-granted parental veto over 
" a minor's abortion decision. See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 
74-75. 20 Nor may the State itself retain the arbitrary 
right of veto over a mature minor's abortion. A majority 
of the Justices of this Court, however, has indicated ~nat~ 
19As in Danforth, we emphasize that, although 
§188.047 is not constitutionally offensive in itse~l~~­
"perhaps approach[es] impermissible limits." U.S., at 
52. Small burdens in cost, even promote maternal 
health, may not be "abused or rdone," id. Obviously, 
even a few additional sm requirements, even when they 
individually promote od medical practices, eventually 
will burden the rtion decision to the point that women 
will be d red from having an otherwise medicallY. 
desira abortion. 
20This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional 
Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried 
minors under the age of 18. See 428 u.s., at 72, 75. In 
response to our decision, Missouri enacted the section 
challenged here. This new statute became effective 
shortly before our decision in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 
622 (1979). 
19. 
~ i t ---wottld 
~~ 
approv~ a narrowly drafted statute allowing 
minors judicially determined to be mature to make their 
own abortion decisions, while requiring immature minors to 
obtain a consent-substitute, such as parental permission 
or judicial authorization predicated upon a determination 
of the minor's best interests. 21 See Bellotti v. Baird 
(Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643-644, 647-648 (1979) 
21The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 
(1979) , also require that the alternative to parental 
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue 
"will be completed with anonymity and sufficient 
expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an 
abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality 
is assured by the statutoryrequirement that allows the 
minor to use her initials on the petition. See Mo. Stat. 
§188.028.2(1). As to expedition of appeals, §188.028.2(6) 
provides in relevant part: 
The notice of intent to appeal shall be 
given within twenty-four hours from the date of 
issuance of the order. The record on appeal 
shall be completed and the appeal shall be 
perfected within five days from the filing of 
not ice to appeal. Because time may be of the 
essence regarding the performance of the 
abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, 
by court rule, provide for expedited appellate 
review of cases appealed under this section. 
We believe the section provides the framework for a 
constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial 
proceedings. Immediately after the effective date of this 
statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined 
enforcement: No unemancipated pregnant minor has been 
required to comply with this statutory section before an 
abortion is performed. Thus, to this point in time, there 
has been no need for the state Supreme Court to promulgate 
rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to 
believe that Missouri will not expedite any appeal 
consistent with the mandate in our prior opinionsf an e 
e 1eve 1s ourt of the 
judgment of the Court concerning the 
constitutionality of this section, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri shall proceed with diligence to enact relevant 
20. 
(plurality opinion for four Justices} : id. , at 656-6 57 
(WHITE, J., dissenting} (expressing approval of absolute 
parental consent requirement}. 22 The reasons for, and 
arguments against, these rules have been thoroughly 
explored in prior opinions, and we need not discuss them 
again in detail. 
The issue here is one purely of statutory 
construction. 23 The Missouri statute, in relevant part, 
provides: 
(4} In the decree, the court shall for good 
cause: 
22cf. H.L. ~ :::eson, 450 u.s. 398, 407 & n.l4, 
411 (1981) (uphol ing a parental notification requirement 
but not extending holding to mature or emancipated minors 
or to immature minors showing such notification 
detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts 
found that §188.028's notice requirement was 
unconstitutional. See 655 F.2d, at 873: 483 F. Supp., at 
679. Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this 
Court for review, § 188.028 contains no requirement for 
parental notification. 
23The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" 
women under the age of 18 both from the requirement of 
parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a 
judicial proceeding. The word "emancipated" in this 
context is not void for vagueness. Although the question 
whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the peculiar 
facts and circumstances of each individual case, the 
Missouri courts have declared general legal rules to guide 
that determination, and the term is one of general usage 
and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 
C.J.S. Parent and Child §88, at 811 (1950 ed.}}: In re the 
Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) 
(same}: Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. App. 
1958} . It should also be noted that, before a person may 
be successfully prosecuted for a violation of §188.028, 
the State must show that defendant "knowingly" violated 
the section. 
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights 
for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; 
or 
(b) Find the abortion to be in the best 
interests of the minor and give judicial consent 
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for 
so finding; or 
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the 
grounds on which the petition is denied[.] 
21. 
On its face, §188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts to 
do (a), (b), or (c). The Court of Appeals concluded that 
a denial of the petition permitted in subsection (c) 
"would initially require the court to find that the minor 
was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her 
own decision and that an abortion was not in her best 
interests." 655 F.2d, at 858. Plaintiffs contend that 
4~ 
this interpretation is unreasonable. We ti+sagree. 
1\ 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a 
statute so as to avoid a danger of unconsti tut ionali ty. 
The Court of Appeals was cognizant of the fact that if the 
statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor 
for~ "good cause," it would violate the principles set 
forth in Danforth and Bellotti II. See 655 F.2d, at 858. 
The court, however, reached the logical conclusion that 
"findings and the ultimate denial of the petition must be 
22. 
supported by a showing of 'good cause.'" Ibid. Before 
exercising any option, the juvenile court must receive 
evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, 
intellect and understanding of the minor." The Court of 
Appeals rationally found that a court could not deny a 
petition, "for good cause," unless it first found--after 
having received the required evidence--that the minor was 
not mature enough to make her own decision. 24 Clearly, 
after Bellotti I I, there would be no legally sufficient 
reason to deny a petition if evidence demonstrated that a 
minor was sufficiently mature to make her own decision. 
Thus, we believe the Court of Appeals correctly 
24Missouri argues t at, under state law, "for good 
cause" is "'a cause orr ason sufficient in law.'" State 
v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1971) (quoting Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 978 (1976)). The 
Missouri courts f t, however, in a variety of 
contexts, that the commonly used legal phrase "for good 
cause" "is not susceptible of precise definition," Vaughn 
v. Ripley, 416 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. App. 1967), and that 
"'good cause' depends upon the circumstances of the 
individual case," Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 
(Mo. 1963). A finding of its existence "lies largely in 
the discretion of the ••• court to which the decision is 
committed," ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial 
purpose in a matter addressed primarily to the conscience 
of the court," Corzine v. Scott, 505 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo. 
App. 1974). This discretion, however, no doubt is limited 
to choices that are "a cause or reason sufficient in law." 
We are unwilling to assume that the discretion given to 
the Missouri courts by t~~lQg~at~~ includes the 
privilege of ignoring this Court's \GOilstrtJctio~ of- the 
y Otlf'P"""' l"''f ~ fund mnental r irC.~srn. :.-t.A~-4-Utf~"'H.,.._,...__ 
23. 
interpreted the statute, and as interpreted, §188.028 
avoids the infirmities of the state statute reviewed in 
Bellotti I I. 25 
III 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it 
invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization 
requirement and upheld the State's parental consent 
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the 
requirement of a pathology report for all abortions and 
the requirement that a second physician attend the 
abortion of any viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the 
judgment upholding an award of attorneys' fees for all 
hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys and remand for 
proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart, ___ u.s. 
25Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the clear 
ambiguity of §188.028.2(4), as evidenced by the differing 
interpretations placed upon it by reasonable judicial 
minds, perhaps the appropriate course of judicial 
restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398, 
407 (1981): Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 146-147. Plaintiffs 
did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the 
court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification 
procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state 
statutory construction to the state supreme court, see 655 
F.2d, at 861 n. ?.0, which procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" 
our analysis in Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 151. Moreover, 
where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair 
construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving construction, there is no need 




SECOND DRAFT: Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 
Nos. 81-1255, 81-1623 
~JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
------~:7 
cf!on June 29, 1979, 
.:r: 
the Governor of Missouri signed 
into law comprehensive regulations of abortions. The next 
day, plaintiffs--Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, 
Missouri, Inc., two doctors that perform abortions, and an 
abortion clinic (the 1 plaintiff~;--filed a complaint in the 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri 
challenging, as unconstitutional, several sections of the 
new statutes. Named as defendants were the Attorney 
General of Missouri and the prosecuting attorney of 
Jackson County, Missouri, who was sued both in that 
capacity and as representative of the class of all 
prosecuting attorneys of the various counties in Missouri. 
See 483 F. Supp. 679, 683 (WD Mo. 1980). The sections 
relevant here include Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.025 (Supp. 




that abortions after twelve-weeks 
performed in a hospital; 1 §188.047, 





requiring a pathology report after every abortion; 2 
§188.030, requiring the presence of a second physician 
after viability; 3 and §188.028, requiring minors to secure 





Rev. Stat. §188.025 provides: "Every abortion 
subsequent to the first twelve weeks of 
shall be performed in a hospital." 
Rev. Stat. §188.047 states: 
A representative sample of tissue removed at the time 
of abortion shall be submitted to a board 
eligible or certified pathologist, who shall 
file a copy of the tissue report with the state 
division of health, and who shall provide a copy 
of the report to the abortion facility or 
hospital in which the abortion was performed or 
induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record. 
3Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.3 provides: 
An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be 
performed or induced only where there is in 
attendance a physician other than the physician 
performing or adducing the abortion who shall 
take constrol of and provide immediate medical 
care for a child born as a result of the 
abortion. During the performance of the 
abortion, the physician performing it, and 
subsequent to the abort ion, the physic ian 
required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with 
good medical practice, consistent with the 
procedure used, to perserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it 
does not pose an increased risk to the life or 
health of the woman. 
4Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028 reads: 
1. No person shall knowingly perform an 
abortion upon a pregnant woman under the age of 
eighteen years unless: 
(1) The attending physician has secured the 
informed written consent of the minor and one 
parent or guardian; or 
( 2) 
attending 
The minor is emancipated and the 
physician has received the informed 
Footnote continued on next page. 
3. 
f After a full trial, at which a number of expert 
written consent of the minor; or 
(3) The minor has been granted the right to 
self-consent to the abortion by court order 
pursuant to subsection 2 of this sect ion, and 
the attending physician has received the 
informed written consent of the minor; or 
(4) The minor has been granted consent to 
the abortion by court order, and the court has 
given its informed written consent in accordance 
with subsection 2 of this section, and the minor 
is having the abortion willingly, in compliance 
with subsection 3 of this section. 
2. The right of a minor to self-consent to 
an abortion under subdivision (3) of subsection 
1 of this section or court consent under 
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section 
may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
(1) The minor or next friend shall make an 
application to the juvenile court which shall 
assist the minor or next friend in preparing the 
petition and notices required pursuant to this 
section. The minor or the next friend of the 
minor shall thereafter file a petition setting 
forth the initials of the minor; the age of the 
minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are 
deceased and no guardian has been appointed, any 
other person standing in loco parentis of the 
minor; that the minor has been fully informed of 
the risks and consequences of the abortion; that 
the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient 
intellectual capacity to consent to the 
abortion; that, if the court does not grant the 
minor majority rights for the purpose of consent 
to the abortion, the court should find that the 
abortion is in the best interest of the minor 
and give judicial consent to the abortion; that 
the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have 
private counsel, that the court should appoint 
counsel. The petition shall be signed by the 
minor or the next friend; 
(3) A hearing on the merits of the 
petition, to be held on the record, shall be 
held as soon as possible, within five days of 
the filing of the petition .... At the hearing, 
the court shall hear evidence relating to the 
emotional development, maturity, intellect and 
Footnote continued on next page. 
4. 
witnesses testified, the District Court invalidated each 
of except~ the 
requirement. 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
these sections, pathology 
reversed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§188. 028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It 
understanding of the minor; the nature, possible 
consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; 
and any other evidence that the court may find 
useful in determining whether the minor should 
be granted majority rights for the purpose of 
consenting to the abortion or whether the 
abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
(4) In the decree, the court shall for good 
cause: 
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights 
for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; 
or 
(b) Find the abortion to be in the best 
interests of the minor and give judicial consent 
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for 
so finding; or 
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the 
grounds on which the petition is denied; 
3. If a minor des ires an abort ion, then 
she shall be orally informed of and, if 
possible, sign the written consent required by 
section 188.039 in the same manner as an adult 
person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion 
may be performed against the will of a minor 
pursuant to a court order described in 
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section 
that the abortion is necessary to perserve the 
life of the minor. 
5 See 4 8 3 F • S u pp. 6 7 9 , 6 9 9 -7 0 1. 
also awarded attorneys' fees for ~ 
plaintiff's attorneys. ~ 
Thes District Court 
houG claimed by the 
A 
5. 
also held that the District Court erred in sustaining 
§188.047, the pathology requirement. The District Court's 
judgment with ~~o the second-physician requirement 
was affirmed, and the case was remanded for further 
proceedings and findings relating to the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement. 655 F.2d 848, 872-873 
(1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its 
holding that the second-trimester hospitalization 
requirement was unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed this judgment. 664 F.2d 687, 691. 
We granted certiorari, u.s. (1982), to 
resolve the conflict in the Courts of Appeals on the 
hospitalization requirement6 and because the other issues 
presented are questions of federal law that should be 
settled. We now affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals invalidating the Missouri hospitalization 
requirement and upholding the parental consent 
6see Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. 
City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (CA6 1981), rev'd in part & 
aff'd in part, ___ u.s. ___ (1983). Many states require 
hospitalization for second-trimester abortions. See Brief 
for Americans United for Life as Amicus Curiae 4 n. 1 
(listing 23 states). 
6 • 
requirement, but reverse the . judgment holding 
unconstitutional the pathology report and the second-
physician requirements. 7 
The Court today in City of Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., u.s. (1983), has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state 
statutes regulating abortion procedures, and 
need not be repeated here. With these 
principles in mind, we turn to the statutes at issue.~ 
In City of Akron, we held invalid a hospitalization 
requirement for second-trimester abortions. The ordinance 
there required ~ perform such abortions in 
general hospitals or facilities accredited by the Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals or by the 
American Osteopathic Association. u.s., at The 
7The petition also raises the issue whether an 
award of attorneys' fees, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§1988, should be proportioned to reflect accurately the 
extent to which plaintiffs prevailed. See n. 5, supra. 
The judgment as to this issue is vacated and remanded in 
light of our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, U.S. 






heep~a±~~ ~ ee similar to those required by Akron. 8 
" 
We therefore need not discuss t~~~mQRts in detail. 9 
i\ 
~ ~~..e.~k:-~~~-
1\ What is ....iJD~a'fl-t uL. pYrpo..s~ is that both laws 
require all second-trimester abortions to be performed in 
general, acute-care facilities. 
~~-
In short, §188.025 imposes ~ on a woman's abortion 
~~~-~-~~~d1J4 ~ 
decisionj req~etRQRt':s.- Wo9 ~od to "Be uRodul¥- burcQReome in-
~~~~~ 
.-t ..~.tt:( ••• t.J-~- ,... ~ v WM.-~ Jf I e:; L.t · 5 ·A.. 'i/,f'/ 6> ~ .(1 t:f'7 3) , 
8Missour i does not define the term "hospital" in 
its statutory prov1s1ons regulating abortions. We 
therefore must assume, as did the courts below, see 483 F. 
Supp., at 686 n. 10; 664 F.2d, at 689-690 & nn. 3, 5 & 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-
care facility. Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.015(2) (defining 
"abortion facility" as a "clinic, a physician's office, or 
any other place or facility in which abortions are 
performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020, part 
of Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
Hospital means a place devoted primarily to the 
maintenance and operation of facilities for the 
diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more 
abnormal physical conditions; or a place devoted 
primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical care for 
three or more nonrelated individuals. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §197.200 (defining "ambulatory surgical 
center" to include facilities "with an organized medical 
staff of physicians" and "with continuous physician 
services and registered professional nursing services 
whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 CSR 50-
30.010 (1) (A) (1976) (same). The regulations for the 
Department of Social Services, 13 CSR 50-20.010 to -20.030 
(1977), establishes standards for the construction, 
physical facilities, and administration of hospitals--not 
unlike those set by the Joint Commission on Accreditation 
of Hospitals. See City of Akron, U.S., at 
9The parties have drawn no factual distinction 
between the State's requirements of a "hospital" and the 
City's requirements in City of Akron. 
8. 
o.f ~k < Gn. ~e~sons stat~injtil?;/L:!::!;:;- _._ 
/;A IQJL?' £,.,., 
.....,.~.R.Q~t:::::=~~ agree with the Court of Appeals that this 
A 
is invalid. 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973), the Court 
recognized as compelling the interest of a State in the 
life of a viable fetus: " [T] he State in promoting its 
interest in the potentiality of human 1 i fe may, if it 
chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except 
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, 
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." 
Id., at 164-165. Several of Missouri's statutes undertake 
this regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed 
except when necessary to preserve the life or the health 
of the mother. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.1. The State 
also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater 
risk to the health of the mother. 
;,.._ H-e-~ 
See id., §188.030.2. 
The statute at issue I\ fte-r-e , §188.030.3, requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a 
viable fetus. The l r courts below both agreed that 
9. 
this requirement is invalid. 
The plaintiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge 
affirmance, advancing a number of arguments. They say 
J--k{ 
that ~s second-physician requirement is an aberration of 
the traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is 
impractical, unnecessary, burdensome, and costly. No 1 
other Missouri statute requires two physicians in 
attendance for any other medical or surgical procedure, 
including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. 
These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view the 
issue as a close one. 1 
Our cases repeatedly have held, however, that the 
State's interest in the potential life of a fetus is 
compelling. It therefore has substantial discretion in 
the regulations it may adopt with respect to abortions 
that are permissible after viability. See Beal v. Dole, 1 
432 U.S. 438, 445-446 (1977); Roe, 410 u.s., at 165. The 
~ 
fetusl\ uniquely vulnerable at t .his stage~as recognized 
~
in Roe, the abortionA no longer is [SOle\ yJ one to be made ~ 
between the mother and her physician. See id., at 166. 
Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician 1 
' 10. 
"shall take control of and provide immediate medical care 
for a child born as a result of the abortion." Moreover, 
the statute requires that the physician "be in attendance" 
during the abortion and "take all reasonable steps in 
keeping with good medical practice to preserve the 1 
life and health of the viable unborn child; provided that 
it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health 
of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It is clear from these 
provisions that Missouri has made a judgment that there 
are some physicians primarily interested in performing 1 
abortions when desired by the woman, and that there may be 
tension between this interest and the state interest in 
protecting the potential life of an unborn child. For 
example, the District Court found, and the record supports 
its finding, that the dilatation-and-evacuation procedure 1 
{D&E) of abortion "carries no chance of fetal survival." 
483 F. Supp., at 694. 10 The presence of a second 
lOAt a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that 
viability is possible, the fetus is sufficiently large 
that it must be dismembered, and the skull must be 
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See 
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 
655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29. 
' 11. 
physician could be a safeguard against the improper use of 
this procedure. 
Perhaps the most persuasive argument relied on by 1 
plaintiffs is that the presence of a second physician is 
not required for any other medical or surgical procedure, 
including childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. 
The answer given by the State to this argument, in effect, 
is that abortions are unique. In other situations, the 1 
patient's primary interest is in preserving her own 
hetfith. Exceptions to this, of course, are childbirth and 
where an infant must be delivered prematurely. Yet, in 
H..~ d-/d 
these situations, the mother ardently desires that ~ be 
~ 
born safely and heal thy. 
II 
She also naturally hopes to 1 
survive herself in good health. Thus, there rarely if 
ever is a conflict of interests between the principal 
actors. 
The situation is different with respect to the woman 
who on her own initiative seeks an abortion. This is a 1 
surgical procedure she may desire for no health reason and 
solely to avoid childbirth. To be sure, if told that the 
fetus is or may be viable, many mothers who otherwise 
would like to have an abortion may determine not to do so. 
~ 
But ~ does not alter the decision of all mothers and the 1 
State's assumption that some physicians will accord 
primacy to the wishes of the woman cannot be viewd as 
unreasonable. After all, the State's interest is 
compelling and this necessarily supports the right of a 
State to impose some burdens on the woman's choice 1 
of 
in£ i ic teel-"""t!f>OR -tfie-- f~us. Moreover, certain procedures 
that are almost certainly fatal to the fetus may not be 
necessary to protect the health or 1 i fe of the woman or 
may have to be abandoned when complications 
that a preservable human not often be 
llsee gener ly ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, 
supra n. 11, (live-birth rate as high as 7% for 
intrauterine nstillation of uterotonic agents); Grimes & 
Cates, The r ief for H ertonic Saline, 15 Contemporary 
Ob/Gyn 2 , 38 (1980); Stroh & Hinman, Reported Live Births 
Follo Induced Abortion: Two and One-Half Years' 
Ex 1ence 1n U state New Yor , Am. J. 0 stet. 
G ecol. 83 (1976) (26 following saline induced-abortions; 
Footnote continued on next page. 
~~-~~~ . . 
'j-lt«~~'<.-f.. .4.-~ ~~ ~.,L ~c; d 








t~b~rtions should not 
and then only for serious 
· second-doctor requirement "has both logical and biological 1 
justifications," id., at 163, and bears a reasonable 
relationship to the State interest in protecting the lives 
of viable unborn children. We reverse the Court of 
Appeals on this issue. 
The most vulnerable State regulations are those that 
apply to adult women during the first trimester. Section 
188.047, requiring a pathology report after every 
9 following hysterotomy: 
abortion): 
1 following oxtyocin-induced 
~ 
12There is no clearly expressed excepti n on the 
face of the statute for the performance of an a ortion of 
a viable fetus without the second physician in a tendance. 
I . . . . 
w~e. The last clause of §188.030.3 qualif~ 
at least the last part of the provision with t e phra~ e 
"provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the 
life or health of the woman." It-ma¥ ~ t~a-t this clause 
w · · · ot 
pe oM b 1 e . See H . L • v . Matheson , 4 50 U . S . 3 9 8 , 4 0 7 n . 14 
(1981) (rejecting argument that statute might apply to 
ind · viduals with emergency health care needs). n an 
ase, we need not 1nva 1 e a o erw1se constitution 
laws simply because they ~, if applied--~--~~~ 







abortion, is such a regulation. The question is whether 
~ i i,L... sri e~.,r o.f the requirement burdens a woman's abortion 1 
decision. We think it does not. 
In its regulation of hospital services within the 
~ 
state, Missouri requires "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, ,.. 
with the exception of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, 
hernial sacs, and prepuces, shall be examined by a 1 
pathologist, either on the premises or by arrangement 
outside the hospital." See 13 CSR 50-20.030(3}(A}.7 
(1977}. Although Missouri apparently does not require 
pathology reports in all procedures, or in all surgical 
operations outside of a hospital, "not all distinction 1 
between abortion and other procedures is forbidden." 
Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti I}, 428 U.S. 132, 149 (1976}. 
Section §188.047, on its face and in effect, is reasonably 
related to generally accepted medical standards and 
maternal health. 13 
13The District Court noted that several medical 
experts testified that pathology should be done in every 
case of abortion. See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 49. 
Moreover, the standards for abortion services of the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG} 
state that for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory outpatient basis: 
Footnote continued on next page. 
2 
' 15. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology 
examinations are "clearly" "useful and even necessary in 
some cases," because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn 
of serious, possibly fatal disorders." 655 F.2d, at 870. 
The State may be justified in singling out abortions 2 
because it is the one surgical procedure frequently 
performed outside of hospitals that affects the 
reproductive capabilities of patients. There are still 
Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a 
pathologist for an examination. In the 
situation of elective termination of pregnancy, 
the attending physician should record a 
description of the gross products. Unless 
definite embryonic or fetal parts can be 
identified, the products of elective 
interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to 
a pathologist for gross and microscopic 
examination. 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th 
ed. 1982) (emphasis added). The standards of the National 
Abortion Federation, whose members include the 
institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: 
{ 
All tissue must be examined grossly at the time 
of the abortion procedure by a physician or 
trained assistant and the results recorded in 
the chart. In the absence of visible fetal 
parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low 
power microscope for the detection of villi. If 
this examination is inconclusive, the tissue 
should be sent to the nearest suitable pathology ? 
laboratory for microscopic examination. (~~~ 
National Abortion Federation, National Abortion Federation 
Standards 22 (1981). See Brief of the American Public 
Health Association as Amicus Curiae 29 n. 6 in Nos. 81-
185, 81-746 & 81-1172 (supporting the National Abortion 
Federation standards for nonhospi tal abortion facilities 
as constituting "minimum standards"). 
' 16. 
some unanswered questions about the long-range 
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent 2 
pregnancies. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard 
Cates). It is thought that recorded pathology reports, in 
concert with abortion complication reports, should provide 
a statistical basis on which to study those 
complications. 14 2 
Plaintiffs contend that the additional cost of a 
tissue examination is ~ly burdensome; that the 
requirement of an examination by a pathological cannot be 
justified under traditional medical cost/benefit analysis; 
that such an examination in every case is simply 2 
unnecessary and serves no rational purpose; and is 
duplicative of the gross examination the performing 
..... 
physic ian makes in every case. Indeed, plaintiffs note, 
§188.047 does not specify whether the pathologist must 
make a microscopic examination15 and does not impose any 2 
14section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report 
be sent to the State's division of health. 
l5state regulations, however, state: "All reports 
shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If 
fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an 
accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed 
with the Division of Health." 13 CSR 50-151.030(1). 
' 17. 
time limits within which the examination must be 
conducted, thereby obviating somewhat the reasons for the 
examination~We need not, however, balance the costs and 
benefits to determine whether §188.047 is constitutional. 
We agree with the District Court that "the Court has not 2 
been shown that the increase in cost per abortion 
procedure resulting from the required tissue examination 
will constitute an undue burden on a woman seeking an 
abortion." 483 F. Supp., at 699-700. The estimated cost 
of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services 2 
is $19.40 per abortion performed. 16 The pathology 
requirement, like the Missouri record-keeping requirements 
upheld in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 u.s. 52 (1976), "can be useful to the 
State's interest in protecting the health of its female 2 
citizens, and may be a resource that is relevant to 
decisions involving medical experience and judgment," id., 
16 See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 48. There was also 
testimony in the District Court that the additional cost 
of pathology would range from $10.00, for a gross 
examination, to $40.00, in cases where multiple 
microscopic examinations of the tissue were necessary. 
See ibid. 
the abort· · · n or on the physician-
patient relationship." See id., at 81. Accordingly, we 2 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
It is settled that the State's special concern for 
the parent-child relationship will not support a State-
granted parental veto over a minor's abortion decision. 2 
See Danforth, 428 u.s., at 74-75. 18 Nor may the State 
itself retain the arbitrary right of veto over a mature 
minor's abortion. A majority of the Justices of this 
~ 
Court, however, ~ indicated approval of a narrowly 
drafted statute allowing minors judicially determined to 2 
17The Danforth Court also noted that "[t] he added 
requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception 
for public health officers, and for retention for seven 
years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and 
persuade us in our determination of the constitutional 
limits." 428 U.S., at 81. Missouri extends the identical 
safeguards found reassuring in Danforth to the pathology 
reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§188.055.2, 
188.060. 
18Th is Court in Danforth held unconstitutional 
Missouri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried 
minors under the age of 18. See 428 U.S., at 72, 75. In 
response to our decision, Missouri enacted the section 
challenged here. This new statute became effective 





be mature to make their own abortion decisions, while 
requiring immature minors to obtain a consent-substitute, 
such as parental permission or judicial authorization 
predicated upon a determination of the minor's best 
interests. 19 See Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 
u.s. 622, 643-644, 647-648 (1979) (plurality opinion for 
four Justices): id., at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting) 
(expressing approval of absolute parental consent 
19The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 
(1979) , also require that the alternative to parental 
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue 
"will be completed with anonymity and sufficient 
expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an 
abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality 
is assured by the statutoryrequirement that allows the 
minor to use her initials on the petition. See Mo. Stat. 
§188.028.2(1). As to expedition of appeals, §188.028.2(6) 
provides in relevant part: 
The notice of intent to appeal shall be 
given within twenty-four hours from the date of 
issuance of the order. The record on appeal 
shall be completed and the appeal shall be 
perfected within five days from the filing of 
not ice to appeal. Because time may be of the 
essence regarding the performance of the 
abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, 
by court rule, provide for expedited appellate 
review of cases appealed under this section. 
I 
We believe th~section provides the framework for a 
constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial 
proceedings. Immediately after the effective date of this 
statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined 
enforcement: No unemancipated pregnant minor has been 
required to comply with this 5-tat~o~eory section before an 
abortion is performed. Thus, to this point in time, there 
has been no need for the state Supreme Court to promulgate 
rules concerning appellate review. There is no reason to 
believe that Missouri will not expedite any appeal 
consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
2 
' 20. 
requirement) . 20 The reasons for, and arguments against, 
these rules have been thoroughly explored in prior 2 
opinions, see, e. g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 434-
454 (1981) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Bellotti II, 443 
u.s., at 633-651, and we need not discuss them again in 
detail. 
The issue here is one purely of statutory 
construction. 21 
j I UK . .- oz3. 2 fii}) 
The Missouri statute, I\ in relevant part, 
provides: 
(4) In the decree, the court shall for good 
2 ° C f. H . L . v . Matheson , 4 5 0 U . S . 3 9 8 , 4 0 7 & n . 14 , 
411 (1981) (upholding a parental notification requirement 
but not extending the holding to mature or emancipated 
minors or to immature minors showing such notification 
detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts 
, found that §188.028's notice requirement was 
unconstitutional. See 655 F.2d, at 873; 483 F. Supp., at 
679. The State has not sought review of that judgment 
here. Thus, in the posture in which it appears before 
this Court for review, § 188.028 contains no requirement 
for parental notification. 
21The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" 
women under the age of 18 both from the requirement of 
parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a 
judicial proceeding. The word "emancipated" in this 
context is not void for vagueness. Although the question 
whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the ~ee\:il:i:er: r 
facts and circumstances of, each individual case, the 
1ssouri cour s ave deolared general ~ rules to guide 
that determination, and the term is one of general usage 
and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting 
67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §88, at 811 (1950 ed.)); In re 
the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). It should also be noted that, before a person may 
be successfully prosecuted for a violation of §188.028, 
the State must show that I defendant "knowingly" violated 
the section. \~ 
2 
cause: 
(a) Grant the petition for majority rights 
for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; 
or 
(b) Find the abortion to be in the best 
interests of the minor and give judicial consent 
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for 
so finding; or 
(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the 
grounds on which the petition is denied[.] 
On its face, §188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts to 
2 
2 
do (a) , (b) , or (c) . The Court of Appeals concluded that 2 
a denial of the petition permitted in subsection (c) 
"would initially require the court to find that the minor 
was not emancipated and was not mature enough to make her 
own decision and that an abortion was not in her best 
interests." 655 F.2d, at 858. Plaintiffs contend that 
this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a 
statute y to avoid a danger of 
~ 
The Court of Appeals was gegRizaRt o£ 
1\ 
unconstitutionality. 
the £~ot that if the 
2 
statute provides discretion to deny permission to a minor 3 
for~ "good cause," it would violate the principles set 
forth in Danforth and Bellotti II. See 655 F.2d, at 858. 
The court, however, reached the logical conclusion that 
"findings and the ultimate denial of the petition must be 
' 22. 
supported by a showing of 'good cause.'" Ibid. Before 3 
exercising any option, the juvenile court must receive 
evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, 
intellect and understanding of the minor." The Court of 
Appeals rationally found that a court could not deny a 
petition, "for good cause," unless it first found--after 3 
having received the required evidence--that the minor was 
not mature enough to make her own decision. 22 ~, 
s~ J-
pftQ" Bellotti II,. ..there wQuld be no legally sH:ffjci,e~ 
~ 
reason to deny a. petiHon if eszidence demonstratgd tha~ 
minor wa..»- .._ sqffi~ien.tly matlJ,te tQ make Qer own decision ) 3 
W..e.~~ 
Thus.:,- ~ eel ietlQ the Court rc:r 
interpreted the statute, and 
of Appeals correctly 
as interprete.:l. §188.028 
22Missouri argues that, under state law, "for good 
cause" is "'a cause or reason sufficient in law.'" State 
v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1971) (quoting Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary 978 (1976)). The 
Missouri courts concede, however, in a variety of 
contexts, that the commonly used legal phrase "for good 
cause" "is not susceptible of precise definition," Vaughn 
v. Ripley, 416 S.W.2d 226, 228 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967), and 
that "'good cause' depends upon the circumstances of the 
individual case," Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 
(Mo. 1963) . A finding of its existence "lies largely in 
the discretion of the .•• court to which the decision is 
committed," ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial 
purpose in a matter addressed primarily to the conscience 
of the court," Corzine v. Scott, 505 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1974). ~This discretion, however, no doubt is 
{
limited to choice that are "a cause or reason sufficient 
in law." We are unwilling to assume that the discretion 
given to the Missouri courts includes the privilege of 
ignoring this Court's constitutional decision::J 
' 2 3. 
avoids the infirmities of the state statute reviewed in 
Bellotti Ir. 23 
3 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it 
invalidated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization 
requirement and upheld the State's parental consent 
provision, is affirmed. The judgment in validating the 
requirement of a pathology report for all abortions and 3 
the requirement that a second physician attend the 
abortion of any viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the 
judgment upholding an award of attorneys' fees for all 
hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys and remand for 
proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eckerhart, u.s. 
23Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ~ 
ambiguity of §188.028.2(4), as evidenced by the differing 
interpretations placed upon it ) &y b9asonahle j~dicial~ 
· _,~ the appropriate course of judicial 
restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398, 
407 (1981); Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 146-147. Plaintiffs 
did not, however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the 
court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification 
procedure whereby this Court can refer questions of state 
statutory construction to the state supreme court, see 655 
F.2d, at 861 n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, 
Federal Practice and Procedure §4248, at 525 n. 29 (Supp. 
1982), which procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis 
in Bellotti I, 428 u.s., at 151. Moreover, where, as 
here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction that 
obviates the need to have the state courts render the 
saving construction, L~e ±-s--- 'l'le--.... zHHsd for ~ federal 
courts to abstain. ----------_ ~  
~bJ·~~ 
3 
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• 
It is so ordered. 
CHAMBERS DRAFT: Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 
Nos. 81-1255, 81-1623 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
This case, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive 
Health, Inc., ante, p. ___ , and Simopoulos v. Virginia, post, p. ___ , 
presents questions as to the validity of state regulations governing 
the performance of abortions. 
I 
On June 30, 1979, the day after Missouri's abortion regulations 
went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., 
two doctors who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
several sections of the new bill. The sections relevant here 
include Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that 
abortions after twelve weeks of pregnancy be performed in a 
hospitall; §188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 




Rev. Stat. §188.025 provides: "Every abortion 
subsequent to the first twelve weeks of 
shall be performed in a hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at 
time of abortion shall be submitted to a board 
eligible or certified pathologist, who shall 
file a copy of the tissue report with the state 
division of health, and who shall provide a copy 
of the report to the abortion facility or 
hospital in which the abortion was performed or 
induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
the 
during abortions performed after viability3 ; and §188.028, requiring 
minors to secure parental or judicial consent.4 
3Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be 
performed or induced only where there is in 
attendance a physician other than the physician 
performing or adducing the abortion who shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical 
care for a child born as a result of the 
abortion. During the performance of the 
abortion, the physician performing it, and 
subsequent to the abortion, the physician 
required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with 
good medical practice, consistent with the 
procedure used, to perserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it 
does not pose an increased risk to the life or 
health of the woman." 
4Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an 
abortion upon a pregnant woman under the age of 
eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured 
the informed written consent of the minor and 
one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the 
attending physician has received the informed 
written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right 
to self-consent to the abortion by court order 
pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and 
the attending physician has received the 
informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to 
the abortion by court order, and the court has 
given its informed written consent in accordance 
with subsection 2 of this section, and the minor 
is having the abortion willingly, in compliance 
with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent 
Footnote continued on next page. 
After hearing testimony from a number of expert witnesses, the 
"· 
to an abortion under subdivision (3) of 
subsection 1 of this section or court consent 
under subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this 
section may be granted by a court pursuant to 
the following procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an 
application to the juvenile court which shall 
assist the minor or next friend in preparing the 
petition and notices required pursuant to this 
section. The minor or the next friend of the 
minor shall thereafter file a petition setting 
forth the initials of the minor; the age of the 
minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are 
deceased and no guardian has been appointed, any 
other person standing in loco parentis of the 
minor; that the minor has been fully informed of 
the risks and consequences of the abortion; that 
the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient 
intellectual capacity to consent to the 
abortion; that, if the court does not grant the 
minor majority rights for the purpose of consent 
to the abortion, the court should find that the 
abortion is in the best interest of the minor 
and give judicial consent to the abortion; that 
the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have 
private counsel, that the court should appoint 
counsel. The petition shall be signed by the 
minor or the next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the 
petition, to be held on the record, shall be 
held as soon as possible, within five days of 
the filing of the petition •... At the hearing, 
the court shall hear evidence relating to the 
emotional development, rna tur i ty, intellect and 
understanding of the minor; the nature, possible 
consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; 
and any other evidence that the court may find 
useful in determining whether the minor should 
be granted majority rights for the purpose of 
consenting to the abortion or whether the 
abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
" ( 4) In the decree, the court shall for 
Footnote continued on next page. 
District Court invalidated each of these sections, except the 
pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 (1980) • 5 The 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the District 
Court's judgment with respect to §188.028, thereby upholding the 
requirement that a minor secure parental or judicial consent to an 
4. 
abortion. It also held that the District Court erred in sustaining 
§188.047, the pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment 
with respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, and 
the case was remanded for further proceedings and findings relating 
good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights 
for the purpose of consenting to the abortion; 
or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best 
interests of the minor and give judicial consent 
to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for 
so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the 
grounds on which the petition is denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then 
she shall be or ally informed of and, if 
possible, sign the written consent required by 
section 188.039 in the same manner as an adult 
person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion 
may be performed against the will of a minor 
pursuant to a court order described in 
subdivision (4) of subsection 1 of this section 
that the abortion is necessary to perserve the 
life of the minor." 
5The District Court also awarded attorney's fees 
for all hours claimed by the plaintiffs' attorneys. See 
655 F.2d 848, 872 (CAS 1981). 
to the second-trimester hospitalization requirement. 655 F.2d 848, 
872-873 (1981). On remand, the District Court affirmed its holding 
that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement was 
unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 
F.2d 687, 691 (1981). 
We granted certiorari. u.s. (1982). We now affirm the 
Court of Appeals' judgment invalidating the Missouri hospitalization 
requirement and upholding the parental consent requirement, but 
reverse the judgment holding the pathology report and the second-
physician requirements unconstitutional.6 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state statutes 
regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated here. With 
these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes at issue. 
II 
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at general or 
special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on 
Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Osteopathic 
Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitalization requirements 
are similar to those enacted by Akron, as all second-trimester 
abortions must be performed in general, acute-care facilities. 7 For 
6The petition also raises the issue whether an 
award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 u.s.c. 
§ 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to 
which plaintiffs prevailed. See n. 5, supra. As to this 
issue, the judgment is vacated and remanded in light of 
our decision in Hensley v. Eckerhart, U.S. (1983). 
Footnote(s) 7 will appear on following pages. 
the reasons stated at some length in City of Akron, we held that 
such a requirement "unreasonably infringes upon a woman's 
constitutional right to obtain an abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For 
the same reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment that 
§188.025 is unconstitutional. We turn now to the State's second-
physician requirement. 
III 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized as 
~· 
7Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in 
its statutory prov1s1ons regulating abortions. We 
therefore must assume, as did the courts below, see 483 F. 
Supp., at 686 n. 10; 664 F.2d, at 689-690 & nn. 3, 5 & 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-
care facility. Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.015(2) (Supp. 
1982) (defining "abortion facility" as "a clinic, 
physician's office, or any other place or facility in 
which abortions are performed other than a hospital"). 
Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of Missouri's hospital 
licensing laws, reads: 
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to 
the maintenance and operation of facilities for 
the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less 
than twenty-four hours in any week of three or 
more nonrelated individuals suffering from 
illness, disease, injury, deformity or other 
abnormal physical conditions; or a place devoted 
primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical care for 
three or more nonrelated individuals •••. " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. §197.200(1) (1978) (defining 
"ambulatory surgical center" to include facilities "with 
an organized medical staff of physicians" and "with 
continuous physician services and registered professional 
nursing services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 
13 Mo. Admin Code 50-30.010 (1) (A) (1977) (same). The 
regulations for the Department of Social Services 
establish standards for the construction, physical 
facilities, and administration of hospitals. See id., 
§§50-20.010 to -20.030 (1977). These are not unlike those 
set by the JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13 & n. 16. 
compelling the interest of a State in the life of a viable fetus: 
"[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human 
life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion 
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for 
the preservation of the life or health of the mother." Id., at 164-
165. Several of the Missouri statutes undertake such regulation. 
Post-viability abortions are proscribed except when necessary to 
preserve the life or the health of the mother. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§188.030.1 (Supp. 1982}. The State also forbids the use of abortion 
procedures fatal to the viable fetus unless alternative procedures 
pose a greater risk to the health of the mother. See §188.030.2. 
The statute at issue in this case requires the attendance of a 
second physician at the abortion of a viable fetus. See §188.030.3. 
The lower courts held that this requirement is invalid. 
The plaintiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance 
on the grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impractical and 
costly. They note that Missouri does not require two physicians in 
attendance for any other medical or surgical procedure, including 
childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. These are not 
insubstantial arguments, and we view the issue as a close one. 
Our cases repeatedly have held that the State's interest in the 
potential life of a viable fetus is compelling. The State has 
latitude in regulating after viability. See Beal v. Doe, 432 u.s. 
438, 445-446 (1977}: Roe, 410 u.s., at 164-165. The fetus is 
uniquely vulnerable at this stage and, as recognized in Roe, the 
. ' 
'8. 
abortion decision no longer is entrusted solely to the mother and 
her physician. See id., at 165-166. 
Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician "shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child born 
as a result of the abortion." Moreover, the statute requires that 
the physician "be in attendance" during the abortion and "take all 
reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice •.. to 
preserve the life and health of the viable unborn child; provided 
that it does not pose an increased risk to the life or health of the 
woman." Seen. 3, supra. It is clear from these provisions that 
Missouri has made a judgment that there are some physicians 
primarily interested in performing abortions when desired by the 
woman, and that there may be tension between this interest and the 
state interest in protecting the potential life of an unborn child. 
For example, the District Court found that the dilatation-and-
evacuation procedure (D&E) of abortion "carries no chance of fetal 
survival."B 483 F. Supp., at 694. The presence of a second 
physician could be a safeguard against the improper and unnecessary 
use of this procedure. 
The tension between the State's interest and the primary 
concern of the woman's physician also explains why a second 
physician is required for third-trimester abortions but not for any 
8At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that 
viability is possible, the fetus is sufficiently large 
that it must be dismembered, and the skull must be 
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See 
655 F.2d, at 865 & n. 29. 
other medical or surgical procedure, including childbirth or 
delivery of a premature infant.9 In most situations, a patient's 
primary interest is in preserving her own health. Exceptions to 
this, of course, are childbirth and where an infant must be 
'9. 
delivered prematurely. In these situations, the mother ardently 
desires that the child be born safely and is healthy, although she 
naturally hopes to survive in good health. 
The situation often is different with respect to the woman who 
seeks an abortion. Many pregnant women who otherwise would have an 
abortion may determine not to do so if the fetus is viable. But the 
9The courts below found the statutory provision 
unconstitutional because there is no possible 
justification for a second-physician requirement: no 
viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. See 483 E'. 
Supp., at 694; 655 F.2d, at 865. As the Court of Appeals 
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is 
subject to the requirements of §188.030.2. See id., at 
865 & n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be used when the fetus 
is viable and other methods are more likely to preserve 
its life but not pose a greater risk to the woman's life 
or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified 
they would not use D&E in third-trimester); American 
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of Midtr imester 
Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or 
similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that there is 
an exact correspondence between the situations in which 
there are compelling medical reasons for per forming any 
abortion after viability and the method that presents the 
least risk to the mother--r9 D&E. Cf. 655 F.2d, at 865 
(experts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after 
viability). We therefore cannot assume that all third-
trimester abortions will be D&E abortions, thus precluding 
all possibility of live birth. The possibility that does 
exist, plus the constant threat that any D&E abortion 
might have to be abandoned because of complications, 
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at 
every third-trimester abortion. 
10. 
viability of the fetus will not alter the decision of all women, and 
the State's assumption that some physicians will accord primacy to 
the wishes of these woman cannot be viewed as unreasonable. The 
State's interest is compelling, and this necessarily justifies 
imposition of some burdens on the woman's choice following viability 
of the fetus. 
We believe the second-physician requirement furthers the 
State's compelling interest in potential life, particluarly in those 
cases where the abortion does result in a live birth. 10 It is true 
that the medical literature indicates that preserving the potential 
life of a viable fetus during a third trimester abortion often is 
not possible. 11 But use of methods that are fatal to the fetus are 
not always required to preserve the life and health of the mother. 
The State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for these 
few instances of live birth. The second physician, in those 
emergency situations under which Missouri permits any third-
trimester abortion, 12 may be of assistance to the mother's physician 
10see ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 9, at 
4 {as high as 7% live-birth rate for intrauterine 
instillation of uterotonic agents): Grimes & Cates, The 
Brief for Hypertonic Saline, 15 Contemporary Ob/Gyn 29,-:nr 
{1980) {increasing number of live-born fetuses in 
prostaglandin abortions): Stroh & Hinman, Reported Live 
Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-Half Years' 
Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. 
Gynecol. 83, 83-84 {1976) {26 live births following saline 
induced-abortions: 9 following hysterotomy: 1 following 
oxtyocin-induced abortion). 
llsee Stoh & Himman, supra n. 10, at 88 {one 
survival out of thirty-eight live births). 
12There is no clearly expressed exception on the 
face of the statute for the performance of an abortion of 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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in preserving the health of the child. We thus believe the second-
doctor requirement bears a reasonable relationship to the State 
interest in protecting the lives of viable unborn children. We 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that §188.030.3 
is unconstitutional. 
IV 
The most suspect state regulations are those that apply to 
mature women during the first trimester. We have made clear that 
even "minor regulations on the abortion procedure during the first 
trimester may not interfere with physician-patient consultation or 
with the woman's choice between abortions and childbirth." City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. Nevertheless, even in the early weeks of 
pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on 
the woman's exercise of her right may be permissible where justified 
by important state health objectives." Ante, at 11. Section 
188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion performed. 
The question is whether this requirement unconstitutionally burdens 
a woman's abortion decision. We hold that it does not. 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the exception 
a viable fetus without the second physician in attendance. 
There may be emergency situations where, for example, the 
woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section 
§188.030.3 is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase 
"provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the 
life or health of the woman." This clause reasonably 
could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. 
v. Matheson, 450 u.s. 398, 407 n. 14 (1981) (rejecting 
argument that Utah statute might apply to individuals with 
emergency health care needs). 
of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and prepuces, 
shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the premises or by 
arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-
12. 
20.030(3) (A)7 (1977). Although Missouri apparently does not require 
pathology reports in all procedures, "[t]his does not mean that a 
State never may enact a regulation touching on the woman's abortion 
right during the first weeks of pregnancy." City of Akron, ante, at 
11. The specific issue here is whether §188.047, which on its face 
and in effect is reasonably related to generally accepted medical 
standards and maternal health, 1 3 "further[s] important health-
13A pathological examination is designed to as~ist 
in the detection of fatal ectopic pregnanc1es, 
hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous growths, and a 
variety of other problems that can only be discovered 
through a pathological examination. The District Court 
noted that several medical experts testified that 
pathology should be done in every case of abortion. 483 
F. Supp., at 700 n. 49. See The Abortion Profiteers, 
Chicago Sun Times (1978) (special report), at 26, col. 3 
(quoting Dr. Willard Cates, head of abortion surveillance 
for the National Center for Disease Control, as saying 
"pathological reports are so important that no clinic 
should allow a patient to leave the premises without 
one"). Moreover, the ACOG standards for abortion services 
state that for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be 
subsmi tted to a pathologist for an examination. In 
the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, the 
attending physician should record a description of the 
gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts 
can be identified, the products of elective interruptions 
of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for gross 
and microscopic examination." ACOG, Standards for 
Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis 
added) . The standards of the National Abortion Federation 
(NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs 
in this case, itself provides: "All tissue must be 
examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by 
a phbsician or trained assistant and the results recorded 
in t e chart. In the absence of visible fetal parts or 
placenta upon gross examination, obtained tissue may be 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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related State concerns," ante, at 12, without interfering with the 
woman's decision to have an abortion. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examinations are 
"clearly" "useful and even necessary in some cases," because 
"abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, possibly fatal 
disorders." 655 F.2d, at 870. Examining tissue removed during an 
abortion provides a State with an unique opportunity to further its 
interest in promoting the health of its citizens. Additionally, 
questions about the long-range complications of abortions and their 
effect on subsequent pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony 
of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.): Levin, et al., Association of Induced 
Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 
(1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with abortion 
complication reports, provide a statistical basis to study those 
complications. 14 Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. 
examined under a low power microscope If this 
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to 
the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic 
examination." NAF, National Abortion Federation Standards 
6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance with standards 
obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good 
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health 
Association as Amicus Curiae in Simopoulos and City of 
Akron 29 n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-
hospital abortion facilities as constituting "minimum 
standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan 
Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, 
Maintenance and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient 
Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination must be 
performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis 
must be done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation 
is inadequate or does not confirm a normal gestation."). 
l4section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report 
be sent to the State's division of health. 
14. 
Danforth, 428 u.s. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the additional cost of a 
tissue examination is a significant burden on a pregnant woman's 
abortion decision. 15 The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff 
Reproductive Health Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 
F. Supp., at 700 n. 48. 16 We think this minor burden is justified, 
like the Missouri record-keeping requirements upheld in Planned 
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, supra, as "useful to the 
State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, 
and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical 
experience and judgment," 428 u.s., at 81. 17 In sum, "we see no 
legally significant impact or consequence on the abortion decision 
or on the physician-patient relationship." See id., at 81. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this 
15Plaintiffs also note that §188.047 does not 
specify whether the pathologist must make a microscopic 
examination. State regulations, however, state: "All 
reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. 
If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an 
accompanying microscopic tissue report must also be filed 
with the Division of Health." 13 Mo. Admin. Code 50-
151.030 (1) (1981). 
l6There was testimony in the District Court that the 
additional cost of pathology would range from $10.00 to 
$40.00. See 483 F. Supp., at 700 n. 48. 
17The Danforth Court also noted that "[t] he added 
requirements for confidentiality, with the sole exception 
for public health officers, and for retention for seven 
years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and 
persuade us in our determination of the constitutional 
limits." 428 u.s., at 81. Missouri extends the identical 
safeguards found reassuring in Danforth to the pathology 
reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§188.055.2, 




As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards with 
respect to parental consent requirements are not in dispute. A 
State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a 
requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial. 
We have cautioned, however, that "the State must provide an 
alternative procedure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that 
she is sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her best 
interests." 18 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 19 The issue here is 
18The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 
(1979) (Bellotti II), also required that the alternative 
to parental consent must "assure" that the resolution of 
this issue "will be completed with anonymity and 
sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity 
for an abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. 
Confidentiality here is assured by the statutory 
requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on 
the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). 
As to expedition of appeals, §188.028.2(6) provides in 
relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given 
within twenty-four hours from the date of 
issuance of the order. The record on appeal 
shall be completed and the appeal shall be 
perfected within five days from the filing of 
notice to appeal. Because time may be of the 
essence regarding the performance of the 
abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, 
by court rule, provide for expedited appellate 
review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a 
constitutionally sufficient means of expediting judicial 
proceedings. Immediately after the effective date of this 
statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined 
enforcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been 
Footnote continued on next page. 
Footnote(s) 19 will appear on following pages. 
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one purely of statutory construction: whether Missouri provides a 
judicial alternative that is consistent with these established legal 
standards. 20 
The Missouri statute, §188.028.2,21 in relevant part, provides: 
1' ... ' 
required to comply with this section. Thus, to this point 
in time, there has been no need for the state Supreme 
Court to promulgate rules concerning appellate review. 
There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not 
expedite any appeal consistent with the mandate in our 
prior opinions. 
l9cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 u.s., at 406-407 & n.l4, 
411 (upholding a parental notification requirement but not 
extending the holding to mature or emancipated minors or 
to immature minors showing such notification detrimental 
to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. See 
655 F.2d, at 873; 483 F. Supp., at 701. The State has not 
sought review of that judgment here. Thus, in the posture 
in which it appears before this Court for review, §188.028 
contains no requirement for parental notification. 
20The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" 
women under the age of 18 both from the requirement of 
parental consent and from the alternative requirement of a 
judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the word 
"emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but 
we disagree. Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using 
word to describe a minor). Although the question whether 
a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts and 
circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts 
have adopted general rules to guide that determination, 
and the term is one of general usage and understanding in 
the Missouri common law. See Black v. Cole, 626 S.W.2d 
397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C.J .S. Parent and 
Child §86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 
535 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. 
Wurth, 313 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd 
on other grounds, 322 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1959). It should 
also be noted that, before a person may be successfully 
prosecuted for a violation of §188.028, the State must 
show that the defendant "knowingly" violated the section. 
21see n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held 
unconstitutional Missouri's parental consent requ1rement 
for all unmarried minors under the age of 18. 428 u.s., 
at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the 
purpose of consenting to the abortion: or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of 
the minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, 
setting forth the grounds for so finding: or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, §188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts to do (a), 
(b), or (c). The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the 
petition permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the 
17. 
court to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not mature 
enough to make her own decision and that an abortion was not in her 
best interests." 655 F.2d, at 858. Plaintiffs contend that this 
interpretation is unreasonable. We do not agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals was 
aware that if the statute provides discretion to deny permission to 
a minor for~ "good cause," it would violate the principles that 
this Court has set forth. Ibid. The court, however, reached the 
logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate denial of the 
petition must be supported by a showing of 'good cause.'" Ibid. 
Before exercising any option, the juvenile court must receive 
evidence on "the emotional development, maturity, intellect and 
understanding of the minor." Mo. Rev. Stat. §188.028.2(3) (Supp. 
1982) • The Court of Appeals rationally found that a court could not 
section challenged here. This new statute became 
effective shortly before our decision in Bellotti II. 
18. 
deny a petition, "for good cause," unless it first found--after 
having received the required evidence--that the minor was not mature 
enough to make her own decision. 22 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 u.s. 
622, 643-644, 647-648 {1979) {plurality opinion). We conclude that 
the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute, and as 
interpreted §188.028 avoids constitutional infirmities. 23 
··':.t. 
22Missouri argues that, under state law, "for good 
cause" is "'a cause or reason sufficient in law.'" State 
v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1, 5 {Mo. 1971) {quoting Webster's 
Third New International Dictionary). The Missouri courts 
recognize, however, in a variety of contexts, that the 
commonly used legal phrase "for good cause" "is not 
susceptible of precise definition," Vaughn v. Ripley, 416 
S • W. 2 d 2 2 6 , 2 2 8 { Mo • A pp • 19 6 7 ) , and that " ' [ g] ood cause ' 
depends upon the circumstances of the individual case," 
Wilson v. Morris, 369 S.W.2d 402, 407 {Mo. 1963). A 
finding of 1ts existence "lies largely in the discretion 
of the court to which the decision is committed," 
ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial purpose in a 
matter addressed primarily to the conscience of the 
court," Corzine v. Stoff, 505 S.W.2d 162, 164 {Mo. App. 
1973). This discretion, however, no doubt is limited to 
choices that are not inconsistent with the federal 
Constitution. 
23Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the 
ambiguity of §188.028.2{4), as evidenced by the differing 
interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate course of 
judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found 
such an approach appropriate. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 
u.s., at 407: Bellotti v. Baird, 428 u.s. 132, 146-147 
{1976) {Bellott1 I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue 
in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and 
Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court 
can refer questions of state statutory construction to the 
state supreme court. See 655 F.2d, at 861 n. 20: 17 c. 
Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure §4248, at 525 n. 29 {1978 & Supp. 1982). Such a 
procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti 
I. Supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute 1s 
susceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need 
to have the state courts render the saving construction, 
there is no reason for federal courts to abstain. Cf. 
City of Akron, ante, at 23-24. 
19. 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invalidated 
Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization requirement and upheld 
the State's parental consent provision, is affirmed. The judgment 
invalidating the requirement of a pathology report for all abortions 
and the requirement that a second physician attend the abortion of 
any viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an 
award of attorneys' fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' 
attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. 
Eckerhart, u.s. (1983}. 
It is so ordered. 
il •• • ~ • 
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Nos. 81-1255 AND 81-1623 
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81-1255 v. 
JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
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JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
MISSOURI, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
81-1623 v. 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSOCIATION OF 
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI, INC., 
ET AL., PETITIONERS 
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --- , and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. , two 
~~~:s who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic ("plain-
tiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the Western 
District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, several 
sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the performance 
81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION 
2 PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 
of abortions. The sections relevant here include Mo. Rev. 
Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abortions after 12 
weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospital; 1 § 188.047, 
requiring a pathology report for each abortion performed; 2 
§ 188.030, requiring the presence of a second physician during 
abortions performed after viability; 3 and § 188.028, requiring 
minors to secure parental or judicial consent. 4 
After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
• Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
81-1255 & 81-1623--0PINION 
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nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex- I 
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699--701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
. ' 
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§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining § 188.04 7, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. --U.S.-- (1982). I OM~5SION 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the I 
life of the minor." 
6 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CA81981). The petition 
for certiorari raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made 
pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent 
to which plaintiffs prevailed . 
CoiY\biMd_ 
tM._Ho\-u 
-o"'alect ol'(t.. ~~~~eNC.~ 
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all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-




We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
6 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals .... " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
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the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, I 
439 U. S. 379, 386--387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2.ff.rhe statute at I 
issue in this case requires the attendance of a second physi-
. e a · a viable fetus. § 188.030.3. 
g r ~ Se£ti9H 1~. 936-. a provides that the secon p ysician "shall 
"'take control of and provide immediate medi for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." ,The statu e e-
qmres that the physician "be in attendance" during the abor-
tion and "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medi-
cal practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable 
unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk 
to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. 1s 
lear from t hese provisions tnat MisSOUri has rna e a judg-
ent that there are some physicians who may choose a ~ 
method of abortion without fully considering the state inter-
est in protecting the potential life of an unborn child. 7 For 
> '"""~ 
7 Some physicians perform the abortion with no consideration of alterna-
tive methods. The mode of one clinic was described in Danforth: 
"The counseling ... occurs entirely on the day the abortion is to be per-
formed . . . . It lasts for two hours and takes place in groups that include 
both minors and adults who are strangers to one another . . . . The physi-
cian takes no part in this counseling process . . . . Counseling is typically 
limited to a description of abortion procedures, possible complications, and 
birth control techniques .... 
"The abortion itself takes five to seven minutes . . . . The physician has 
no prior contact with the minor, and on the days that abortions are being 
performed at the [clinic], the physician, ... may be performing abortions 
on many other adults and minors. . . . On busy days patients are sched-
uled in separate groups, consisting of five patients . . . . After the abor-
tion [the physician] spends a brief period with the minor and others in the 
--
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example, if a physician chooses th ilatation-and-evacuation 
method (D&E) of abortion, e this method "carries no 
chance of fetal survival." 8 483 F. Supp., at 694. The pres-
ence of a second physician could be a safeguard against the 
improper and unnecessary use of this procedure. I 
The lower courts invalidated this requirement. The plain-
tiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature in-
fant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view 
the issue as a close one. 
The tension -that may exist between the State's interest 
and the primary concern of the woman's physician explains 
why a second physician is required for third-trimester abor-
tions but not for any other medical or surgical procedure, in-
cluding childbirth or delivery of a premature infant. 9 In 
group in the recovery room . . . . " 
428 U.S., at 91-92 n. 2 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for Appel-
lants in Bellotti I, 0. T. 1975, pp.43-44). 
8 At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that viability is possible, 
the fetus is sufficiently large that it must be dismembered, and the skull 
crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See 655 F. 2d, at 
865, and n. 29. 
9 The courts below found the statutory provision unconstitutional be-
cause there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement 
whenever D&E is used, since no viable fetus can survive a D&E proce-
dure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. As the Court of Appeals 
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the require-
ments of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be 
used when the fetus is viable and when other methods are more likely to 
preserve its life bat do not pose a greater risk to the woman's life or health. 
Cf. id., at 865 (so'me physicians testified they would not use D&E in third-
trimester); American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) 
(mortality rate for D&E less than or similar to that of instillation abortions 
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most situations, a patient's primary interest is in preserving 
her own health. Exceptions to this, of course, are childbirth 
and where an infant must be delivered prematurely. In 
these situations, the mother ardently desires that the child 
be born safely and is healthy, although she naturally hopes to 
survive in good health. 
The woman's interest in an abortion often will be at odds 
with the State's interest in preserving potential life. We 
that t.Qe second phys · ian requirement may be necessary 
to furthe~ interest. It may be that preserving the po-
tentiallife of a v1ao e fetus during a third trimester abortion 
often is not possible. 10 But the State legitimately may 
choose to provide safeguards for the comparatively few in-
stances of live birth. And of course, the State has a compel-
ling interest in preserving the life of any child that survives 
the abortion procedure. Viable fetuses will be in immediate 
and grave danger because of their prematurity. The second 
physician, in situations where Missouri permits third-trimes-
ter abortions, 11 may be of assistance to the woman's physician 
up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the record to indicate that D&E will 
be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in every situation in 
which there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abortion 
after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E 
should ever be used after viability). We therefore cannot assume that all 
third-trimester abortions will be D&E abortions, or that there will be no 
live births. Thus, the State's compelling interest in preserving the life of 
the fetus when there is a live birth justifies the State in requiring a second 
physician at every third-trimester abortion. 
10 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 10, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, ~4 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one sur-
vival out of 38 live births).) 
"There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
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in preserving the health of the child. We thus believe the 
second-physician requirement bears a reasonable relationship 
to the State interest in protecting the lives of viable unborn 
children. We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals 
holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
,......-,ttre-..patllo.!J~-i'efR:~Wemt~t. 
IV 
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abor-
tion performed. But even in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
"[c]ertain regulations that have no significant impact on the 
woman's exercise of her rightfi,o decide to have an abortion] 
may be permissible where justffied by important state health" 
objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See Planned Parent-
hood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 80-81 (1976). 
The question is whether§ 188.047 unconstitutionally burdens 
a woman's abortion decision. We hold that it does not. 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and 
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri 
apparently does not require pathology reports in all proce-
dures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid 
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right dur-
ing the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue 
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is 
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards 
and maternal health, 12 "further[s] important health-related 
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
12 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
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State concerns," ante, at 12, without interfering with the 
woman's decision to have an abortion. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tis-
sue removed during an abortion provides a State with an 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered 
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several 
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of 
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards 
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a 
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termina-
tion of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identi-
fied, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted 
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added). 
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose mem-
bers include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tis-
sue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a 
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In 
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, ob-
tained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this 
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suit-
able pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." N AF, National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance 
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good 
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Ami-
cus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the 
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, 
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of 
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination 
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be 
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does 
not confirm a normal gestation."). 
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opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of 
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range 
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent 
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Wil-
lard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abor-
tion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495, 
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with 
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for 
studying those complications. 13 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 
81. 
In light of these factors, we think the small additional cosV4 
of a tissue examination 15 does not significantly burden a preg-
nant woman's abortion decision. 
n Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's 
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest 
in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a re-
source that is relevant to decisions involving medical experi-
ence and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 16 We view the re-
13 Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's 
division of health. 
14 The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. 
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of 
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See 483 F. Supp., at 700, 
n. 48. 
15 Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the pa-
thologist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, how-
ever, state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. 
If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying micro-
scopic tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 
Mo. Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981). 
16 The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in Dan-
forth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
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quirement for a pathology report as comparable and as a 
relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant al standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements Bet in dis-
pme. A State's interest in protecting immature minors will 
sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental 
or judicial. We have cautioned, however, that "the State 
must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant 
minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to 
make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her imma-
turity, an abortion would be in her best interests." 17 City of 
Akron, ante, at 21-22. 18 The issue here is one purely of stat-
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
17 The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II), 
also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that 
the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and suffi-
cient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be 
obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality here is assured by the statutory 
requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on the petition. Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to expedition of appeals, 
§ 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the State Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
18 Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
. . 
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utory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial al-
ternative that is consistent with these established legal 
standards. 19 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2,w in relevant part, 
provides: 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
19 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 0~ 
20 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II . 
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On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 21 to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, tha~before exercising any optiollt>the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
643--644, 647-648 (1979) (plurality opinion). We conclude 
that the Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute 
and that § 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 22 
21 We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II , 443 U.S., at 
643 n. 22. 
22 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4) , as 
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VI -
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is af-
firmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a 
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a 
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is 
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of 
attorneys' fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys 
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eck-
erhart,- U.S.- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts 
to abstain. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
This case, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
- --
Virginia, post, p. --,presents questions as to the validity r--------
of state r-egulations governing e performance of abortions. /J-~ 
I ~~ 
On June 30, 1979, the day after Missouri's abortion :reg:Yla .. ~ -
y---4tn~iOeH-ml~ went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Kansas City,' ~ G.-:....._ , 
Missouri, Inc., two doctors who perform abortions, and an I ~ ·- -~ 
abortion clinic ("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District L--z.., 
Court for the Western District of Missouri challenging, as un- ~ 
constitutional, several sections of the new bill. The sections q . f? s- · 
relevant here include Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), ( ~f ~ \ 
requiring that abortions after twelve weeks of pregnancy be -; 
I 
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performed in a hospital 1; § 188.047, requiring a pathology re-
port for each abortion performed 2; § 188.030, requiring the 
presence of a second physician during abortions performed 
after viability 3; and § 188.028, requiring minors to secure pa-
rental or judicial consent. • 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed subse-
quent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: · 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
where there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to perserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
,• 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated each of these sections, 
except the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 
69~ 701 (1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible, within five days of the filing of the peti-
tion. . . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the 
emotional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the 
minor; the nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; 
and any other evidence that the court may find useful in determining 
whether the minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of 
consenting to the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests 
of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
.. 
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cuit reversed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872--873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). 
We granted certiorari.-- U. S. -- (1982). We now 
affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment invalidating the Mis-
souri hospitalization requirement and upholding the parental 
consent requirement, but reverse the judgment holding the 
pathology report and the second-physician requirements 
unconstitutional. 6 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8--12, has 
stated fully the principles that govern judicial review of state 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to perserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CAS 1981). 
6 The petition also raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, 
made pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the 
extent to which plaintiffs prevailed. See n. 5, supra. As to this issue, 
the judgment is vacated and remanded in light of our decision in Hens ley v. 
Eckerha:rt, U. S. (1983). 
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statutes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 7 For the reasons stated at some length 
in City of Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreason-
ably infringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain 
7 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, a\689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals .... " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. See id., §§ 50-20.010 to -20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by the JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 
13, and n. 16. 
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an abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that§ 188.025 is uncon-
stitutional. We turn now to the State's second-physician 
requirement. 
III 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
as compelling the interest of a State in the life of a viable fe-
tus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potentiality 
of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, 
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical 
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the 
mother." Id., at 164-165. Several of the Missouri statutes 
undertake such regulation. Post-viability abortions are pro-
scribed except when necessary to preserve the life or the 
health of the mother. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 
1982). The State also forbids the use of abortion procedures 
fatal to the viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a 
greater risk to the health of the mother. See § 188.030.2. 
The statute at issue in this case requires the attendance of a 
second physician at the abortion of a viable fetus. See 
§ 188.030.3. The lower courts held that this requirement is 
invalid. 
The plaintiffs, respondents here on this issue, urge affirm-
ance on the grounds that the second-physician requirement 
distorts the traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is 
both impractical and costly. They note that Missouri does 
not require two physicians in attendance for any other medi-
cal or surgical procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a 
premature infant. These are not insubstantial arguments, 
and we view the issue as a close one. 
Our cases repeatedly have held that the State's interest in 
the potential life of a viable fetus is compelling. The State 
has latitude in regulating after viability. See Beal v. Doe, 
432 U. S. 438, 44&-446 (1977); Roe, 410 U. S., at 164-165. 
The fetus is uniquely vulnerable at this stage and, as recog-
-. 
'•.t ' 
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nized in Roe, the abortion decision no longer is entrusted 
solely to the mother and her physician. See id., at 165-166. 
Section 188.030.3 provides that the second physician "shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." Moreover, the statute re-
quires that the physician "be in attendance" during the abor-
tion and "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medi-
cal practice ... to preserve the life and health of the viable 
unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk 
to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It is 
clear from these provisions that Missouri has made a judg-
ment that there are some physicians primarily interested in 
performing abortions when desired by the woman,ttand that 
there may be tension between this interest and the state in-
terest in protecting the potential life of an unborn child. For 
example, the District Court found that the dilatation-and-
evacuation procedure (D&E) of abortion "carries no chance of 
fetal survival." 8 483 F. Supp., at 694. The presence of a 
second physician could be a safeguard against the improper 
and unnecessary use of this procedure. 
e tension between the State's interest and the primary 
concern of the woman's physician also explains why a second 
physician is required for third-trimester abortions but not for 
any other medical or surgical procedure, including childbirth 
or delivery of a premature infant. 9 In most situations, a pa-
8 At a stage late enough in the pregnancy so that viability is possible, 
the fetus is sufficiently large that it must be dismembered, and the skull 
must be crushed, to evacuate the uterus by the D&E procedure. See 655 
F. 2d, at 865, and n. 29. 
9 The courts below found the statutory provision unconstitutional be- ? 
cause there is no possible justification for a second-physician requirement: 
no viable fetus can survive a D&E procedure. See 483 F. Supp., at 694; 
655 F. 2d, at 865. As the Court of Appeals noted, however, the choice of 
D&E after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., 
at 865, and n. 28. · Thus, D&E is not to be used when the fetus is viable 
and other methods are more likely to preserve its life but not pose a 
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tient's primary interest is in preserving her own health. Ex-
ceptions to this, of course, are childbirth and where an infant 
must be delivered prematurely. In these situations, the 
mother ardently desires that the child be born safely and is 
healthy, although she naturally hopes to survive in good 
health. 
The situation often is different with respect to the woman 
who seeks an abortion. Many pregnant women who other-
wise would have an abortion may determine not to do so if 
the fetus is viable. But the viability of the fetus will not al-
ter the decision of all women, and the State's assumption that 
some physicians will accord primacy to the wishes of these 
woman cannot be viewed as unreasonable. The State's in-
terest is compelling, and this necessarily justifies imposition 
of some burdens on the woman's choice following viability of 
the fetus. 
We believe the second-physician requirement furthers the 
State's compelling interest in potential life, · · 
t abo · GeS-.l:f.SU).t-iR-8-li~ 
greater risk to the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians 
testified they would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Meth-
ods of Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or 
similar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing 
in the record to indicate that there is an exact correspondence between the 
situations in which there are compelling medical reasons for performing 
any abortion after viability and the method that presents the least risk to 
the mother is D&E. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (experts disagree whether D&E 
should ever be used after viability). We therefore cannot assume that all 
third-trimester abortions will be D&E abortions, thus precluding all pOS:. 
sffiility orTiv~ The possibility that does exist, plus the constant 
threat that any D&E abortion might have to be abandoned because of com-
plications, justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-
trimester abortion. 
10 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 9, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Grimes & 
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It is true that the medical literature indicates that preserving 
the potential life of a viable fetus during a third trimester 
abortion often is not possible. 11 But use of methods that are 
fatal to the fetus are not always required to preserve the life 
and health of the mother. The State legitimately may ~ 
choose to provide safeguards for ~fistances of live ,....~~...Lo .L. : .. /. 
birth. The second physician, in those emerg8W!.y situations ~.._..,~ 
Missouri permits ar;y third-trimester abortio~ ..>; -----
~ ssistance to the motber's physician in preserving _ ~ - 9 
_ the health of the child. We thus believe the second-~ ) -/h.#1 
requirement bears a reasonable relationship to the State in- ~ 
terest in protecting the lives of viable unborn children. We 'r \1 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding that 
§ 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. ~~ 
~ ']......-{. 
IV 
The most suspect state regulations are those that apply to 
mature women during the first trimester. We have made 
~ "minor regulations on the abortion procedure 
during the first trimester may not interfere with physician-
patient consultation or with the woman's choice between 
(1980) (increasing number of live-born fetuses in prostaglandin abortions); 
Stroh & Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two 
and One-Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. 
Gynecol. 83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 
9 following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion). " 
11 See Stoh & Himman, supra n. 10, at 88 (one survival out of thirty- ) 
eight live births). 
12 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
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abortions and childbirth." City of Akron, ante, at 12. Nev-
ertheless, even in the early weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain 
regulations that have no significant impact on the woman's 
exercise of her right may be permissible where justified by 
important state health objectives." Ante, at 11. Section 
188.047 requires a pathology report for every abortion per-
formed. The question is whether this requirement uncon-
stitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold 
that it does not. 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and pre-
puces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri 
apparently does not require pathology reports in all proce-
dures, "[t]his does not mean that a State never may enact a 
regulation touching on the woman's abortion right during the 
first weeks of pregnancy." City of Akron, ante, at 11. The 
specific issue here is whether§ 188.047, which on its face and 
in effect is reasonably related to generally accepted medical 
standards and maternal health, 13 "further[s] important 
health-related State concerns," ante, at 12, without interfer-
'
3 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of fa-
tal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered 
through a pathological examination. The Districf'court noted that several 
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of 
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. See The Abortion Profiteers, Chi-
cago Sun Times (1978) (special report), at 26, col. 3 (quoting Dr. Willard 
Cates, head of abortion surveillance for the National Center for Disease 
Control, as saying "pathological reports are so important that no clinic 
should allow a patient to leave the premises without one"). Moreover, the 
ACOG standards for abortion services state that for all surgical services 
performed on an ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be 
subsmitted to a pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of 
elective termination of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a 
description of the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts 
-. 
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ing with the woman's decision to have an abortion. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are "clearly" "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tis-
sue removed during an abortion provides a State with an 
unique opportunity to further its interest in promoting the 
health of its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-
range complications of abortions and their effect on subse-
quent pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of 
Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced 
Abortion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 
2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert 
with abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis 
to study those complications. 14 Cf. Planned Parenthood of 
can be identified, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must 
be submitted to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) 
(emphasis added). The standards of the National Abortion Federation 
(NAF), whose members include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, it-
self provides: "All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the abor-
tion procedure by a physician or trained assistant and the results recorded 
in the chart. In the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross 
examination, obtained tissue may be examined under a low power micro-
scope . . . . If this examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent 
to the nearest suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." 
NAF, National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (compliance with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to 
remain in good standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Asso-
ciation as Amicus Curiae in Simopoulos and City of Akron 29, n. 6 (sup-
porting the NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constitut-
ing "minimum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan 
Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and 
Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross 
examination must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue anal-
ysis must be done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inade-
quate or does not confirm a normal gestation."). 
"Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's 
division of health. 
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Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs contend, however, that the additional cost of a 
tissue examination is a significant burden on a pregnant 
woman's abortion decision. 15 The estimated cost of compli-
ance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services was $1~1,0 
per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48_.6 I We 
1Iiink this minor burden is justified, like the Missouri record-
keeping requirements upheld in Planned Parenthood ofCen-
~ tral Missouri v. Danforth, supra, as "useful to the State's in-
0 terest in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a 
resource that is relevant to decisions involving medical ex-
perience an? j~dgme~t," 428 U. S., at 81. J In sum, "we ~ee 
-noiegally significant Impact or consequence on the abortion 
decision or on the physician-patient relationship." See id., 
at 81. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals on this point. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. A State's interest in protecting immature minors will 
sustain a requirement of a consent substitute, either parental 
or judicial. We have cautioned, however, that "the State 
"Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the pa-
thologist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, how-
ever, state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. 
If fetal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying micro-
scopic tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 
Mo. Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981). 
16 There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of 
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 
48. 
"The Danforth Court also noted that "[t)he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., at 
81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in Dan-
forth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
1~4 
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must provide an alternative procedure whereby a pregnant 
minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to 
make the abortion decision herself or that, despite her imma-
turity, an abortion would be in her best interests." 18 City of 
Akron, ante, at 21-22. 19 The issue here is one purely of stat-
utory construction: whether Missouri provides a judicial al-
ternative that is consistent with these established legal 
standards. 20 
18 The plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti I/), 
also required that the alternative to parental consent must "assure" that 
the resolution of this issue "will be completed with anonymity and suffi-
cient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be 
obtained." ld., at 644. Confidentiality here is assured by the statutory 
requirement that allows the minor to use her initials on the petition. Mo. 
Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to expedition of appeals, 
§ 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
19 Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. See 655 F. 2d, at 
873; 483 F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judg-
ment here. Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for 
review, § 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
20 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
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The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2,21 in relevant part, 
provides: 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts to do (a), 
(b), or (c). The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of 
the petition permitted in subsection (c) "would initially re-
quire the court to find that the minor was not emancipated 
and was not mature enough to make her own decision and 
that an abortion was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 
858. Plaintiffs contend that this interpretation is unreason-
able. We do not agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S.W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C.J.S. Parent 
and Child §86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S.W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S.W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). It should also be noted that, before a person may be successfully 
prosecuted for a violation of § 188.028, the State must show that the de-
fendant "knowingly" violated the section. 
21 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
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avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
~if the statute provides discretion to deny per-
L/ mission to ~ minor for any "good cause," 1 would violate the 
principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. The court, 
however, reached the logical conclusion that "findings and 
the ultimate denial of the petition must be supported by a 
showing of 'good cause."' Ibid. Before exercising any op-
tion, the juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of 
the minor." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). 
The Court of Appeals rationally found that a court could not 
deny a petition, "for good cause," unless it first found-after 
having received the required evidence-that the minor was 
not mature enough to make her own decision. 22 See Bellotti 
v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 643-644, 647-648 (1979) (plurality 
opinion). We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly 
interpreted the statute, and as interpreted § 188.028 avoids 
constitutional infirmities. 23 
22 Missouri argues that, under state law, "for good cause" is '"a cause or 
reason sufficient in law."' State v. Davis, 469 S.W. 2d 1, 5 (Mo. 1971) 
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary). The Missouri 
courts recognize, however, in a variety of contexts, that the commonly 
used legal phrase "for good cause" "is not susceptible of precise definition," 
Vaughn v. Ripley, 416 S.W. 2d 226, 228 (Mo. App. 1967), and that '"[g)ood 
cause' depends upon the circumstances of the individual case," Wilson v. 
Morris, 369 S.W. 2d 402, 407 (Mo. 1963). A finding of its existence "lies 
largely in the discretion of the ... court to which the decision is commit-
ted," ibid., and the phrase "connotes a remedial purpose in a matter ad-
dressed primarily to the conscience of the court," Corzine v. Stoff, 505 
S.W. 2d 162, 164 (Mo. App. 1973). This discretion, however, no doubt is 
limited to choices that are not inconsistent with the federal Constitution. 
23 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 407; Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 (1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, 
however, argue in the Court of Appeals that the court should abstain, and 
Missouri has no certification procedure whereby this Court can refer ques-
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VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is af-
firmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a 
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a 
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is re-
versed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of at-
torneys' fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys 
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. 
E ckerhart, U. S. - (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
tions of state statutory construction to the state supreme court. See 655 
F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 (1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a proce-
dure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analysis in Bellotti I. Supra, at 151. 
Moreover, where, as here, a statute is susceptible to a fair construction 
that obviates the need to have the state courts render the saving construc-
tion, there is no reason for federal courts to abstain. Cf. City of Akron, 
ante, at 23-24. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188.04 7, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The rrunor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 41 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. - U. S. -- (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
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In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
6 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals . ... " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. !d., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 386--387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188. 030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
7 The courts below found that there is no possible justification for a sec-
ond-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can 
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Ac-
cordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals 
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the require-
ments of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be 
used when the fetus is viable; when other methods are more likely to pre-
serve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to 
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified they 
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature in-
fant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view 
the issue as a close one. 
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only 
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman's condition, and not to protecting the ac-
tual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. 
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of 
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or simi-
lar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to 
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical rea-
sons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (ex-
perts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability) . We 
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compel-
ling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth 
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester 
abortion. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
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Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because 
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requirement furthers the State's 
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, 
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding 
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abor-
tion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant im-
pact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an 
abortion may be permissible where justified by important 
state health objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See 
9 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one sur-
vival out of 38 live births).) 
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 
52, 80--81 (1976). The question is whether§ 188.047 uncon-
stitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold 
that it does not. 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and 
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri 
apparently does not require pathology reports in all proce-
dures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid 
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right dur-
ing the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue 
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is 
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards 
and maternal health, 10 "further[s] important health-related 
'"A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered 
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several 
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of 
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards 
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a 
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termina-
tion of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identi-
fied, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted 
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added). 
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose mem-
bers include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tis-
sue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a 
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In 
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, ob-
tained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this 
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfer-
ing with the woman's decision to have an abortion. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tis-
sue removed during an abortion provides a State with an 
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of 
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range 
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent 
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Wil-
lard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abor-
tion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495, 
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with 
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for 
studying those complications. 11 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 
81. 
In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12 
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suit-
able pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." N AF, National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance 
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good 
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Ami-
cus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the 
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, 
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of 
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination 
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be 
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does 
not confirm a normal gestation."). 
a Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's 
division of health. 
12 The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. 
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of 
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See ibid. 
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of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a preg-
nant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court 
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as 
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its 
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to deci-
sions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., 
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as 
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on 
this point. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
13 Plaintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the patholo-
gist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however, 
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fe-
tal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic 
tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981). 
14 The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
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best interests." 15 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 16 The issue 
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with 
these established legal standards. 17 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 18 in relevant part, 
provides: 
'
6 The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to paren-
tal consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be com-
pleted with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality 
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use 
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). 
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
16 Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
17 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 19 to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
18 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
19 We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 20 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
20 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146--147 
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts 
to abstain. 
" .. 
81-1255 & 81-162~0PINION 
PLANNED PA1~ENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 15 
dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is af-
firmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a 
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a 
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is 
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of 
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys 
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eck-
erhart,- U.S.- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4} 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. -- U. S.- (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
• ;t 
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In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
6 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 68~90, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals .... " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. !d., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16 . 
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." ld., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
'The courts below found that there is no possible justification for a sec-
ond-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can 
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Ac-
cordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals 
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is subject to the require-
ments of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E is not to be 
used when the fetus is viable; when other methods are more likely to pre-
serve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to 
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified they 
•. 
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature in-
fant. These are not insubstantial arguments, and we view 
the issue as a close one. 
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only 
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman's condition, and not to protecting the ac-
tual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. 
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of 
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or simi-
lar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to 
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical rea-
sons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (ex-
perts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability). We 
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compel-
ling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth 
justifies the State in requiring a second physician at every third-trimester 
abortion. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
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Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because 
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requirement furthers the State's 
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, 
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding 
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
Section 188.047 requires a pathology report for every abor-
tion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant im-
pact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an 
abortion may be permissible where justified by important 
state health objectives." City of Akron, at 11. See 
9 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, 83--84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one sur-
vival out of 38 live births).) 
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 
52, 80-81 (1976). The question is whether § 188.047 uncon-
stitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold 
that it does not. 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and 
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri 
apparently does not require pathology reports in all proce-
dures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid 
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right dur-
ing the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue 
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is 
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards 
and maternal health, 10 "further[s] important health-related 
10 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered 
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several 
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of 
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards 
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a 
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termina-
tion of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identi-
fied, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted 
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added). 
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose mem-
bers include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tis-
sue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a 
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In 
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, ob-
tained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If this 
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfer-
ing with the woman's decision to have an abortion. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tis-
sue removed during an abortion provides a State with an 
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of 
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range 
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent 
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Wil-
lard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abor-
tion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M. A. 2495, 
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with 
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for 
studying those complications. 11 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 
81. 
In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12 
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suit-
able pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." N AF, National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance 
with standards obligatory for NAF member facilities to remain in good 
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Ami-
cus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the 
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, 
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of 
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination 
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be 
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does 
not confirm a normal gestation."). 
"Section 188.047 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's 
division of health. 
12 The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. 
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of 
pathology would range from $10.00 to $40.00. See ibid. 
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of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a preg-
nant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court 
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as 
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its 
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to deci-
sions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., 
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as 
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on 
this point. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
13 Plaintiffs also note that§ 188.047 does not specify whether the patholo-
gist must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however, 
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fe-
tal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic 
tissue report must also be filed with the Division of Health." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-151.030(1) (1981). 
"The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
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best interests." 15 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 16 The issue 
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with 
these established legal standards. 17 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 18 in relevant part, 
provides: 
15 The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to paren-
tal consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be com-
pleted with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality 
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use 
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). 
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
16 Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
17 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 19 to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
18 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
19 We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H .L . v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 20 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
20 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 
(1976) (Bellotti[). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving CQ!lstruction, there is no reason for federal courts 
to abstain. 
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dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental consent provision, is af-
firmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a 
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a 
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is 
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of 
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys 
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eck-
erhart, - U. S. - (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
liAR a 1963 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
We have considered today mandatory hospitalization re-
quirements for second-trimester abortions in City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, 
and Planned Parenthood Ass'n. of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. 
Ashcroft, ante, p. --. The principal issue here is whether 
Virginia's mandatory hospitalization requirement is constitu-
tional. 
I 
Appellant is a practicing obstetrician-gynecologist certified 
by the American Board of Obstetrics and Gynecology. In 
November, 1979 he practiced at his office in Woodbridge, 
Virginia, at four local hospitals, and at his clinic in Falls 
Church. The Falls Church clinic has an operating room and 
facilities for resuscitation and emergency treatment of 
cardiac/respiratory arrest. Replacement and stabilization 
fluids are on hand. Appellant customarily performs first-tri-
mester abortions at his clinic. During the time relevant to 
this case, the clinic was not licensed, nor had appellant 
sought any license for it. 
P.M. was a 17-year old high-school student when she went 
to appellant's clinic on November 8, 1979. She was unmar-
ried, and told appellant that she was approximately 22 weeks 
pregnant. She requested an abortion but did not want her 
parents to know. Examination by appellant confirmed that 
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P.M. was five months pregnant, well into the second trimes-
ter. Appellant testified that he encouraged her to confer 
with her parents and discussed with her the alternative of 
continuing the pregnancy to term. She did return home, but 
never advised her parents of her decision. 
Two days later, P.M. returned to the clinic with her boy 
friend. The abortion was performed by an injection of saline 
solution. P.M. told appellant that she planned to deliver the 
fetus in a motel, and understood him to agree to this course. 
Appellant gave P.M. a prescription for an analgesic and a 
"Post-Injection Information" sheet that stated that she had 
undergone "a surgical procedure" and warned of a "wide 
range of normal reactions." App. 199. The sheet also ad-
vised that she call the physician if "heavy" bleeding began. 
Although P.M. did not recall being advised to go to a hospital 
when labor began, this was included on the instruction sheet. 
ld., at 200. 
P.M. went to a motel. Alone, she aborted her fetus in the 
motel bathroom 48 hours after the saline injection. She left 
the fetus, follow-up instructions, and pain medication in the 
wastebasket at the motel. Her boy friend took her home. 
Police found the fetus later that day and began an investiga-
tion.1 
Appellant was indicted 2 for unlawfully performing an 
abortion during the second trimester of pregnancy outside of 
'Except as permitted by statute, persons performing an abortion are 
guilty of a Class 4 felony under Virginia law and subject to mandatory li-
cense revocation. Va. Code §§ 18.2-71, 54-316(3), 54-317(1), 54.321.2 
(1982). A Class 4 felony is punishable by a sentence of two to ten years in 
prison. Va. Code § 18.2-10(d). 
2 The indictment alleges a violation of Va. Code § 18.2-71, which 
provides: 
"Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person admin-
ister to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use 
means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or 
miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or 
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a licensed hospital and was convicted by the Circuit Court of 
Fairfax County sitting without a jury. The Supreme Court 
of Virginia unanimously affirmed the conviction. Simop-
oulos v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 1059, 277 S. E. 2d 194 
(1981). This appeal followed. We noted probable jurisdic-
tion, -- U. S. --, and now affirm. 
II 
Appellant broadly attacks Virginia's hospitalization re-
quirements. 3 He contends that they restrict the availability 
miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony." 
The Virginia Code sets forth four exceptions to this statute: there is no 
criminal liability if the abortion (i) is performed within the first trimester, 
§ 18.2-72; (ii) is performed in a licensed hospital in the second trimester, 
§ 18.2-73; (iii) is necessary to save the woman's life, § 18.2-74.1; and (iv) is 
performed during the third trimester under certain circumstances, 
§ 18.2-74.1. The indictment here alleged a violation of§ 18.2-71 and ex-
pressly negated any defense of hospitalization under § 18.2-73 and any 
first-trimester defense under§ 18.2-72. The indictment did not, however, 
rebut the other defenses. 
3 Questions raised particularly with respect to Virginia's outpatient sur-
gical clinics are considered in Part III, infra. Appellant raises two addi-
tional issues that do not require extended treatment. He first contends 
that Va. Code§ 18.2-71 was applied unconstitutionally to him, because lack 
of medical necessity for the abortion was not alleged in the indictment, ad-
dressed in the prosecution's case, or mentioned by the trier of fact. Ap-
pellant contends that this failure renders the indictment unconstitutional 
for two reasons: (i) the State failed to meet its burden of alleging necessity 
in the indictment, as required by United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62 
(1971); and (ii) the prosecution failed to meet its burden of persuasion, as 
required by Patterson v. New York, 432 U. S. 197 (1977). 
The authoritative construction of§ 18.2-71 by the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia makes it clear that, at least with respect to the defense of medical 
necessity, the prosecution was not obligated to prove lack of medical neces-
sity beyond a reasonable doubt until appellant invoked medical necessity 
as a defense. See 221 Va., at 1069, 277 S. E. 2d, at 200. Appellant's reli-
ance on Vuitch thus is misplaced: the District of Columbia statute in 
Vuitch, as construed by this Court, required the prosecution to make this 
allegation. See 402 U. S., at 70. Placing upon the defendant the burden 
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of abortions after the first trimester by granting a monopoly 
to the few licensed hospitals that will permit mid-trimester 
abortions. He also argues that the Virginia requirements 
result in negative health consequences and, as applied to him 
and the abortions he performs in his well-equipped non-li-
censed clinic, do not further the State's interests. 
We need not pause long here to consider the guiding princi-
ples, for we have set them out at length today in City of Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, at 
9-12, 14-16. For present purposes here, the critical point is 
that we consistently have recognized and reaffirm today that 
a State has an "important and legitimate interest in the 
health of the mother" that becomes "'compelling' ... at ap-
proximately the end of the first trimester," Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. 113, 163 (1973), and is compelling throughout the re-
mainder of the pregnancy. This interest, of course, em-
braces the facilities and circumstances in which abortions are 
performed. ld., at 150. 
A 
It is in furtherance of this compelling interest in maternal 
health that Virginia has enacted its hospitalization require-
ment for abortions performed during the second trimester. 
As a general proposition, physicians' offices are not regulated 
under Virginia law. 4 Virginia law does not, however, per-
of going forward with evidence on an affirmative defense is normally per-
missible. See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 120-121, and n. 20 (1982); 
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684, 701-703, nn. 28, 30, 31 (1975). 
Appellant also contends that the prosecution failed to prove that his acts 
in fact caused the death of the fetus . In view of the undisputed facts 
proved at trial, summarized above, this contention is meritless. See 221 
Va. , at 106~1070 , 277 S. E. 2d, at 200-201. 
'A physician's office is explicitly excluded from the hospital licensing 
statutes and regulations unless the office is used principally for performing 
surgery. Va. Code §32.1-124(5). Surgery is not defined. Appellant 
contends that whether his facility principally performs surgery is a ques-
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mit a physician licensed in the practice of medicine and sur-
gery to perform an abortion during the second trimester of 
pregnancy unless "such procedure is performed in a hospital 
licensed by the State Department of Health." Va. Code 
§ 18.2-73 (1982). The Virginia abortion statute itself does 
not define the term "hospital." This definition is found in 
Va. Code § 32.1-123.1, which defines "hospital" to include 
"outpatient ... hospitals." Section 20.2.11 of the Depart-
ment of Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of 
Outpatient Hospitals in Virginia (1977) ("regulations") 5 de-
fines outpatient hospital in pertinent part as "[i]nstitutions 
... which primarily provide facilities for the performance of 
surgical procedures on outpatients" 6 and provides that sec-
ond-trimester abortions may be performed in these clinics. 7 
tion of fact that has not been resolved, and that it is uncertain whether his 
clinic may be licensed as a "hospital." He notes that after he performed 
the abortion on P.M. he requested a certificate of need, see also id., 
§ 32.1-102.3, but was informed by the Office of the Attorney General that 
his "clinic-office cannot be licensed as a hospital" and that "if you wish to 
perform this type of procedure, you must, in essence, build a hospital to do 
it." App. to Reply Brief for Appellant 3a, 4a. Appellant did not seek a 
license before he performed the abortion at issue here. Thus, without 
record evidence that appellant's facility qualifies as a surgical outpatient 
clinic and that he was denied a hospital license, the issue of whether the 
Falls Church facility would qualify under Virginia law is irrelevant to our 
determination in this case. Seen. 7, infra (noting State's interpretation of 
the Virginia regulations). 
5 The regulations were promulgated pursuant to 1947 Va. Acts, c. 15, 
§ 1514-a5, repealed by 1979 Acts, c. 711. Although not relevant to our 
determination here, we note that new but similar regulations now super-
sede the regulations in effect when appellant performed the abortion for 
which he has been prosecuted. See Department of Health, Rules and 
Regulations for the Licensure of Hospitals in Virginia, pt. IV (1982). 
•section 32.1-125 of the Code provides: "No person shall establish, con-
duct, maintain, or operate in this Commonwealth any hospital ... unless 
such hospital . . . is licensed as provided in this article." See also Va. 
Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 30.1 (similar provision specifically govern-
ing outpatient surgical clinics). 
7 Part II of the regulations sets minimum standards for outpatient surgi-
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Thus, under Virginia law, a second-trimester abortion may 
be performed in an outpatient surgical clinic 8 provided that 
clinic has been licensed as a "hospital" by the State. 
It is readily apparent that Virginia's second-trimester hos-
pitalization requirement is significantly different from those 
at issue in City of Akron, ante, at 13, and Planned Parent-
hood Association of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 
ante, at 45. In those cases, the regulations required that "all 
second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities." Ashcroft, ante, at 5. We found that 
such a requirement, by preventing the use of the dilatation 
and evacuation method (D&E) of performing abortions in ap-
propriate non-hospital settings, "imposed a heavy, and un-
necessary, burden on women's access to a relatively inexpen-
sive, otherwise accessible, and safe abortion procedure." 
City of Akron, ante, at 20. The Court invalidated these laws 
invalid because they did not reasonably further the state in-
terest in maternal health. 
One of the most important factors in our analysis in City of 
Akron was the medical fact that, "at least during the early 
weeks of the second trimester[,] D&E abortions may be per-
cal clinics that may perform second-trimester abortions. This interpreta-
tion is confirmed by several sections in Part II, i. e., §§ 43.6.2, 43.6.3, 
43. 7.3(c), 43.8.4, 43.8.5, 43.9.5, all of which refer to abortion services. 
Moreover, the State's counsel at oral argument represented that facilities 
licensed pursuant to Part II legally may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
Virginia uses the term "outpatient abortion clinics" to refer specifically 
to those facilities meeting the minimum standards of Part III of the regula-
tions. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals), p. i. Facilities meeting 
these standards are limited to performing abortions only during the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Ibid. See id., § 62.1.2 ("Any procedure per-
formed to terminate a pregnancy [in an outpatient abortion clinic] shall be 
performed prior to the end of the first trimester (12th week amenor-
rhea)."). 
8 We herein usually refer to the outpatient "hospitals" in Virginia that 
legally may perform second-trimester abortions as "outpatient surgical 
clinics." 
81-185-0PINION 
SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 7 
formed as safely in an outpatient clinic as in a full-service hos-
pital." Ante, at 19. In contrast, the Virginia statutes and 
regulations do not require that second-trimester abortions be 
performed exclusively in full-service hospitals. Under Vir-
ginia's regulations, outpatient surgical clinics may qualify for 
licensing as hospitals in which second-trimester abortions 
lawfully may be performed. Thus, our decisions in City of 
Akron and Ashcroft are not controlling here. 
B 
Second-trimester abortions may give rise to serious com-
plications, 9 and certain procedures significantly increase the 
risks. Although the increasingly common use and relative 
safety of the D&E method, see City of Akron, ante, at 17-19 
may make the need for particular equipment in and designs of 
a facility less imperative, the need for reasonable regulations 
has not been eliminated. D&E, despite its safety early in 
the second trimester, still may cause complications. 10 
The American Public Health Association (APHA), al-
though recognizing "that greater use of the dilatation and 
evacuation procedure make[s] it possible to perform the vast 
• See Cadesky, Ravinsky & Lyons, Dilation and Evacuation: A Pre-
ferred Method ofMidtrimester Abortion, 129 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 329, 
331 (1981), Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Dis-
ease Control, Abortion Surveillance: Annual Summary 1978, at 48 (1980). 
'"Hemorrhaging is a leading cause of death and complications in D&E 
abortion patients. Other potential complications are uterine perforation 
and cervical tears, which are significantly increased in comparison to other 
second-trimester procedures. See ACOG Technical Bulletion No. 56, 
Methods of Midtrimester Abortion 75 (1979). 
A major potential complication for all abortion techniques-infection-
normally does not arise until 24 to 72 hours after the procedure has taken 
place, by which time the woman usually will have been discharged from 
any facility. See Ashcroft, 664 F. 2d 687, 690, n. 6 (CA8 1981), rev'd in 
part and aff'd in part, ante, p. -. Thus the relative safety of the D&E 
procedure does not alleviate the need for standards designed to prevent 
infection. 
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majority of second trimester abortions during or prior to the 
16th [ w ]eek after the last menstrual period," still "[u]rges en-
dorsement of the provision of second trimester abortion in 
free-standing qualified clinics that meet the state standards 
required for certification." APHA, The Right to Second Tri-
mester Abortion 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added). The medical 
profession has not thought the standards need be relaxed 
merely because the facility performs abortions: "Ambulatory 
care facilities providing abortion services should meet the 
same standards of care as those recommended for other sur--
gical procedures performed in the physician's office and out-
patient clinic or the free-standing and hospital-based ambula-
tory setting." American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (AGOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 54 (5th ed. 1982) (hereinafter AGOG Standards). 
See also id., at 52 ("Free-standing or hospital-based ambula-
tory surgical facilities should be licensed to conform to re-
quirements of state or federal legislation."). Indeed, the 
medical profession's standards for outpatient surgical facili-
ties are stringent: "Such facilities should maintain the same 
surgical, anesthetic, and personnel standards as recom-
mended for hospitals." Ibid. 
In view of its interest, the State necessarily has consider-
able discretion in determining standards for the licensing of 
medical facilities, but its discretion does not "permit it to 
adopt abortion regulations that depart from sound medical 
practice." City of Akron, ante, at 12. "If a State requires 
licensing or undertakes to regulate the performance of abor-
tions during [the second trimester], the health standards 
adopted must be 'legitimately related to the objective the 
State seeks to accomplish.' Doe, 410 U. S., at 195.'' City of 
Akron, ante, at 12. The issue here is whether Virginia's li-
censing requirements for outpatient surgical clinics perform-
ing second-trimester abortions are reasonable means of fur-
thering the State's compelling interest in the woman's health. 
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c 
The Virginia regulations applicable to outpatient surgical 
clinics performing second-trimester abortions are, with few 
exceptions, the same regulations applicable to all outpatient 
surgical clinics in Virginia. These regulations may be 
grouped for purposes of discussion into three main categor-
ies. 
The first grouping relates to organization, management, 
policies, procedures, and staffing. These regulations re-
quire personnel and facilities "necessary to meet patient and 
program needs." Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §40.3; 
see also § 40.1. They also require a policy and procedures 
manual, 11 § 43.2, an administrative officer, § 40.6, a licensed 
physician who must supervise clinical services and perform 
surgical procedures, § 42.1, and a registered nurse to be on 
duty at all times while the facility is in use, § 42.2. The sec-
ond category of requirements outlines construction standards 
for outpatient surgical clinics, but also provides that "devi-
ations from the requirements prescribed herein may be ap-
proved if it is determined that the purposes of the minimum 
requirements have been fulfilled," § 50.2.1. There are also 
construction requirements that set forth standards for the 
public areas, clinical areas, laboratory and radiology serv-
ices, 12 and general building. 13 
11 The manual must describe emergency and elective procedures that 
may be performed at the facility, § 41.2.1; the anesthesia that may be used, 
§ 41.2.2; the criteria and procedures for admissions and discharge, § 41.2.4; 
written informed consent, § 41.2.4; and procedures for housekeeping and 
infection control, § 41.2.5. 
12 These services may be provided within the outpatient surgical clinic if 
the services comply with applicable requirements of the Department of 
Health's Rules and Regulations for the Licensure of General and Special 
Hospitals or through a contractual arrangement with nearby facilities. 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 52.3.1. 
13 The regulations contain customary provisions with respect to meeting 
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The most important group of regulations for our purposes 
relates to patient care services. Most of these set the re-
quirements for various services that the facility may offer, 
such as anesthesia,t4 laboratory,t5 and pathology. 16 Some of 
the requirements relate to sanitation, laundry, and the physi-
cal plant. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) 
§§43.2, 43.10, 43.11, 43.12.6. There are also guidelines on 
medical records, § 43. 7, pre-operative admission, 17 and post-
operative recovery.'8 Finally, the regulations mandate some 
emergency services and evacuation planning. 19 
tient Hospitals) §§ 50.6.1, 50. 7.1, 50.8.1, 50.8.4. 
14 See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.1.1 (service must be 
directed by licensed physician); id., § 43.1.2 (physician responsible for an-
esthesia must be present for administration and recovery). 
15 Each patient admitted must receive "appropriate routine laboratory 
testing." See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals)§ 43.6.1. Outpatient sur-
gical clinics providing abortion services also must conduct pregnancy test-
ing, hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations, blood and Rh typing, 
Coomb's testing where woman is Rh-negative, urinalysis for suger and al-
bumin, culture for gonorrheal infection, § 64.1.3, and, where medically in-
dicated, serologic testing for syphilis and a Papanicolaou smear, § 64.1.4. 
16 Section 43.6.3 requires that all tissue be submitted for a pathology 
examination, with pathology services for abortion patients meeting the 
minimum requirements of § 64.2.4 (must be "submitted for histological 
examination by a pathologist in all cases where gross examination by the 
attending physician does not confirm presence of fetal parts"). See 
Ashcroft, ante, at --. 
17 Section 43.8.1 provides for a medical history and physical examination 
before initiating any procedure. Sufficient time to permit review of lab-
oratory tests must be allowed between initial examination and initiation of 
any procedure. !d., § 43.8.3. In an outpatient surgical clinic providing 
abortion services, the diagnosis of pregnancy is the responsibility of the 
performing physician. !d., § 43.8.4. 
Section 43.8.5 provides that the facility performing abortions "shall offer 
each patient appropriate counseling and instruction in the abortion proce-
dure and in birth control methods." Virginia does not require that the 
doctor personally provide this counseling or specify the means by which 
this counseling is performed. Under this requirement, unlike in City of 
Akron, it is for the woman, in conjunction with her physician, to decide 
what considerations are relevant to her decision. See ante, at 27-28. 
18 Each patient shall be observed for post-operative complications for one 
[Footnote 19 is on p. 11} 
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III 
Appellant does not attack these regulations expressly in 
his jurisdictional statement or in his principal brief. In-
stead, he challenges Virginia's requirement of hospitalization 
for second-trimester abortions without alluding to the fact 
that the statutory term "hospital" is defined to include outpa-
tient surgical clinics that may perform second-trimester abor-
tions. As appellant had not sought a license for his clinic at 
the time he was indicted, he appears to argue that the Vir-
ginia hospitalization requirements are comparable to those 
we have invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft, and thus 
invalid. 
Appellant's reply brief does criticize the Virginia regula-
tions on various grounds. He argues that even if he had ap-
plied for a license, it is uncertain whether it would have been 
granted; that Virginia courts have had no opportunity to con-
strue the "licensing statutes and regulations;" that Part II of 
the regulations does not cover an outpatient surgical facility 
where second trimester abortions are performed, but seen. 
8, supra; and that medical evidence rebuts the view "that it is 
hour under the direct supervision of a nurse trained in resuscitation tech-
niques and other emergency procedures. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) §§ 43. 9.1, 43. 9.2. A licensed physician must be present on the 
premises until the patient is discharged on his written orders. I d., 
§§ 43. 9.3, 43. 9.4. For a discussion of similar standards by various medical 
organizations, seen. 32, infra. 
19 See Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) § 43.4.1 (written evacuation 
plan); id., §43.5.1 ("adequate monitoring equipment, suction apparatus, 
oxygen, and related items necessary for resuscitation and control of hemor-
rhage and other complications"); id., § 43.5.2 (ambulance service to a li-
censed general hospital). Section 43.5.3 provides: 
"A written agreement shall be executed with a general hospital to ensure 
that any patient of the outpatient surgical hospital shall receive needed 
emergency treatment. The agreement shall be with a licensed general 
hospital capable of providing full surgical, anesthesia, clinical laboratory, 
and diagnostic radiology service on thirty (30) minutes notice and which 
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safer to perform second trimester abortions in hospitals." 
Reply Brief for Appellant 1. Only the last of these argu-
ments is relevant to the validity of these statutes and regula-
tions, and appellant points to no evidence that supports his 
generalized claim of "safety." We have noted above that the 
Virginia requirements are strikingly different from those we 
invalidated in City of Akron and Ashcroft. Compliance with 
the state's requirements will entail costs, but this can be said 
of most regulations adopted by governments to protect the 
health and safety of people. Moreover, ethical physicians 
are obligated to provide facilities consistent with the stand-
ards set by their profession, and appellant has not identified 
any significant differences between professional standards 
and the Virginia requirements. We are convinced, at least 
on the record before us, that the Virginia provisions are rea-
sonably related to and further the State's compelling interest 
in protecting the health of the pregnant woman during the 
second trimester. 
The requirements of the first 20 and second categories 21 of 
regulations discussed in Part 11-C above have little relevance 
to this case. They have not been challenged by appellant be-
20 ACOG's standards discuss many of Virginia's concerns about proper 
management and policies under the appropriate heading of "Quality Assur-
ance." See ACOG Standards 55 ("Each physician's office and outpatient 
clinic should assess whether effective and efficient management of health 
care has been accomplished."). Like Virginia's "narrative" requirement, 
Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 50.1.1, 50.2.1, ACOG's standards sug-
gest that the "outpatient clinic evaluation of patient care should assess the 
completeness of medical records, the accuracy of diagnoses, appropriate-
ness of use of laboratory and other services, and outcome of care." ACOG 
Standards 55-56. See National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 11 (1981) (hereinafter NAF Standards) (re-
quiring written descriptions of procedures and policies in each area of 
care). Cf. Brief of the APHA as Amicus Curiae 29, n. 6. (supporting the 
NAF Standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). 
ACOG also advises that each ambulatory body should have a "governing 
body" that has the final authority and responsibility for the appointment of 
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SIMOPOULOS v. VIRGINIA 13 
yond his sweeping condemnation of any requirement that sec-
ond-trimester abortions-even those during the twenty-sec-
ond week of pregnancy-be performed in hospitals, however 
defined and whether outpatient or not. In any event, as ap-
pears from the recommendations of AGOG and the American 
Public Health Association (APHA) set forth in the margin, 
see nn. 22, 23, and 24, Virginia's requirements, although 
more detailed with respect to specific facilities, 22 equipment, 
the medical staff, ACOG Standards 60; cf. Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospi-
tals) § 40.3, and that "[w]ritten policies describing specific responsibilities 
of each member of the team are desirable, and should be reviewed and re-
vised periodically," ACOG Standards 60. Cf. NAF Standards 12 (respon-
sibilities of chief administrative officer); Planned Parenthood of Metropoli-
tan Washington, D.C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance 
and Evaluation of First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 1 (herein-
after "Planned Parenthood Guidelines") (duties of administrator). 
21 This second category of Virginia regulations is consistent with those 
set forth by ACOG. ACOG recommends that even physicians' offices pro-
vide at least a patient reception room, consultation room, two examining 
rooms, a utility room, and storage. ACOG Standards 56-58. Cf. Planned 
Parenthood Guidelines, 1-3 (detailing extensive physical requirements for 
first-trimester abortion clinics). ACOG's standards for an ambulatory 
surgical facility are more detailed, providing space for reception, waiting, 
administrative activities, patient dressing, lockers, preoperative evalua-
tion, physical examination, laboratory testing, preparation of anesthesia, 
performance of surgical procedures, preparation and sterilization of instru-
ments, storage of equipment, storage of drugs and fluids, postanesthetic 
recovery, staff activities, and janitorial and utility support. See ACOG 
Standards 61. 
ACOG details the equipment to be found in the various rooms and areas. 
ACOG Standards 57-58, 61. Cf. APHA Recommended Program Guide for 
Abortion Services, 70 Am. J. Pub. Health 652, 655 (1980) (hereinafter 
"APHA Guide") (any abortion facility should have "[a]n operating table, or 
conventional gynecologic examining table with accessories, located in a 
room which is adequately lighted and ventilated and meets all other envi-
ronmental standards for surgical procedures"); Planned Parenthood Guide-
lines 2. A doctor's examining room should contain instruments for vaginal 
examinations, supplies for obtaining cultures and smears, and equipment 
for diagnostic studies and operative procedures. ACOG Standards 57. 
Cf. Planned Parenthood Guidelines 2. When local anesthesia is used, the 
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and personnel than the AGOG and APHA standards, are 
compatible with generally accepted medical standard. 
Our concern centers on whether the patient services re-
quirements of the Virginia regulations further the State's in-
terest in the health and safety of the pregnant woman. We 
think they clearly do. Again, we have compared them to the 
standards used by AGOG and APHA, and we are impressed 
with the scrupulousness with which Virginia has drawn regu-
lations reasonably related to its interest in protecting the 
pregnant woman's health. The sanitation 23 and record-keep-
ing standards 24 are typical and not unreasonable in detail. 
clinic or doctor's office should have emergency resuscitation equipment, in-
cluding positive pressure oxygen, intravenous equipment and fluids, suc-
tion, and a cardiac monitor. ACOG Standards 57. Ambulatory surgical 
centers should, in addition to oxygen, suction, and resuscitation equip-
ment, provide for emergency lighting and intercommunications. I d., at 
61. Cf. APHA Guide 655 (requiring oxygen, and equipment for artificial 
ventilation and resuscitation); NAF Standards 9 (requiring all facilities 
performing second-trimester abortions to have resuscitation bag, oxygen, 
and defibrillator if general anesthesia is administered); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 2 (even first-trimester abortion clinics should have paren-
teral fluids, resuscitation equipment, and oxygen). 
22 ACOG provides that both clinics and ambulatory facilities should meet 
all state and local building, safety, and fire codes. ACOG Standards 58, 
61. Specific plans should be developed to evacuate patients in case of an 
emergency. ld., at 59, 62. Cf. NAF Standards 8, 11; Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 10. 
23 Infection can be a serious complication with any abortion procedure. 
See nn. 11 and 12, supra. Significant portions of the Virginia regulations 
are designed to assure that outpatient surgical clinics take appropriate 
steps to control infection, including sterile processing, appropriate waste-
disposal and laundry practices, isolation of nonpotable water, and protec-
tion of the integrity of the operating suite. See Va. Regs. (Outpatient 
Hospitals) §§41.2.5, 43.2.1, 43.2.2, 43.10.1, 43.11, 43.12.3, 43.12.5, 52.2.5, 
52.2. 6, 52.2. 7 & 52.2.13. ACOG recommends that all facilities develop 
procedures for controlling and disposing of needles, syringes, glass, knife 
blades, and contaminated waste supplies. ACOG Standards 58, 62. 
APHA Guide 655; NAF Standards 7 ("Surgical instruments must be suffi-
cient in number to permit individual sterilization of the instruments used 
for each procedure .... "). 
24 The Virginia record-keeping requirements are similar to those detailed 
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The laboratory services 25 support-and often are essential 
to-the direct medical services 25 performed by the physi-
cian 27 and nurse. 28 The post-operative recovery stand-
ards 29 also comport with accepted medical practice, 30 and the 
by ACOG for a physician's office, ACOG Standards 54-55, 59--60, which re-
quire at the initial visit a comprehensive data base including information on 
reason for visit, menstrual history, obstetric history, gynecologic history, 
sexual history, past medical and surgical history, current medications, al-
lergies, social history, and family history. For ambulatory surgical facili-
ties, ACOG recommends that the patient's record contain sufficient in-
formation to justify the preoperative diagnosis and the operative 
procedure, and should at least contain patient identification data, history 
and physical examination, provisional diagnosis, diagnostic and therapeutic 
orders, surgeons' and nurses' notes, laboratory data, operative consent, 
operative report, anesthesia report, tissue report, medications record, and 
discharge summary and instructions. ld., at 59. See also id., at 60 ("On 
the day of surgery a preanesthetic evaluation, including an interval his-
tory, medical record review, and a heart and lung examination should be 
performed by a physician and the findings should be noted in the record."). 
We have found that such requirements, "if not abused or overdone," im-
pose a legally insignificant burden on the Roe right. See Planned Parent-
hood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). We do not think 
Virginia's requirements are excessive. Cf. APHA Guide 655-656 (recom-
mended reporting requirements); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 13 
(record-keeping and reporting requirements). 
25 The risk of hemorrhage is reduced by requiring an outpatient surgical 
clinic to make hemoglobin or hematocrit determinations before initiating 
instillation. See ACOG Standards 59 ("The laboratory data should include 
hemoglobin or hematocrit, urinalysis, and, in certain selected patients, 
other studies such as a chest x-ray, electrocardiogram, and electrolytes."). 
See also APHA Guide 654 ("Appropriate laboratory procedures must in-
clude determination of hematocrit and Rh factor in every case. The value 
of other laboratory procedures will depend upon the population served; 
may include sickle cell testing; endocervical and anal culture for gonorrhea; 
urinalysis; serologic testing for syphilis; and, when indicated cytologic 
screening for cancer."); NAF Standards 7 ("Rh-immune globulin must be 
explained and administered to Rh-negative patients."); Planned Parent-
hood Guidelines 8 (requiring lab facilities to be available on premises for 
pregnancy tests,' urine protein and sugar, hematocrit or hemoglobin deter-
mination, and Rh typing). 
26 See ACOG Standards 59 ("The appropriate records should be com-
pleted and laboratory data recorded prior to surgery.") (emphasis added). 
[Footnotes 27 through J1 are on pp. 16 and 17} 
.,, 
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equipment requirements for emergency services are 
minimal. 31 
We do not suggest that all of the Virginia requirements are 
necessary for every second-trimester abortion. But a State 
simply cannot adopt regulations that serve every case with 
ACOG also recommends that "[t]he physician should strive to identify pre-
existing or concurrent illness, medications, and adverse drug reactions that 
may have a bearing on the operative procedure or anesthesia. All records 
should be reviewed before any surgery is performed." !d., at 60 (emphasis 
added). APHA Guide 654; Planned Parenthood Guidelines 8. 
27 For example, the ACOG requires careful laboratory work before an-
esthesia is administered, and even then, it must be given only by or under 
the supervision of a doctor: "Any ambulatory surgical unit that utilizes gen-
eral, epidural, or spinal anesthesia should do so under the direction of an 
anesthesiologist. These anesthetics should be administered by a qualified 
anesthesiologist, another qualified physician, or a certified nurse-anesthe-
tist under the supervision of an anesthesiologist. When any form of an-
esthesia is used, trained personnel and proper equipment for cardiopulmo-
nary resuscitation must be available." ACOG Standards 53. Cf. APHA 
Guide 655; Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10. 
28 The ACOG Standards do not specifically require nurses for physicians' 
offices or for ambulatory surgical facilities, but note: "The efficient opera-
tion of an ambulatory surgical facility requires adequate staffing with ad-
ministrative and professional personnel. The assignment of personnel 
should be based on the number of patients, patient profiles, type of proce-
dures, and facility design." ACOG Standards 60. Cf. id., at 56 ("Admin-
istrative and professional personnel requirements will vary considerably in 
each physician's office and outpatient clinic depending on the patient load, 
pattern of practice, and type of facility."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 
7-8 (head laboratory technician); id., at 9 ("It is strongly recommended 
that three staff persons be present in the procedure room: the operating 
physician, the physician's assistant and a counselor to assist the patient."). 
29 See n. 19, supra. 
30 Complications resulting from anesthesia are alleviated by requiring a 
physician to be present during the recovery period. See ACOG Standards 
53 ("The supervising anesthesiologist, or another physician qualified in car-
diopulmonary resuscitation, should be present in the ambulatory surgical 
facility until all surgical patients have been discharged. This physician 
should oversee the postanesthetic recovery area and should share with the 
surgeon responsibility for discharging patients or transferring them to the 
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the same degree of relevance; "[a] State necessarily must 
have some latitude in adopting regulations of general applica-
bility in this sensitive area." City of Akron, ante, at 16. 
Although a State's general licensing regulations must be 
drawn to further the State's interests in women's health for 
all reasonable periods of time within the second-trimester, a 
particular requirement "is not unconstitutional simply be-
cause it does not correspond perfectly in all cases to the as-
serted state interest." City of Akron, ante, at 20. 
We therefore conclude, at least on the record before us in 
this case, that Virginia's regulations concerning second-tri-
mester abortions are reasonably related to and further the 
back-up hospital."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11; see also APHA 
Guide 655 ("[I]t will be necessary to periodically observe the temperature, 
pulse rate, blood pressure, and the amount of bleeding. In addition, the 
abdomen should be examined for evidence of intra-abdominal bleeding or 
injury."). Less serious complications can be monitored by the registered 
nurse on duty. See ACOG Standards 53 ("During the recovery period, the 
patient should be under continuous observation by a qualified member of 
the health care team. This person should maintain a complete record of 
the patient's general condition including vital signs, blood loss, and occur-
rence of complications."); NAF Standards 6 ("The recovery area must be 
supervised by a licensed nurse or physician who is immediately available to 
the recovery area."); Planned Parenthood Guidelines 11. The required 
one-hour recovery period is intended to permit detection of these complica-
tions. See APHA Guide 655 (requiring post-operative observations "over 
a period of two or more hours, depending upon the type of anesthesia 
used"); Kerenyi, Mandelman & Sherman, Five Thousand Consecutive Sa-
line Inductions, 116 Am. J . Obstet. & Gynecol. 593, 597 (1973); ACOG 
Standards 53; App. 37 (defense expert witness concedes waiting period 
desirable). 
81 The arrangements for emergency transfer to an acute-care, general 
hospital are clearly reasonable. See APHA Guide 655; ACOG Standards 
52 ("There should be a written policy requiring the medical staff to provide 
for prompt emergency treatment or hospitalization in the event of an unan-
ticipated complication."); id., at 58, 62; NAF Standards, supra, n. 22, at 7; 
Planned Parenthood Guidelines, supra, n. 22, at 10 ("Each facility must 
have a functioning arrangement for emergency transport to a local accred-
ited hospital."). 
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State's compelling interest in "protecting the woman's own 
health and safety." Roe, 410 U. S., at 150.32 As we empha-
sized in Roe, "[t]he State has a legitimate interest in seeing to 
it that abortion, like any other medical procedure, is per-
formed under circumstances that insure maximum safety for 
the patient." Ibid. Unlike Akron in City of Akron or Mis-
souri in Ashcroft, Virginia does not require that the patient 
be hospitalized as an inpatient or that the abortion be per-
formed in a full-service, acute-care hospital. Rather, the 
State's requirements-the statutes and the regulations-ac-
commodate accepted medical practice, and leave the method 
and timing of the abortion precisely where they belong-be-
tween the physician and the patient. 
IV 
We hold that Virginia's requirement that second-trimester 
abortions be performed in, properly equipped outpatient 
clinic is constitutional. The judgment of the Supreme Court 
of Virginia is 
Affirmed. 
32 Appellant argues that Part III of the regulations, covering first-tri-
mester abortion clinics requires the same services and equipment as Part 
II. In fact, part Part III has detailed regulations that do not appear in 
Part II. See, e. g., Va. Regs. (Outpatient Hospitals) §§ 63.1.1(b), § 63.3, 
64.2.5(a)-(m). Appellant contends that, given these extensive regulations 
for first-trimester abortion clinics, the only way to require more techno-
logical support for second-trimester abortions would be to restrict them to 
acute-care, general hospitals. The only regulations before us, however, 
relate to second-trimester abortions, and we find those requirements rea-
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --, present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
r • 
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188.047, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
8 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4} 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8--12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees , made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
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In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
6 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals .... " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. !d., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
f I 
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." Seen. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
7 he courts e ow ound that there is no possible justification for a sec-
ond-physician requirement whenever D&E is used since no viable fetus can 
survive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp. , at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Ac-
cordingly, they found the provision overbroad. As the Court of Appeals 
noted, however, the choice of D&E after viability is.subject to the reg;rire-
ments of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Thus, D&E IS not to be 
usectw'lien the fetus1 s viable; when other methods are more likely to pre-
serve its life; and when alternative procedures do not pose a greater risk to 
the woman's life or health. Cf. id., at 865 (some physicians testified the 
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature in-
fant. ~hese tu•e RQt i~iUbiltaRtial aPgYFBeRts, oftHS we""'¥:iew 
tfie is~tle as a elese eHe.. 
The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only 
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman'weH8itieE?, and not to protecting the ac-
tual life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. 
would not use D&E in third-trimester); American College of Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists (ACOG) Technical Bulletin No. 56, Methods of 
Midtrimester Abortion 4 (1979) (mortality rate for D&E less than or simi-
lar to that of instillation abortions up to 20 weeks). There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that D&E will be the method that poses the least risk to 
the woman in every situation in which there are compelling medical rea-
sons for performing an abortion after viability. Cf. 655 F. 2d, at 865 (ex-
perts disagree whether D&E should ever be used after viability). We 
therefore cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births. Thus, the State's compel-
ling interest in preserving the life of the fetus when there is a live birth 
justifies the State in requirin a second h sician at every third-trimeste 
bortion. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
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Viable fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because 
of their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requiremen~furthers the State's 
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses, 
and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding 
that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
Section 188. 04 7 reqmres a pat o ogy report for every abor-
tion performed. Even in the early weeks of pregnancy, 
however, "[c]ertain regulations that have no significant im-
pact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide to have an 
abortion may be permissible where justified by important 
state health ob · ectives." City of Akron, at 11. See 
• See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J . Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 
following hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one s,ur- r 
d viva! out of 38 live birth~ 1 4 ~~ 'IJ 8 ( 5<J- (o :Z.% ~~ ~ ~:n-
(f~ ()_focwd. ~~ ~)) ~ •• ~ ~a\(~&-'\l%v~f\~ 
~ )ot.C{~ d--S ~ &'l -~))'Ill. 
1 
cJ: <i?ll7 '( 5o1?\ 4 l<l>lo nk ~ """"') ' 
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Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S. 
52, 80-81 (1976). The question is whether § 188.047 uncon-
stitutionally burdens a woman's abortion decision. We hold 
that it does not. 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed, with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and 
prepuces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20. 030(3)(A)7 (1977). Although Missouri 
apparently does not require pathology reports in all proce-
dures, this does not mean that such a requirement is invalid 
simply because it touches on the woman's abortion right dur-
ing the first weeks of pregnancy. Rather, the specific issue 
here is whether § 188.047, which on its face and in effect is 
reasonably related to generally accepted medical standards 
and maternal health, 10 "further[s] important health-related 
10 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can only be discovered 
through a pathological examination. The District Court noted that several 
medical experts testified that pathology should be done in every case of 
abortion. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 49. Moreover, the ACOG standards 
for abortion services state that for all surgical services performed on an 
ambulatory outpatient basis: "Tissue removed should be subsmitted to a 
pathologist for an examination. . . . In the situation of elective termina-
tion of pregnancy, the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identi-
fied, the products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted 
to a pathologist for gross and microscopic examination." ACOG, Stand-
ards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52 (5th ed. 1982) (emphasis added). 
The standards of the National Abortion Federation (NAF), whose mem-
bers include the institutional plaintiffs in this case, itself provides: "All tis-
sue must be examined grossly at the time of the abortion procedure by a 
physician or trained assistant and the results recorded in the chart. In 
the absence of visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, ob-
tained tissue may be examined under a low power microscope . . . . If t · 
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State concerns," City of Akron, ante, at 12, without interfer-
ing with the woman's decision to have an abortion. 
As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. Examining tis-
sue removed during an abortion provides a State with an 
opportunity to further its interest in promoting the health of 
its citizens. Additionally, questions about the long-range 
complications of abortions and their effect on subsequent 
pregnancies remain. See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Wil-
lard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et al., Association of Induced Abor-
tion with Subsequent Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A. M. A. 2495, 
2499 (1980). Recorded pathology reports, in concert with 
abortion complication reports, provide a statistical basis for 
studying those complications. 11 Cf. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 
81. 
In light of these factors, we think the small additional cost 12 
examination is inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest suit-
able pathology laboratory for microscopic examination." N AF, National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (emphasis in original) (compliance 
with standards obligatory for N AF member facilities to remain in good 
standing). See Brief of the American Public Health Association as Ami-
cus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the 
NAF standards for non-hospital abortion facilities as constituting "mini-
mum standards"). Cf. Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington, 
D. C., Inc., 1980 Guidelines for Operation, Maintenance and Evaluation of 
First Trimester Outpatient Abortion Facilities 10 ("Gross examination 
must be performed on all specimens. Microscopic tissue analysis must be 
done for all cases when immediate gross evaluation is inadequate or does 
not confirm a normal gestation."). 
11 Section 188.04 7 requires that a copy of the report be sent to the State's 
division of health. 
12 The estimated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. 
There was testimony in the District Court that the additional cost of 




81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 11 
of a tissue examination 13 does not significantly burden a preg-
nant woman's abortion decision. In Danforth, this Court 
unanimously upheld Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as 
"useful to the State's interest in protecting the health of its 
female citizens, and [as] a resource that is relevant to deci-
sions involving medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., 
at 81. 14 We view the requirement for a pathology report as 
comparable and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the jud ent of the Court of Appeals on 
this point. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 16 A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
laintiffs also note that § 188.047 does not specify whether the patholo-
gJ.S must make a microscopic examination. State regulations, however, 
state: "All reports shall contain the findings of a gross examination. If fe-
tal parts or placenta are not identified, then an accompanying microscopic 
tissue report must also be filed · Div' · of Health." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Cod -151.030 1 (1981 
' The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
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~ 11 
best interests."~ City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 1.8' The issue 
here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with 
these established legal standards.-~'~"' I~ 1q 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2,.1!1 in relevant part, 
provides: 
J 0 ...r'The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to paren-
tal consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be com-
pleted with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." !d., at 644. Confidentiality 
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use 
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). 
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
1"1 J"Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
19 )"'The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). AI-
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" ·20 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courtsJAf to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Pla.intiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
I r ~ee n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
20 .;'we have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643--644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
z.l infirmities.~ 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
~~ ? Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146--147 
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F . 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I , supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts 
to abstain. 
-·,. 
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dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental{£onsent provision. is af-
firmed. The judgment invalidating the requirement of a 
pathology report for all abortions and the requirement that a 
second physician attend the abortion of any viable fetus is 
reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding an award of 
attorney's fees for all hours expended by plaintiffs' attorneys 
and remand for proceedings consistent with Hensley v. Eck-
erhart,- U.S.- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
l ~.j~J 
~: \,to - \'1 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188.04 7, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly peiform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The mir10r or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4] 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872--873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8--12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
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physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
6 Missouri does not define the tenn "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the tenn has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are perfonned other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, defonnity or other abnonnal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals . .. . " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice ... to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
7 The courts below found, and JuSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion 
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-phy-
sician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can sur-
vive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accord-
ingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad.J\Tfiepe is ag;pil!ffteRt tfiat a fet~ 
· · as the Court of Appeals 
noted, the choice oft 1s proce ure er VIa 1 1 1s subject to the require-
ments of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts 
below, in conclusory language, found that D&E is the "method of choice fee 
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature 
infant. 
I , ' 
£"1t. .. 4fi!r vi~~tb.1,·s.1 IS f"'.3:S;Lic!. . (D55 f..t.l, a! 81..~. 
r6 seme ;wemen who need post-viability :ilhartigniJt"" Po.,t, a~ ~ No schol-
arly writing supporting this view is cited by those courts or by the dissent. 
Reliance apparently is placed solely on the testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a 
physician om ansa~ ~estimony, if nothing else, is remarkable in its 
candor. He is a member of the National Abortion Federation, "an orga-
nization of abortion providers and people interested in the pro-choice 
movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported the use of D&E on 28-
week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In some circumstances, 
he considered it a better procedure than other methods. See 2 Record 
427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evidenced by his agree-
ment "that the abortion patient has a right not only to be rid of the growth, 
called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a dead fetus." I d., at 431. 
He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any intention of trying to protect the 
fetus, if it can be saved," id., and finally that "as a general principle" 
"[t]here should not be a live fetus," id., at 435. Moreover, contrary to 
every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a D&E abortion. Id., 
at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testified at the trial, those 
called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, considered that any use of 
D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21 (limiting use of D&E 
to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Robert Kretzschmar) 
(D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after 26 weeks); 4 Record 
787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viability); 7 Record 52 (D&E 
safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not performing D&E past 20 
weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E equivalent to childbirth 
at 24 weeks~ Record 33, 78-81~r. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E 
performed)~''A.pparently Dr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 
368, 428, a state having no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and 
§ 188.030.2. It is not clear whether he was operating under or familiar 
with the limitations imposed by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the cir-
cumstances when there were "contraindications" against the use of any of 
the procedures that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory 
opinion was limited to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record 
evidence that D&E ever will be the method that poses the least risk to the 
woman in those rare situations where there are compelling medical reasons 
( Dr.C.r;.s'- ·~) 
" 
' . 
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only 
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
for performing an abortion after viability. If there were such instances, 
they hardly would justify invalidating § 188.030.3. 
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in,._l'footnote, the District Court cited-
with no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agree-
ment with Dr. Crist is enlightening. 
/~~~~~~~~~~~~~----------------------~~~ 
, "Q. Is there any reason that you can give us for the attendance of a sec-
ond physician for an abortion on a viable fetus by method of D&E. \ 
"A. No. 
"Q. There is no possibility of survival, is there? 
"A. No. Mr. Susman, can I add to that just a moment? 
"Q. Certainly. 
"A. To get that in focus, to me this is not a practical point. I simply do 
not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an elected 
method of abortion. Because, again, we are talking about well along in 
second trimester, not early trimester. 
"Q. Doctor, there has been prior testimony of D&E being performed at 
those stages when contraindication exists for the other alternatives. 
"A. Well, okay. There very well may be, but I personally cannot con· 
ceive that as a significant practical point. It may be important legally, 
but from a medical standpoint, that doesn't bother me. ""' 
4 Record 83&-837 (emphasis added). Given that Dr. Crist's discordant 
testimony IS wholly unsupportea, tne State's compelling interest in pro-
tecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even 
though there may be the rare case when a physician may think honestly 
that D&E is required for the mother's health. Legislation need not ac-
commodate every conceivable contingency. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
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able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual 
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Vi-
able fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of 
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requirement rationally furthers 
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of via-
ble fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri I 
9 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J . Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, 83--84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 follow-
ing hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out 
of 38live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27 
weeks); id., at 729 (2&--92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id. , 
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks). 
..... 
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requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and pre-
puces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abor-
tions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facil-
ity, § 188.047 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the 
tissue report with the State Division of Health. . . . " See n. 
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy 
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri ap-
pears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as 
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological 
examination by the performing doctor. The narrow question 
before us is whether the State lawfully also may require the 
tissue removed following an abortion performed in clinics as 
well as in hospitals to be submitted to a pathologist. We be-
lieve that it can. 
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] impor-
tant health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, it is 
10 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only 
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of patho-
logical examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obliga-
tory for N AF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the 
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 
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good medical practice to submit all tissue to the examination 
of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important following 
abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range com-
plications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. See 
App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et 
al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Preg-
nancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pa-
thology reports, in concert with abortion complication re-
ports, provide a statistical basis for studying those 
complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion 
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination. 
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a 
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tis-
sue after almost every type of surgery. Although this re-
quirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in 
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the 
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospi-
tal abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). 
11 ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recom-
mended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all 
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations." ACOG, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG 
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services per-
formed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a 
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The 
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as 
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the prac-
tice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examina-
tion for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change 
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. 
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized-on 
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a 
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Com-
mittee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980). 
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Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient 
clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence re-
quired in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such 
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose 
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abor-
tions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District 
Court indicates, medical opinion is not YMniffiOtis. on this 
question. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 
845-847; n. 2, supra. ~.there is substantial support for 
Missouri's requirement. In t his case, for example, Dr. Ber-
nard Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, 
testified that he requires a pathologist examination after each 
of the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the 
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He 
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's re-
port on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abor-
tion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure 
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body." 
12 The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position 
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all 
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to eth-
ical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to "incompetent 
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-
Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread ques-
tionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to 
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago 
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a 
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary 
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals. 
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judg-
ment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pa-
thology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests 
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But 
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic 
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be 
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examina-
tion of tissue is particularly importan~ ~ ~,_~~~.:::..._h_Jt...-'\ 
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App. 143-144. See also App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. 
Keitges); 5 Record 798--799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's 
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pa-
thologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution 
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to min-
imize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early 
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no sig-
nificant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide 
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by im-
portant state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11. 
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80-81. In light of the substan-
tial benefits that a pathologist's examination can have, we 
think the cost of a tissue examination does not significantly 
burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The esti-
mated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., 
at 700, n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld 
Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the 
State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, 
and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving 
medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We 
13 The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.04 7 is constitutionally infirm 
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that 
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the 
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue. 
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is 
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more 
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. 
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the 
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically 
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine preg-
nancy.") (emphasis added). 
14 The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
\ -
t·.· ', 
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view the requirement for a pathology report as comparable I 
and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we re-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 656-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 15 A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
16 The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one, 
and adhere to the viewsjftti they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11. 
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court, 
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality 
opinion). 
16 The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental 
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed 
with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportu-
nity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality here is 
assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use her ini-
tials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to 
expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
[Footnote 17 is on p. 15} 
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with 
these established legal standards. 18 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part, 
provides: 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
17 Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at406-407, and n. 14,411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
18 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
19 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to 1 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
'IJ) We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 21 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent 
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the re-
quirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the re-
quirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any 
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding 
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plain-
tiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, -- U. S. -- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
21 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts 
to abstain. 
RIDER A 
Although he conceded that the attendance of a second physician for a 
D&E abortion on a viable fetus was not necessary, he thought the 
point mostly was theoretical, because he "simply [did] not believe 
that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an elected 
method of abortion." 4 Record 836. When reminded of Dr. Crist's 
earlier testimony, he conceded the remote possibility of third-
trimester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive 
that as a significant practical point. It may be important legally, 
but [not] from a medical standpoint •••• " Id. 
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These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Rfii 
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. /-
Virginia, post, p. --, present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
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several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188.04 7, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
'Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the 
following procedures: 
"(1) The mirwr or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 41 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
II 
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
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physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
6 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals . .. . " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
·' 
•' 
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In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." !d., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." Seen. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188. 030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
7 The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion 
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-phy-
sician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can sur-
vive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accord-
ingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad. This reasoning rests on two 
assumptions. First, a fetus cannot survive a D&E abortion, and second, 
D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester. There is general 
agreement as to the first proposition, but not as to the second. Indeed, 
almost all of the authorities disagree with JuSTICE BLACKMUN's critical as-
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature 
infant. 
sumption, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this procedure 
after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 
865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in conclusory language, 
found that D&E is the "method of choice even after viability is possible." 
655 F. 2d, at 865. No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by 
those courts or by the dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the 
testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas, to whom the Dis-
trict Court referred in a footnote. 483 F. Supp. , at 694, n. 25. This testi-
mony provides slim support for this holding. Dr. Crist's testimony, if 
nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the National 
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people in-
terested in the pro-choice movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported 
the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In 
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure than other meth-
ods. See 2 Record 427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evi-
denced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to 
be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a 
dead fetus." Id., at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any inten-
tion of trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," id., and finally that 
"as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus, " id. , at 435. 
Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a 
D&E abortion. I d ., at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testi-
fied at the trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, consid-
ered that any use of D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21 
(limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Rob-
ert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after 
26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viabil-
ity); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not per-
forming D&E past 20 weeks); i d. , at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E 
equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks). See also 8 Record 33, 78-81 (deposi-
tion of Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently 
Dr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a state having 
no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and § 188.030.2. It is not clear 
whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations imposed 
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State only 
permits these late abortions when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when there were 
"contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures that could pre-
serve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited to emer-
gency situations. Indeed, there is no record evidence that D&E ever will 
be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in those rare situa-
tions where there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abor-
tion after viability. If there were such instances, they hardly would jus-
tify invalidating § 188.030.3. 
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in its footnote, the District Court cited-
with no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agree-
ment with Dr. Crist, is enlightening. 
Although he conceded that the attendance of a second physician for a D&E 
abortion on a viable fetus was not necessary, he thought the point mostly 
was theoretical, because he "simply [did] not believe that the question of 
viability comes up when D&E is an elected method of abortion." . 4 Record 
836. When reminded of Dr. Crist's earlier testimony, he conceded there-
mote possibility of third-trimester D&E abortions, but stated: "I person-
ally cannot conceive that as a significant practical point. It may be impor-
tant legally, but [not] from a medical standpoint .... " Ibid. Given that 
Dr. Crist's discordant testimony is wholly u!\supported, the State's compel-
ling interest in protecting a viable fetus justifies the second-physician re-
quirement even though there may be the rare case when a physician may 
think honestly that D&E is required for the mother's health. Legislation 
need not accommodate every conceivable contingency. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L. v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
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first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual 
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Vi-
able fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of 
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible/ but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requirement rationally furthers 
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of via-
ble fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the excep-
9 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J . Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 follow-
ing hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out 
of 38 live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27 
weeks); id., at 729 (25-92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id., 
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks). 
,v 
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tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and pre-
puces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abor-
tions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facil-
ity, § 188.047 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the 
tissue report with the State Division of Health .... " See n. 
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy 
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri ap-
pears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as 
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely to a pathological 
examination by the performing doctor. The narrow question 
before us is whether the State lawfully also may require the 
tissue removed following an abortion performed in clinics as 
well as in hospitals to be submitted to a pathologist. We be-
lieve that it can. 
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] impor-
tant health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, it is 
10 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only 
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of patho-
logical examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obliga-
tory for NAF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the 
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospi-
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good medical practice to submit all tissue to the examination 
of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important following 
abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range com-
plications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. See 
App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, et 
al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent Preg-
nancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded pa-
thology reports, in concert with abortion complication re-
ports, provide a statistical basis for studying those 
complications. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. 
Danforth, 428 U. S. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion 
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination. 
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a 
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tis-
sue after almost every type of surgery. Although this re-
quirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in 
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the 
Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient 
tal abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). 
"AGOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recom-
mended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all 
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations." ACOG, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG 
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services per-
formed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a 
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The 
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as 
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the prac-
tice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examina-
tion for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change 
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799--800. 
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized--on 
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a 
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Com-
mittee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980). 
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clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence re-
quired in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such 
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose 
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abor-
tions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District 
Court indicates, medical opinion differs widely on this ques-
tion. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847; 
n. 2, supra. There is substantial support for Missouri's re-
quirement. In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard 
Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testi-
fied that he requires a pathologist examination after each of 
the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the 
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He 
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's re-
port on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abor-
tion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure 
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body." 
App. 143-144. See also App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. 
12 The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position 
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all 
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to eth-
ical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to "incompetent 
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-
Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread ques-
tionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to 
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago 
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a 
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary 
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals. 
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judg-
ment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pa-
thology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests 
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But 
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic 
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be 
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examina-
tion of tissue is particularly important for their protection. 
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Keitges); 5 Record 798--799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's 
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pa-
thologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution 
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to min-
imize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early 
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no sig-
nificant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide 
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by im-
portant state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11. 
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80-81. In light of the substan-
tial benefits that a pathologist's examination can have, we 
think the cost of a tissue examination does not significantly 
burden a pregnant woman's abortion decision. The esti-
mated cost of compliance for plaintiff Reproductive Health 
Services was $19.40 per abortion performed. 483 F. Supp., 
at 700, n. 48. In Danforth, this Court unanimously upheld 
Missouri's recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the 
State's interest in protecting the health of its female citizens, 
and [as] a resource that is relevant to decisions involving 
medical experience and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We 
18 The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.04 7 is constitutionally infirm 
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that 
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the 
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue. 
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is 
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more 
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. 
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the 
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically 
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine preg-
nancy.") (emphasis added). 
14 The Danforth Court also noted that "(t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
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view the requirement for a pathology report as comparable 
and as a relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, were-
verse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 64~4 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting)Y A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
15 The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one, 
and adhere to the views they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11. 
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court, 
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality 
opinion). 
16 The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to parental 
consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be completed 
with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportu-
nity for an abortion to be obtained." I d., at 644. Confidentiality here is 
assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use her ini-
tials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). As to 
expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
[Footnote 17 is on p. 15] 
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with 
these established legal standards. 18 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part, 
provides: 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
17 Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S., at 406--407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
18 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J . S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
19 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
,-
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause."' 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
00 We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643-644, 647--648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 21 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent 
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the re-
quirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the re-
quirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any 
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding 
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plain-
tiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, -- U. S. -- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
21 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I, II, and VI, and an opinioin with respect to 
Parts III, IV, and V, in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins. 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
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("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188.04 7, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
' Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissue removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699-701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"( 4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the fol-
lowing procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights ,for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4] 
• 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872-873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 988 (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at ~12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
5 The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F . 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
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II 
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
6 Missouri does not define the term "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-{)90, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the term has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are performed other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
"'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, deformity or other abnormal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals ... . " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
( ' 
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III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." !d., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 386--387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of, 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
7 The courts below found, and JUSTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion 
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-phy-
sician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can sur-
vive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accord-
ingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad. This reasoning rests on two 
assumptions. First, a fetus cannot survive a D&E abortion, and second, 
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grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature 
infant. 
D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester. There is general 
agreement as to the first proposition, but not as to the second. Indeed, 
almost all of the authorities disagree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's critical as-
sumption, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this procedure 
after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 
865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in conclusory language, 
found that D&E is the "method of choice even after viability is possible." 
655 F. 2d, at 865. No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by 
those courts or by the dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the 
testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas, to whom the Dis-
trict Court referred in a footnote . 483 F. Supp., at 694, n. 25. This testi-
mony provides slim support for this holding. Dr. Crist's testimony, if 
nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the National 
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people in-
terested in the pro-choice movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported 
the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In 
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure than other meth-
ods. See 2 Record 427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evi-
denced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to 
be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a 
dead fetus." !d., at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any inten-
tion of trying to protect the fetus , if it can be saved," id., and finally that 
"as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus," id., at 435. 
Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a 
D&E abortion. I d. , at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testi-
fied at the trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, consid-
ered that any use of D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21 
(limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Rob-
ert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after 
26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viabil-
ity); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not per-
forming D&E past 20 weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E 
equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks). See also 8 Record 33, 78--81 (deposi-
tion of Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently 
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State permits 
these late abortions only when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
Dr. Crist practiced only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a state having 
no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and § 188.030.2. It is not clear 
whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations imposed 
by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when there were 
"contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures that could pre-
serve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited to emer-
gency situations. Indeed, there is no record evidence that D&E ever will 
be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in those rare situa-
tions where there are compelling medical reasons for performing an abor-
tion after viability. If there were such instances, they hardly would jus-
tify invalidating § 188.030.3. 
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in its footnote , the District Court cited-
with no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agree-
ment with Dr. Crist, is enlightening. Although he conceded that the at-
tendance of a second physician for a D&E abortion on a viable fetus was not 
necessary, he considered the point mostly theoretical, because he "simply 
[did] not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an 
elected method of abortion." 4 Record 836. When reminded of Dr. 
Crist's earlier testimony, he conceded the remote possibility of third-tri-
mester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive that as a 
significant practical point. It may be important legally, but [not] from a 
medical standpoint .... " Ibid. Given that Dr. Crist's discordant testi-
mony is wholly unsupported, the State's compelling interest in protecting a 
viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even though there 
may be the rare case when a physician may think honestly that D&E is 
required for the mother's health. Legislation need not accommodate 
every conceivable contingency. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H.L . v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
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able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual 
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Vi-
able fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of 
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible, 9 but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requirement reasonably furthers 
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of via-
ble fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
9 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, 83--84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 follow-
ing hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out 
of 38 live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27 
weeks); id., at 729 (2&-:92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id., 
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks). 
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requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and pre-
puces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abor-
tions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facil-
ity, § 188.04 7 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the 
tissue report with the State Division of Health .... " Seen. 
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy 
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri ap-
pears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as 
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely examined by the per-
forming doctor. The narrow question before us is whether 
the Stat~ lawfully also may require the tissue removed fol-
lowing abortions performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to 
be submitted to a pathologist. · 
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] impor-
tant health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, it is 
10 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only 
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of patho-
logical examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
' Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obliga-
tory for N AF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the 
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospi-
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accepted medical practice to submit all tissue to the examina-
tion of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important follow-
ing abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range 
complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. 
See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, 
et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent 
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded 
pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication re-
ports, provide a statistical basis for studying those complica-
tions. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 u. s. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion 
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination. 
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a 
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tis-
sue after almost every type of surgery. Although this re-
quirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in 
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the 
Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient 
tal abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). 
11 ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recom-
mended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all 
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations. " ACOG, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG 
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services per-
formed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a 
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The 
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as 
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the prac-
tice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examina-
tion for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change 
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. 
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized-on 
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a 
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Com-
mittee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980). 
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clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence re-
quired in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such 
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose 
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abor-
tions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District 
Court indicates, medical opinion differs widely on this ques-
tion. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847; 
n. 2, supra. There is substantial support for Missouri's re-
quirement. In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard 
Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testi-
fied that he requires a pathologist examination after each of 
the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the 
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He 
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's re-
port on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abor-
tion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure 
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body." 
App. 143-144. See also App. 146-147 (testimony of Dr. 
12 The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position 
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all 
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to eth-
ical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti![) (minors may resort to "incompetent 
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-
Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread ques-
tionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to 
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago 
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a 
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary 
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals. 
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judg-
ment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pa-
thology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests 
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But 
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic 
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be 
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examina-
tion of tissue is particularly important for their protection. 
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Keitges); 5 Record 79~ 799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's 
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pa-
thologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution 
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to min-
imize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early 
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no sig-
nificant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide 
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by im-
portant state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11. 
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80--81. We think the cost of a 
tissue examination does not significantly burden a pregnant 
woman's abortion decision. The estimated cost of compli-
ance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services was $19.40 
per abortion performed, 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48, and in 
light of the substantial benefit's that a pathologist's examina-
tion can have, this small cost clearly is justified. In Dan-
forth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's 
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest 
in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a re-
source that is relevant to decisions involving medical experi-
ence and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We view the re-
13 The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.047 is constitutionally infirm 
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that 
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the 
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue. 
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is 
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more 
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. 
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the 
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically 
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine preg-
nancy.") (emphasis added). 
"The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
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quirement for a pathology report as comparable and as a 
relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 65&-657 (WHITE, J., dissenting).'" A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
1 ~ The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one, 
and adhere to the views they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11. 
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court, 
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality opin-
ion); id., at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
16 The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to paren-
tal consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be com-
pleted with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality 
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use 
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). 
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with ~ 
these established legal standards. 18 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part, 
provides: 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
11 Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
18 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
19 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S. , at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
,. ' 
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" · 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture eno~gh to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
20 We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence--that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 21 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent 
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the re-
quirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the re-
quirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any 
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding 
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plain-
tiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, --U.S.-- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
21 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I, II, and VI, and an opinioin with respect to 
Parts III, IV, and V, in which THE CHIEF JusTICE joins. 
These cases, like City of Akron v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health, Inc., ante, p. --, and Simopoulos v. 
Virginia, post, p. --,present questions as to the validity of 
state statutes regulating the performance of abortions. 
I 
Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc., two 
physicians who perform abortions, and an abortion clinic 
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("plaintiffs") filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Missouri challenging, as unconstitutional, 
several sections of the Missouri statutes regulating the per-
formance of abortions. The sections relevant here include 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 (Supp. 1982), requiring that abor-
tions after 12 weeks of pregnancy be performed in a hospi-
tal; 1 § 188.04 7, requiring a pathology report for each abortion 
performed; 2 § 188.030, requiring the presence of a second 
physician during abortions performed after viability; 3 and 
§ 188.028, requiring minors to secure parental or judicial 
consent. 4 
1 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.025 provides: "Every abortion performed sub-
sequent to the first twelve weeks of pregnancy shall be performed in a 
hospital." 
2 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.047 provides: 
"A representative sample of tissuli removed at the time of abortion shall 
be submitted to a board eligible or certified pathologist, who shall file a 
copy of the tissue report with the state division of health, and who shall 
provide a copy of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced and the pathologist's report shall be 
made a part of the patient's permanent record." 
3 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 provides: 
"An abortion of a viable unborn child shall be performed or induced only 
when there is in attendance a physician other than the physician perform-
ing or adducing the abortion who shall take control of and provide immedi-
ate medical care for a child born as a result of the abortion. During the 
performance of the abortion, the physician performing it, and subsequent 
to the abortion, the physician required by this section to be in attendance, 
shall take all reasonable steps in keeping with good medical practice, con-
sistent with the procedure used, to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased risk to the life 
or health of the woman." 
4 Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 provides: 
"1. No person shall knowingly perform an abortion upon a pregnant 
woman under the age of eighteen years unless: 
"(1) The attending physician has secured the informed written consent 
of the minor and one parent or guardian; or 
"(2) The minor is emancipated and the attending physician has received 
the informed written consent of the minor; or 
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After hearing testimony from a number of expert wit-
nesses, the District Court invalidated all of these sections ex-
cept the pathology requirement. 483 F. Supp. 679, 699--701 
(1980). 5 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
"(3) The minor has been granted the right to self-consent to the abortion 
by court order pursuant to subsection 2 of this section, and the attending 
physician has received the informed written consent of the minor; or 
"(4) The minor has been granted consent to the abortion by court order, 
and the court has given its informed written consent in accordance with 
subsection 2 of this section, and the minor is having the abortion willingly, 
in compliance with subsection 3 of this section. 
"2. The right of a minor to self-consent to an abortion under subdivision 
(3) of subsection 1 of this section or court consent under subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section may be granted by a court pursuant to the fol-
lowing procedures: 
"(1) The minor or next friend shall make an application to the juvenile 
court which shall assist the minor or next friend in preparing the petition 
and notices required pursuant to this section. The minor or the next 
friend of the minor shall thereafter file a petition setting forth the initials of 
the minor; the age of the minor; the names and addresses of each parent, 
guardian, or, if the minor's parents are deceased and no guardian has been 
appointed, any other person standing in loco parentis of the minor; that the 
minor has been fully informed of the risks and consequences of the abor-
tion; that the minor is of sound mind and has sufficient intellectual capacity 
to consent to the abortion; that, if the court does not grant the minor ma-
jority rights for the purpose of consent to the abortion, the court should 
find that the abortion is in the best interest of the minor and give judicial 
consent to the abortion; that the court should appoint a guardian ad litem of 
the child; and if the minor does not have private counsel, that the court 
should appoint counsel. The petition shall be signed by the minor or the 
next friend; 
"(3) A hearing on the merits of the petition, to be held on the record, 
shall be held as soon as possible within five days of the filing of the petition. 
. . . At the hearing, the court shall hear evidence relating to the emo-
tional development, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor; the 
nature, possible consequences, and alternatives to the abortion; and any 
other evidence that the court may find useful in determining whether the 
minor should be granted majority rights for the purpose of consenting to 
the abortion or whether the abortion is in the best interests of the minor; 
[Footnote 5 is on p. 4] 
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versed the District Court's judgment with respect to 
§ 188.028, thereby upholding the requirement that a minor 
secure parental or judicial consent to an abortion. It also 
held that the District Court erred in sustaining§ 188.047, the 
pathology requirement. The District Court's judgment with 
respect to the second-physician requirement was affirmed, 
and the case was remanded for further proceedings and find-
ings relating to the second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment. 655 F. 2d 848, 872--873 (1981). On remand, the Dis-
trict Court affirmed its holding that the second-trimester 
hospitalization requirement was unconstitutional. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed this judgment. 664 F. 2d 687, 691 
(1981). We granted certiorari. 456 U. S. 988 (1982). 
The Court today in City of Akron, ante, at 8-12, has stated 
fully the principles that govern judicial review of state stat-
utes regulating abortions, and these need not be repeated 
here. With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes 
at issue. 
"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting 
to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor and give 
judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on which the petition is 
denied; 
"3. If a minor desires an abortion, then she shall be orally informed of 
and, if possible, sign the written consent required by section 188.039 in the 
same manner as an adult person. No abortion shall be performed on any 
minor against her will, except that an abortion may be performed against 
the will of a minor pursuant to a court order described in subdivision (4) of 
subsection 1 of this section that the abortion is necessary to preserve the 
life of the minor." 
• The District Court also awarded attorney's fees for all hours claimed by 
the plaintiffs' attorneys. The Court of Appeals affirmed this allocation of 
fees. See 655 F. 2d 848, 872 (CA8 1981). The petition for certiorari 
raises the issue whether an award of attorney's fees, made pursuant to 42 
U. S. C. § 1988, should be proportioned to reflect the extent to which plain-
tiffs prevailed. 
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II 
In City of Akron, we invalidated a city ordinance requiring 
physicians to perform all second-trimester abortions at gen-
eral or special hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission 
on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) or by the American Os-
teopathic Association. Ante, at 13. Missouri's hospitaliza-
tion requirements are similar to those enacted by Akron, as 
all second-trimester abortions must be performed in general, 
acute-care facilities. 6 For the reasons stated in City of 
Akron, we held that such a requirement "unreasonably in-
fringes upon a woman's constitutional right to obtain an 
abortion." Ante, at 20-21. For the same reasons, we af-
firm the Court of Appeals' judgment that § 188.025 is 
unconstitutional. 
6 Missouri does not define the tenn "hospital" in its statutory provisions 
regulating abortions. We therefore must assume, as did the courts below, 
see 483 F. Supp., at 686, n. 10; 664 F. 2d, at 689-690, and nn. 3, 5 and 6, 
that the tenn has its common meaning of a general, acute-care facility. 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015(2) (Supp. 1982) (defining "abortion facility" as 
"a clinic, physician's office, or any other place or facility in which abortions 
are perfonned other than a hospital"). Section 197.020.2 (1978), part of 
Missouri's hospital licensing laws, reads: 
" 'Hospital' means a place devoted primarily to the maintenance and opera-
tion of facilities for the diagnosis, treatment or care for not less than 
twenty-four hours in any week of three or more nonrelated individuals suf-
fering from illness, disease, injury, defonnity or other abnonnal physical 
conditions; or a place devoted primarily to provide for not less than twenty-
four hours in any week medical ... care for three or more nonrelated indi-
viduals .... " 
Cf. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 197.200(1) (1978) (defining "ambulatory surgical cen-
ter" to include facilities "with an organized medical staff of physicians" and 
"with continuous physician services and registered professional nursing 
services whenever a patient is in the facility"); 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
50-30.010(1)(A) (1977) (same). The regulations for the Department of So-
cial Services establish standards for the construction, physical facilities, 
and administration of hospitals. Id., 50-20.010 to 50-20.030 (1977). 
These are not unlike those set by JCAH. See City of Akron, ante, at 13, 
and n. 16. 
·~,; · ... 
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III 
We turn now to the State's second-physician requirement. 
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973), the Court recognized 
that the State has a compelling interest in the life of a viable 
fetus: "[T]he State in promoting its interest in the potential-
ity of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate 
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of 
the mother." Id., at 164-165. See Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U. S. 379, 386-387 (1979); Beal v. Doe, 432 U. S. 438, 
445-446 (1977). Several of the Missouri statutes undertake 
such regulation. Post-viability abortions are proscribed ex-
cept when necessary to preserve the life or the health of the 
woman. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (Supp. 1982). The 
State also forbids the use of abortion procedures fatal to the 
viable fetus unless alternative procedures pose a greater risk 
to the health of the woman. § 188.030.2. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case requires the 
attendance of a second physician at the abortion of a viable 
fetus. § 188.030.3. This section requires that the second 
physician "take all reasonable steps in keeping with good 
medical practice . . . to preserve the life and health of the via-
ble unborn child; provided that it does not pose an increased 
risk to the life or health of the woman." See n. 3, supra. It 
also provides that the second physician "shall take control of 
and provide immediate medical care for a child born as a re-
sult of the abortion." 
The lower courts invalidated § 188.030.3. 7 The plaintiffs, 
respondents here on this issue, urge affirmance on the 
7 The courts below found, and JusTICE BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion 
agrees, post, at 6-7, that there is no possible justification for a second-phy-
sician requirement whenever D&E is used because no viable fetus can sur-
vive a D&E procedure. 483 F. Supp., at 694; 655 F. 2d, at 865. Accord-
ingly, for them, § 188.030.3 is overbroad. This reasoning rests on two 
assumptions. First, a fetus cannot survive a D&E abortion, and second, 
81-1255 & 81-1623-0PINION 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 7 
grounds that the second-physician requirement distorts the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship, and is both impracti-
cal and costly. They note that Missouri does not require two 
physicians in attendance for any other medical or surgical 
procedure, including childbirth or delivery of a premature 
infant. 
D&E is the method of choice in the third trimester. There is general 
agreement as to the first proposition, but not as to the second. Indeed, 
almost all of the authorities disagree with JUSTICE BLACKMUN's critical as-
sumption, and as the Court of Appeals noted, the choice of this procedure 
after viability is subject to the requirements of§ 188.030.2. See id., at 
865, and n. 28. Nevertheless, the courts below, in conclusory language, 
found that D&E is the "method of choice even after viability is possible." 
655 F . 2d, at 865. No scholarly writing supporting this view is cited by 
those courts or by the dissent. Reliance apparently is placed solely on the 
testimony of Dr. Robert Crist, a physician from Kansas, to whom the Dis-
trict Court referred in a footnote. 483 F. Supp., at 694, n. 25. This testi-
mony provides slim support for this holding. Dr. Crist's testimony, if 
nothing else, is remarkable in its candor. He is a member of the National 
Abortion Federation, "an organization of abortion providers and people in-
terested in the pro-choice movement." 2 Record 415-416. He supported 
the use of D&E on 28-week pregnancies, well into the third trimester. In 
some circumstances, he considered it a better procedure than other meth-
ods. See 2 Record 427-428. His disinterest in protecting fetal life is evi-
denced by his agreement "that the abortion patient has a right not only to 
be rid of the growth, called a fetus in her body, but also has a right to a 
dead fetus." !d., at 431. He also agreed that he "[n]ever ha[s] any inten-
tion of trying to protect the fetus, if it can be saved," id., and finally that 
"as a general principle" "[t]here should not be a live fetus," id., at 435. 
Moreover, contrary to every other view, he thought a fetus could survive a 
D&E abortion. I d., at 433-434. None of the other physicians who testi-
fied at the trial, those called both by the plaintiffs and defendants, consid-
ered that any use of D&E after viability was indicated. See 1 Record 21 
(limiting use of D&E to under 18 weeks); 2 Record 381, 410-413 (Dr. Rob-
ert Kretzschmar) (D&E up to 17 weeks; would never perform D&E after 
26 weeks); 4 Record 787 (almost "inconceivable" to use D&E after viabil-
ity); 7 Record 52 (D&E safest up to 18 weeks); id., at 110 (doctor not per-
forming D&E past 20 weeks); id., at 111 (risks of doing outpatient D&E 
equivalent to childbirth at 24 weeks). See also 8 Record 33, 78-81 (deposi-
tion of Dr. Willard Cates) (16 weeks latest D&E performed). Apparently 
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The first physician's primary concern will be the life and 
health of the woman. Many third-trimester abortions in 
Missouri will be emergency operations, 8 as the State permits 
these late abortions only when they are necessary to pre-
serve the life or the health of the woman. It is not unreason-
Dr. Crist performed abortions only in Kansas, 2 Record 334, 368, 428, a 
state having no statutes comparable to § 188.030.1 and § 188.030.2. It is 
not clear whether he was operating under or familiar with the limitations 
imposed by Missouri law. Nor did he explain the circumstances when 
there were "contraindications" against the use of any of the procedures 
that could preserve viability, or whether his conclusory opinion was limited 
to emergency situations. Indeed, there is no record evidence that D&E 
ever will be the method that poses the least risk to the woman in those rare 
situations where there are compelling medical reasons for performing an 
abortion after viability. If there were such instances, they hardly would 
justify invalidating § 188.030.3. 
In addition to citing Dr. Crist in its footnote, the District Court cited-
with no elaboration-Dr. Schmidt. His testimony, reflecting no agree-
ment with Dr. Crist, is enlightening. Although he conceded that the at-
tendance of a second physician for a D&E abortion on a viable fetus was not 
necessary, he considered the point mostly theoretical, because he "simply 
[did] not believe that the question of viability comes up when D&E is an 
elected method of abortion." 4 Record 836. When reminded of Dr. 
Crist's earlier testimony, he conceded the remote possibility of third-tri-
mester D&E abortions, but stated: "I personally cannot conceive that as a 
significant practical point. It may be important legally, but [not] from a 
medical standpoint .... " Ibid. Given that Dr. Crist's discordant testi-
mony is wholly unsupported, the State's compelling interest in protecting a 
viable fetus justifies the second-physician requirement even though there 
may be the rare case when a physician may think honestly that D&E is 
required for the mother's health. Legislation need not accommodate 
every conceivable contingency. 
8 There is no clearly expressed exception on the face of the statute for 
the performance of an abortion of a viable fetus without the second physi-
cian in attendance. There may be emergency situations where, for exam-
ple, the woman's health may be endangered by delay. Section§ 188.030.3 
is qualified, at least in part, by the phrase "provided that it does not pose 
an increased risk to the life or health of the woman." This clause reason-
ably could be construed to apply to such a situation. Cf. H .L . v. Math-
eson, 450 U. S. 398, 407, n. 14 (1981) (rejecting argument that Utah statute 
might apply to individuals with emergency health care needs). 
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able for the State to assume that during the operation the 
first physician's attention and skills will be directed to pre-
serving the woman's health, and not to protecting the actual 
life of those fetuses who survive the abortion procedure. Vi-
able fetuses will be in immediate and grave danger because of 
their premature birth. A second physician, in situations 
where Missouri permits third-trimester abortions, may be of 
assistance to the woman's physician in preserving the health 
and life of the child. 
By giving immediate medical attention to a fetus that is de-
livered alive, the second physician will assure that the State's 
interests are protected more fully than the first physician 
alone would be able to do. And given the compelling inter-
est that the State has in preserving life, we cannot say that 
the Missouri requirement of a second physician in those un-
usual circumstances where Missouri permits a third-trimes-
ter abortion is unconstitutional. Preserving the life of a via-
ble fetus that is aborted may not often be possible/ but the 
State legitimately may choose to provide safeguards for the 
comparatively few instances of live birth that occur. We be-
lieve the second-physician requirement reasonably furthers 
the State's compelling interest in protecting the lives of via-
ble fetuses, and we reverse the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals holding that § 188.030.3 is unconstitutional. 
IV 
In regulating hospital services within the State, Missouri 
9 See ACOG Technical Bulletin No. 56, supra n. 7, at 4 (as high as 7% 
live-birth rate for intrauterine instillation of uterotonic agents); Stroh & 
Hinman, Reported Live Births Following Induced Abortion: Two and One-
Half Years' Experience in Upstate New York, 126 Am. J. Obstet. Gynecol. 
83, 83-84 (1976) (26 live births following saline induced-abortions; 9 follow-
ing hysterotomy; 1 following oxtyocin-induced abortion) (one survival out 
of 38live births); 4 Record 728 (50-62% mortality rate for fetuses 26 and 27 
weeks); id., at 729 (2&-92% mortality rate for fetuses 28 and 29 weeks); id., 
at 837 (50% mortality rate at 34 weeks). 
. , . 
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requires that "[a]ll tissue surgically removed with the excep-
tion of such tissue as tonsils, adenoids, hernial sacs and pre-
puces, shall be examined by a pathologist, either on the 
premises or by arrangement outside of the hospital." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code 50-20.030(3)(A)7 (1977). With respect to abor-
tions, whether performed in hospitals or in some other facil-
ity, § 188.04 7 requires the pathologist to "file a copy of the 
tissue report with the State Division of Health .... " Seen. 
2, supra. The pathologist also is required to "provide a copy 
of the report to the abortion facility or hospital in which the 
abortion was performed or induced." Thus, Missouri ap-
pears to require that tissue following abortions, as well as 
from almost all other surgery performed in hospitals, must be 
submitted to a pathologist, not merely examined by the per-
forming doctor. The narrow question before us is whether 
the State lawfully also may require the tissue removed fol-
lowing abortions performed in clinics as well as in hospitals to 
be submitted to a pathologist. 
On its face and in effect, § 188.047 is reasonably related to 
generally accepted medical standards and "further[s] impor-
tant health-related State concerns." City of Akron, ante, at 
12. As the Court of Appeals recognized, pathology examina-
tions are clearly "useful and even necessary in some cases," 
because "abnormalities in the tissue may warn of serious, 
possibly fatal disorders." 655 F. 2d, at 870. 10 As a rule, itis 
10 A pathological examination is designed to assist in the detection of 
fatal ectopic pregnancies, hydatritaforme moles or other precancerous 
growths, and a variety of other problems that can be discovered only 
through a pathological examination. The general medical utility of patho-
logical examinations is clear. See, e. g., American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic 
Services 52 (5th ed. 1982); National Abortion Federation (NAF), National 
Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) (compliance with standards obliga-
tory for N AF member facilities to remain in good standing); Brief of the 
American Public Health Association as Amicus Curiae in Nos. 81-185, 
81-746, 81-1172, at 29, n. 6 (supporting the NAF standards for non-hospi-
.. 
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accepted medical practice to submit all tissue to the examina-
tion of a pathologist. 11 This is particularly important follow-
ing abortion, because questions remain as to the long-range 
complications and their effect on subsequent pregnancies. 
See App. 72-73 (testimony of Dr. Willard Cates, Jr.); Levin, 
et al., Association of Induced Abortion with Subsequent 
Pregnancy Loss, 243 J. A.M.A. 2495, 2499 (1980). Recorded 
pathology reports, in concert with abortion complication re-
ports, provide a statistical basis for studying those complica-
tions. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 
428 u. s. 52, 81 (1976). 
Plaintiffs argue that the physician performing the abortion 
is as qualified as a pathologist to make the examination. 
This argument disregards the fact that Missouri requires a 
pathologist-not the performing physician-to examine tis-
sue after almost every type of surgery. Although this re-
quirement is in a provision relating to surgical procedures in 
hospitals, many of the same procedures included within the 
Missouri statute customarily are performed also in outpatient 
tal abortion facilities as constituting "minimum standards"). 
11 ACOG's standards at the time of the District Court's trial recom-
mended that a "tissue or operative review committee" should examine "all 
tissue removed at obstetric-gynecologic operations." ACOG, Standards 
for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 13 (4th ed. 1974). The current ACOG 
standards also state as a general rule that, for all surgical services per-
formed on an ambulatory basis, "[t]issue removed should be submitted to a 
pathologist for an examination." ACOG, supra, at 52 (5th ed. 1982). The 
dissent, however, relies on the recent modification of these standards as 
they apply to abortions. ACOG now provides an "exception to the prac-
tice" of mandatory examination by a pathologist and makes such examina-
tion for abortion tissue permissive. Ibid. Not surprisingly, this change 
in policy was controversial within the College. See 4 Record 799-800. 
ACOG found that "[n]o consensus exists regarding routine microscopic 
examination of aspirated tissue in every case," though it recognized-on 
the basis of inquiries made in 29 institutions-that in a majority of them a 
microscopic examination is performed in all cases. ACOG, Report of Com-
mittee on Gynecologic Practice, Item #6.2.1 (June 27-28, 1980) . 
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clinics. No reason has been suggested why the prudence re-
quired in a hospital should not be equally appropriate in such 
a clinic. Indeed, there may be good reason to impose 
stricter standards in this respect on clinics performing abor-
tions than on hospitals. 12 As the testimony in the District 
Court indicates, medical opinion differs widely on this ques-
tion. See 3 Record 623; 4 Record 749-750, 798-800, 845-847; 
n. 2, supra. There is substantial support for Missouri's re-
quirement. In this case, for example, Dr. Bernard 
Nathanson, a widely experienced abortion practitioner, testi-
fied that he requires a pathologist examination after each of 
the 60,000 abortions performed under his direction at the 
New York Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. He 
considers it "absolutely necessary to obtain a pathologist's re-
port on each and every specimen of tissue removed for abor-
tion or for that matter from any other surgical procedure 
which involved the removal of tissue from the human body." 
App. 143--144. See also App. 146--147 (testimony of Dr. 
12 The professional views that the plaintiffs find to support their position 
do not disclose whether consideration was given to the fact that not all 
abortion clinics, particularly inadequately regulated clinics, conform to eth-
ical or generally accepted medical standards. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 
U. S. 622, 641, n. 21 (1979) (Bellotti II) (minors may resort to "incompetent 
or unethical" abortion clinics); Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Dan-
forth, 428 U. S. 52, 91, n. 2 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring). The Sun-
Times of Chicago, in a series of special reports, disclosed widespread ques-
tionable practices in abortion clinics in Chicago, including the failure to 
obtain proper pathology reports. See "The Abortion Profiteers," Chicago 
Sun-Times 25-26 (Special Reprint 1978). It is clear, therefore, that a 
State reasonably could conclude that a pathology requirement is necessary 
in abortion clinics as well as in general hospitals. 
In suggesting that we make from a "comfortable perspective" the judg-
ment that a State constitutionally can require the additional cost of a pa-
thology examination, the dissent suggests that we disregard the interests 
of the "woman on welfare or the unemployed teenager." Post, at 4. But 
these women may be those most likely to seek the least expensive clinic 
available. As the standards of medical practice in such clinics may not be 
the highest, a State may conclude reasonably that a pathologist's examina-
tion of tissue is particularly important for their protection. 
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Keitges); 5 Record 79~799 (testimony of Dr. Schmidt). 13 
In weighing the balance between protection of a woman's 
health and the comparatively small additional cost of a pa-
thologist's examination, we cannot say that the Constitution 
requires that a State subordinate its interest in health to min-
imize to this extent the cost of abortions. Even in the early 
weeks of pregnancy, "[c]ertain regulations that have no sig-
nificant impact on the woman's exercise of her right to decide 
to have an abortion may be permissible where justified by im-
portant state health objectives." City of Akron, ante, at 11. 
See Danforth, 428 U. S., at 80-81. We think the cost of a 
tissue examination does not significantly burden a pregnant 
woman's abortion decision. The estimated cost of compli-
ance for plaintiff Reproductive Health Services was $19.40 
per abortion performed, 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48, and in 
light of the substantial benefit's that a pathologist's examina-
tion can have, this small cost clearly is justified. In Dan-
forth, this Court unanimously upheld Missouri's 
recordkeeping requirement as "useful to the State's interest 
in protecting the health of its female citizens, and [as] a re-
source that is relevant to decisions involving medical experi-
ence and judgment," 428 U. S., at 81. 14 We view the re-
'
3 The dissent appears to suggest that § 188.04 7 is constitutionally infirm 
because it does not require microscopic examination, post, at 4, but that 
misses the point of the regulation. The need is for someone other than the 
performing clinic to make an independent medical judgment on the tissue. 
See n. 12, supra; 4 Record 750 (Dr. Pierre Keitges, a pathologist). It is 
reasonable for the State to assume that an independent pathologist is more 
likely to perform a microscopic examination than the performing doctor. 
See H. Cove, Surgical Pathology of the Endometrium 28 (1981) ("To the 
pathologist, abortions of any sort are evaluated grossly and microscopically 
for the primary purpose of establishing a diagnosis of intrauterine preg-
nancy.") (emphasis added). 
•• The Danforth Court also noted that "[t]he added requirements for con-
fidentiality, with the sole exception for public health officers, and for reten-
tion for seven years, a period not unreasonable in length, assist and per-
suade us in our determination of the constitutional limits." 428 U. S., 
at 81. Missouri extends the identical safeguards found reassuring in 
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quirement for a pathology report as comparable and as a 
relatively insignificant burden. Accordingly, we reverse the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue. 
v 
As we noted in City of Akron, the relevant legal standards 
with respect to parental consent requirements are not in dis-
pute. See ante, at 21; Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
640-642, 643-644 (1979) (plurality opinion) (Bellotti II); id., 
at 65EK>57 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 15 A State's interest in 
protecting immature minors will sustain a requirement of a 
consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear, 
however, that "the State must provide an alternative proce-
dure whereby a pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is 
sufficiently mature to make the abortion decision herself or 
that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be in her 
best interests." 16 City of Akron, ante, at 21-22. 17 The issue 
Danforth to the pathology reports at issue here. See Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§§ 188.055.2, 188.060 (Supp. 1982). 
'~The dissenters apparently believe that the issue here is an open one, 
and adhere to the views they expressed in Bellotti II. Post, at 10-11. 
But those views have never been adopted by a majority of this Court, 
while a majority have expressed quite differing views. See H.L. v. 
Matheson, 450 U. S. 398 (1981); Bellotti II, 443 U. S. 622 (plurality opin-
ion); id., at 656--657 (WHITE, J., dissenting). 
16 The plurality in Bellotti II also required that the alternative to paren-
tal consent must "assure" that the resolution of this issue "will be com-
pleted with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an effective 
opportunity for an abortion to be obtained." Id., at 644. Confidentiality 
here is assured by the statutory requirement that allows the minor to use 
her initials on the petition. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(1) (Supp. 1982). 
As to expedition of appeals, § 188.028.2(6) provides in relevant part: 
"The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from 
the date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed 
and the appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice 
to appeal. Because time may be of the essence regarding the performance 
of the abortion, the supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide 
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here is one purely of statutory construction: whether Mis-
souri provides a judicial alternative that is consistent with 
these established legal standards. 18 
The Missouri statute, § 188.028.2, 19 in relevant part, 
provides: 
for expedited appellate review of cases appealed under this section." 
We believe this section provides the framework for a constitutionally 
sufficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. Immediately after the 
effective date of this statutory enactment, the District Court enjoined en-
forcement. No unemancipated pregnant minor has been required to com-
ply with this section. Thus, to this point in time, there has been no need 
for the state supreme court to promulgate rules concerning appellate re-
view. There is no reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any 
appeal consistent with the mandate in our prior opinions. 
17 Cf. H.L . v. Matheson, 450 U.S., at 406-407, and n. 14, 411 (upholding 
a parental notification requirement but not extending the holding to ma-
ture or emancipated minors or to immature minors showing such notifica-
tion detrimental to their best interests). The lower courts found that 
§ 188.028's notice requirement was unconstitutional. 655 F. 2d, at 873; 483 
F. Supp., at 701. The State has not sought review of that judgment here. 
Thus, in the posture in which it appears before this Court for review, 
§ 188.028 contains no requirement for parental notification. 
18 The Missouri statute also exempts "emancipated" women under the 
age of 18 both from the requirement of parental consent and from the alter-
native requirement of a judicial proceeding. Plaintiffs argue that the 
word "emancipated" in this context is void for vagueness, but we disagree. 
Cf. H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 407 (using word to describe a minor). Al-
though the question whether a minor is emancipated turns upon the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, the Missouri courts have 
adopted general rules to guide that determination, and the term is one of 
general usage and understanding in the Missouri common law. See Black 
v. Cole, 626 S. W. 2d 397, 398 (Mo. App. 1981) (quoting 67 C. J. S. Parent 
and Child § 86, at 811 (1950)); In re the Marriage of Heddy, 535 S. W. 2d 
276, 279 (Mo. App. 1976) (same); Wurth v. Wurth, 313 S. W. 2d 161, 164 
(Mo. App. 1958) (same), rev'd on other grounds, 322 S. W. 2d 745 (Mo. 
1959). 
19 See n. 4, supra. This Court in Danforth held unconstitutional Missou-
ri's parental consent requirement for all unmarried minors under the age of 
18. 428 U. S., at 75. In response to our decision, Missouri enacted the 
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"(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting 
forth the grounds for so finding; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied[.]" 
On its face, § 188.028.2(4) authorizes juvenile courts 20 to 
choose among any of the alternatives outlined in the section. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that a denial of the petition 
permitted in subsection (c) "would initially require the court 
to find that the minor was not emancipated and was not ma-
ture enough to make her own decision and that an abortion 
was not in her best interests." 655 F. 2d, at 858. Plaintiffs 
contend that this interpretation is unreasonable. We do not 
agree. 
Where fairly possible, courts should construe a statute to 
avoid a danger of unconstitutionality. The Court of Appeals 
was aware, if the statute provides discretion to deny permis-
sion to a minor for any "good cause," that arguably it would 
violate the principles that this Court has set forth. Ibid. It 
recognized, however, that before exercising any option, the 
juvenile court must receive evidence on "the emotional devel-
opment, maturity, intellect and understanding of the minor." 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028.2(3) (Supp. 1982). The court then 
reached the logical conclusion that "findings and the ultimate 
section challenged here. This new statute became effective shortly before 
our decision in Bellotti II. 
00 We have indicated in prior opinions that a minor should have access to 
an "independent decisionmaker." H.L. v. Matheson, supra, at 420 (Pow-
ELL, J., concurring). Missouri has provided for a judicial decisionmaker. 
We therefore need not consider whether a qualified and independent non-
judicial decisionmaker would be appropriate. Cf. Bellotti II, 443 U.S., at 
643, n. 22. 
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denial of the petition must be supported by a showing of 'good 
cause.'" 655 F. 2d, at 858. The Court of Appeals reason-
ably found that a court could not deny a petition "for good 
cause" unless it first found-after having received the re-
quired evidence-that the minor was not mature enough to 
make her own decision. See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 
643-644, 647-648 (plurality opinion). We conclude that the 
Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the statute and that 
§ 188.028, as interpreted, avoids any constitutional 
infirmities. 21 
VI 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it invali-
dated Missouri's second-trimester hospitalization require-
ment and upheld the State's parental and juducial consent 
provision, is affirmed. The judgment invalidating the re-
quirement of a pathology report for all abortions and the re-
quirement that a second physician attend the abortion of any 
viable fetus is reversed. We vacate the judgment upholding 
an award of attorney's fees for all hours expended by plain-
tiffs' attorneys and remand for proceedings consistent with 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, --U.S.-- (1983). 
It is so ordered. 
21 Plaintiffs also argue that, in light of the ambiguity of§ 188.028.2(4), as 
evidenced by the differing interpretations placed upon it, the appropriate 
course of judicial restraint is abstention. This Court has found such an 
approach appropriate. See Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132, 146-147 
(1976) (Bellotti I). Plaintiffs did not, however, argue in the Court of Ap-
peals that the court should abstain, and Missouri has no certification proce-
dure whereby this Court can refer questions of state statutory construction 
to the state supreme court. See 655 F. 2d, at 861, n. 20; 17 C. Wright, A. 
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4248, at 525, n. 29 
(1978 and Supp. 1982). Such a procedure "greatly simplifie[d]" our analy-
sis in Bellotti I, supra, at 151. Moreover, where, as here, a statute is sus-
ceptible to a fair construction that obviates the need to have the state 
courts render the saving construction, there is no reason for federal courts 
to abstain. 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Ak-
ron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provi-
sions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that 
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the 
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opin-
ion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the 
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy 
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the 
Court's prior decisions. 
I 
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is per-
formed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligi-
ble or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester 
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy. 
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abor-
tions during the first trimester must be left "'free of inter-
ference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in 
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching 
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting 
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on 
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by 
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see 
ante, at 8. 
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justi-
fied by important health objectives. Although pathology 
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some 
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology 
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the 
examination be performed and the report prepared by a 
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the at-
tending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, 
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in 
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The 
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending 
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tis-
sue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician de-
tects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to 
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination 
by a pathologist in every case: 
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, 
the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal 
parts can be identified, the products of elective interrup-
tions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for 
gross and microscopic examination. 
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure 
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's 
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not 
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be 
sent for further pathologic examination .... " AGOG, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54 
(1982). 1 
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such 
an examination is necessary: 
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the 
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant 
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of 
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power mi-
croscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is 
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest 
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examina-
tion." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) 
(emphasis deleted). 
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice 
1 See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66 
(1982): 
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examina-
tion . . .. An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of 
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified. 
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross 
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the 
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pa-
thologist for gross and microscopic examination." 
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Mis-
souri's requirement that this examination be performed by a 
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was 
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as 
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a 
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of con-
cern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848, 
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135.2 While a pathologist 
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination, 
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination un-
less "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the 
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the ini-
tial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of 
the attending physician and which will often make the pathol-
ogist's services unnecessary. 
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has 
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist re-
quirement] further[s] important health-related State con-
cerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing 
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect 
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician. 
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pa-
thologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8, 
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is un-
disputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a 
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10, 
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase 
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspec-
tive, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every 
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or 
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put 
2 The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that 
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done" 
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980). 
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966) ($1.50 poll 
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to 
appellate review for indigents). 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor record-
keeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps ap-
proach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have 
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that 
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions." 
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a 
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the 
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that 
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under 
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits 
have been exceeded. 
II 
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability 
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability 
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there 
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 188.030.3 
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 
3 A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abor-
tion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester 
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim, 
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981) 
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185 
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure, 
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of 
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19 
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester 
abortion). 
.. 
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal 
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may jus-
tify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abor-
tions , except those necessary to preserve the life and health 
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability 
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must 
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165; 
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute 
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly 
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at 
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake"). 
A 
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on 
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in 
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I 
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving 
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only 
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a 
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physi-
cian performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion 
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction 
does not apply when this method "would present a greater 
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.030.2 (1983). 
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation 
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival, 
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some 
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in 
other words , maternal health considerations will preclude the 
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F. 
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the 
' The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F . 2d, at 865. 
As a general rule , we do not review a District Court's factual findings in 
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's com-
pelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence 
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is 
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where 
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the 
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865--866. 
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving 
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physi-
cian at every third-trimester abortion" because "[ w ]e ... 
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7, 
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of 
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot jus-
tify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at 
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of 
method presumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need 
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health 
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not 
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would 
hold it invalid. • 
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 
507, 512, n. 6 (1980). 
5 In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely 
to preserve fetal life , so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant 
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the avail-
able method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the 
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This 
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one. 
' The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified 
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted 
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more fre-
quently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus, 
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or 
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetus-
destroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the 
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court 
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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B 
In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to pro-
vide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it un-
constitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an 
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to 
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not 
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute ap-
pears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a 
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when 
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take 
control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it 
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this sec-
tion to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (em-
phasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second phy-
sician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the 
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails 
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always 
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict." 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979). 
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that 
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to 
"take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an 
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be 
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions with-
out a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction 
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause 
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physi-
cians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way 
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with. 
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is 
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judg-
ment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license 
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no 
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the phy-
sician's right to practice." 
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not 
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an 
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any 
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissi-
bly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may 
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or 
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the wom-
an's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay. 
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the 
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability 
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute 
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to 
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional 
percentage points offetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The 
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magni-
tude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with 
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible 
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that 
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician require-
ment invalid on this ground as well. 9 
7 "Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since 
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legisla-
tion.'" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United 
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971). 
8 A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician re-
quirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983). 
9 Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds, 
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician require-
ment impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I 
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second phy-
sician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There 
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a nor-
mal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the wom-
an's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The indi-
vidual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery 
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty"). 
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
' ' 
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III 
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on 
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court 
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983). A minor who has 
not obtained parental consent may petition the juvenile court 
for court consent or the right to self-consent. The statute 
then provides that 
"the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion . . . ; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
which the petition is denied .... " § 188.028.2(4). 
The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... au-
thorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alterna-
tives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omit-
ted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that 
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the 
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."' 
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) per-
mits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the gen-
eral standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483 
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear 
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny 
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a 
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not 
competent to make a decision regarding abortion indepen-
dently." Ibid. 
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain Ian-
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a pa-
tient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician. 
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with 
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detri-
ment of both woman and child. 
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 11 
guage, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set 
forth by the plurality in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622, 
643-644, 647-648 (1979) (Bellotti 11), and applied by the 
Court today. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the stat-
ute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[ w ]here fairly possi-
ble, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of un-
constitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves 
the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, concluding 
that a Missouri juvenile court may not "deny a [minor's] peti-
tion 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor 
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at 
14. 
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise 
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of 
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state 
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of 
Missouri law is a matter for the courts of Missouri, and "[t]he 
majority's construction of state law is, of course, not bind-
ing on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of 
WHITE, J.). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition 
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite 
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missou-
ri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the 
court may "for good cause . . . [ d]eny the petition." 10 
'" This statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), but very shortly before its 1979 
decision in Bellotti II . The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti 
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or 
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., 
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this lan-
guage to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where 
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be 
served by an abortion,'" even if the minor "'is capable of making, and has 
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion."' ld., at 
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d 
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It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will 
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court 
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state 
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v. 
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti I), the Court held that 
the District Court should have abstained where "an uncon-
strued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the 
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the ne-
cessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least ma-
terially change the nature of the problem."' Id., at 147, 
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see 
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I 
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as 
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification pro-
cedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules 
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of 
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02, 
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to 
intimate that abstention would be improper . . . were certi-
fication not possible." 428 U. S., at 151. 12 In cases where 
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri 
courts to reach a different result. 
11 The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the 
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on 
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge 
declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section 
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would 
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483 
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of 
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to ne-
cessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345--347 (1976). 
12 While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains im-
portant, Bellotti I, 428 U.S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement 
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation. 
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in ex-
ercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See 
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964). 
., 
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constitutional rights of this magnitude are at stake, we 
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri 
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by 
other means. 13 
'" Because I believe abstention is appropriate , I do not reach the ques-
tion whether Missouri's parental-judicial consent statute as construed by 
the Court is constitutional. 
~-
. . . 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Ak-
ron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provi-
sions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that 
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the 
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opin-
ion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the 
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy 
'. 
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the 
Court's prior decisions. 
I 
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is per-
formed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligi-
ble or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester 
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy. 
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abor-
tions during the first trimester must be left "'free of inter-
ference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in 
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching 
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting 
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on 
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by 
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see 
ante, at 8. 
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justi-
fied by important health objectives. Although pathology 
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some 
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology 
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the 
examination be performed and the report prepared by a 
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the at-
tending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, 
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in 
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The 
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending 
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tis-
sue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician de-
tects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to 
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (AGOG) does not recommend an examination 
by a pathologist in every case: 
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, 
the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal 
parts can be identified, the products of elective interrup-
tions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for 
gross and microscopic examination. 
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure 
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's 
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not 
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be 
sent for further pathologic examination .... " ACOG, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54 
(1982). 1 
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such 
an examination is necessary: 
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the 
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant 
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of 
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power mi-
croscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is 
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest 
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examina-
tion." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) 
(emphasis deleted). 
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice 
1 See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66 
(1982): 
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examina-
tion .. . . An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of 
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified. 
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross 
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the 
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pa-
thologist for gross and microscopic examination." 
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Mis-
souri's requirement that this examination be performed by a 
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was 
expert testimony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as 
capable of performing an adequate gross examination as is a 
pathologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of con-
cern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848, 
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135. 2 While a pathologist 
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination, 
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination un-
less "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the 
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the ini-
tial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of 
the attending physician and which will often make the pathol-
ogist's services unnecessary. 
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has 
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist re-
quirement] further[s] important health-related State con-
cerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing 
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect 
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician. 
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pa-
thologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8, 
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is un-
disputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a 
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10, 
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase 
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspec-
tive, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every 
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or 
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put 
2 The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that 
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done" 
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980). 
~·· 
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 5 
the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663,668 (1966) ($1.50 poll 
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to 
appellate review for indigents). 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo . v. Danforth, 428 
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor record-
keeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps ap-
proach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have 
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that 
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions." 
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a 
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the 
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that 
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under 
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits 
have been exceeded. 
II 
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability 
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability 
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there 
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 
3 A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abor-
tion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester 
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim, 
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981) 
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185 
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure, 
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of 
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19 
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester 
abortion). 
., 
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal 
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may jus-
tify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abor-
tions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health 
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability 
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must 
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." !d., at 165; 
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute 
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly 
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at 
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake"). 
A 
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on 
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in 
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I 
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving 
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only 
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a 
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physi-
cian performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion 
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction 
does not apply when this method "would present a greater 
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.030.2 (1983). 
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation 
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival, 
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some 
women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in 
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the 
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F. 
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the 
' The Court of Appeals upheld this factual finding. 665 F. 2d, at 865. 
As a general rule, we do not review a District Court's factual findings in 
. ' 
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's com-
pelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence 
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is 
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where 
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the 
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865-866. 
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving 
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physi-
cian at every third-trimester abortion" because "[ w ]e ... 
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7, 
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of 
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot jus-
tify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at 
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of 
method presumably will be made in advance ,S and any need 
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health 
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not 
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would 
hold it invalid. 6 
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 
507, 512, n. 6 (1980). 
5 In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely 
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant 
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the avail-
able method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the 
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This 
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one. 
6 The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified 
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted 
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more fre-
quently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus, 
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or 
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetus-
destroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the 
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court 
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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B 
In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to pro-
vide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it un-
constitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an 
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to 
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not 
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute ap-
pears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a 
post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only when 
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take 
control of'' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it 
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this sec-
tion to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (em-
phasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second phy-
sician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the 
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails 
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always 
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict." 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979). 
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that 
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to 
"take all reasonable steps ... to preserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an 
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be 
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions with-
out a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction 
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause 
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physi-
cians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way 
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with. 
ton, 4iO U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is 
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judg-
ment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license 
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no 
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the phy-
sician's right to practice." 
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not 
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an 
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any 
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissi-
bly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may 
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or 
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the wom-
an's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay. 
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the 
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability 
abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute 
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to 
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional 
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The 
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magni-
tude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with 
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible 
criminal sanctions." ld., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that 
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician require-
ment invalid on this ground as well. 9 
7 "Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since 
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legisla-
tion.'" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United 
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971). 
8 A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician re-
quirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983). 
9 Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds, 
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician require-
ment impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I 
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second phy-
sician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There 
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a nor-
mal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the wom-
an's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The indi-
vidual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery 
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty"). 
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
f 
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III 
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on 
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court 
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983). 
A 
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of 
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 11. 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S., at 74, the Court invalidated a parental consent re-
quirement on the ground that "the State does not have the 
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and 
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and 
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the con-
sent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II), 
eight Justices agreed that as a ute perm1ttmg a JU 1c1a ve o 
of a mature minor's decision to have an abortion was uncon-
stitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion of POWELL, J.); id., 
at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS J. . Althou h four Justices 
stated in Bellotti II that appropriately structured judicia 
consent requirement would be constitutional, id., at 647-648 
(opinion of POWELL, J.), this statement was not necessary to 
the result of the case and did not command a majority. Four 
other Justices concluded that any judicial-consent statute 
would suffer from the same flaw the Court identified in Dan-
forth: it would give a third party an absolute veto over the 
decision of the physician and his patient. I d., at 655-656 
(opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE 
STEVENS in Bellotti II: 
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a pa-
tient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician. 
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with 
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detri-
ment of both woman and child. 
.. 
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"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision 
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny 
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign 
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would 
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings 
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden 
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that im-
posed on the minor child by the need to obtain the con-
sent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met, 
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the 
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little 
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must neces-
sarily reflect personal and societal values and mores 
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly whe~·- -< 
1 
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision-
is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underly-
ing the constitutional protection afforded to her deci-
sion." 443 U. S., at 65~56 (footnote omitted). 
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judi-
cial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would 
hold it unconstitutional. 
B 
Even if I believed that a State could require parental or ju-
dicial consent, I could not accept the Court's conclusion that 
the Missouri consent statute should be upheld. Under Mis-
souri law, a minor who has not obtained parental consent may 
petition the juvenile court for court consent or the right to 
self-consent. Section 188.028.2(4) then provides that: 
"the court shall for good cause: 
"(a) Grant the petition for majority rights for the pur-
pose of consenting to the abortion; or 
"(b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of the 
minor and give judicial consent to the abortion ... ; or 
"(c) Deny the petition, setting forth the grounds on 
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which the petition is denied .... " ) 
The Court recognizes that this statute "[o]n its face ... au-
thorizes juvenile courts to choose among any of the alterna-
tives outlined in the section." Ante, at 13 (footnote omit-
ted). The District Court took a similar view, noting that 
"each of the three [alternatives] is clearly independent of the 
others, connected in the statute with the disjunctive 'or."' 
The District Court also concluded that "[a]lternative (c) per-
mits the court to 'deny the petition,' guided only by the gen-
eral standard that such action be 'for good cause.'" 483 
F. Supp., at 689. The District Court thus found it "clear 
... that alternative (c) authorizes the juvenile court to deny 
the minor's petition for good cause, but does not require a 
prior finding that the minor is not sufficiently mature and not 
competent to make a decision regarding abortion indepen-
dently." Ibid. 
If the statute is construed in accordance with its plain lan-
guage, it would be unconstitutional under the standards set ( 
forth in either the opinion of JUSTICE POWELL or the opinion 
of JUSTICE STEVENS in Bellotti II, 443 U. S., at 643-644, 
647-648, 652-656. To avoid the necessity of invalidating the 
statute, the Court applies the maxim that, "[ w ]here fairly 
possible, courts should construe a statute to avoid a danger of 
unconstitutionality." Ante, at 14. The Court thus approves 
the construction adopted by the Court of Appeals, concluding 
that a Missouri juvenile court may not "deny a [minor's] peti-
tion 'for good cause' unless it first [finds] ... that the minor 
was not mature enough to make her own decision." Ante, at 
14. 
The Court's maxim of statutory construction may be a wise 
one for federal courts to follow in discerning the meaning of 
federal statutes, but it is not one we can impose on state 
courts interpreting their own law. The interpretation of 
Missouri law is a matter for the courts of Missouri, and "[t]he 
majority's construction of state law is, of course, not bind-
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ing on the Missouri courts." Planned Parenthood of Cen-
tral Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U. S., at 101, n. 4 (opinion of 
WHITE, J. ). A Missouri juvenile court considering a petition 
brought by a mature minor may therefore conclude, despite 
this Court's optimistic assertion to the contrary, that Missou-
ri's judicial consent statute means exactly what it says: the 
court may "for good cause ... [d]eny the petition." 10 
It is certainly possible that the courts of Missouri will 
agree with this Court and construe Missouri law as the Court 
does today. But this is a task that must be left to the state 
courts. We cannot perform it for them. In Bellotti v. 
Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti!), the Court held that 
the District Court should have abstained where "an uncon-
strued state statute is susceptible of a construction by the 
state judiciary 'which might avoid in whole or in part the ne-
cessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least ma-
terially change the nature of the problem."' Id., at 147, 
quoting Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U. S. 167, 177 (1959); see 
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). I 
feel that the District Court should have abstained here as 
well. 11 Although Missouri does not have a certification pro-
10 This statute was enacted in 1979, after the Court's decision in Bellotti 
v. Baird, 428 U. S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti 1), but very shortly before its 1979 
decision in Bellotti II. The Massachusetts statute held invalid in Bellotti 
II, like the Missouri statute before us today, permitted a court to grant or 
deny a minor's petition "for good cause shown." See Bellotti II, 443 U. S., 
at 625. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court interpreted this lan-
guage to authorize the withholding of consent " 'in circumstances where 
[the court] determines that the best interests of the minor will not be 
served by an abortion,'" even if the minor" 'is capable of making, and has 
made, an informed and reasonable decision to have an abortion."' !d., at 
630, quoting Baird v. Attorney General, 371 Mass. 741, 748, 360 N. E. 2d 
288, 293 (1977). The Court does not explain why it expects the Missouri 
courts to reach a different result. 
11 The Court's interpretation of Missouri law is directly contrary to the 
interpretation given by the United States District Judge, who has been on 
the Missouri bench, state or federal, for over 30 years. The District Judge 
. .. 
81-1255 & 81-1623-CONCUR & DISSENT 
14 PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 
cedure comparable to the one employed in Bellotti I, its rules 
of procedure provide for expedited review of questions of 
"general interest or importance." Mo. S. Ct. Rules 83.02, 
83.06 (1983). In Bellotti I, moreover, we did not "mean to 
intimate that abstention would be improper . . . were certi-
fication not possible." 428 U. S., at 151. 12 In cases where 
constitutional rights of this magnitude are at stake, we 
should refrain from speculating on the meaning of Missouri I 
law when an authoritative interpretation may be obtained by 
other means. 
declined to abstain on the basis that "[i]t is clear to this Court that section 
188.028 is not susceptible to a reasonable construction which would 
avoid the federal constitutional question controlling in Bellotti II." 483 
F. Supp., at 690 (emphasis added). This District Judge's interpretation of 
the statute should indicate that it is at least sufficiently ambiguous to ne-
cessitate abstention. Cf. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 34ih347 (1976). 
12 While "speed in resolution" of this constitutional challenge remains im-
portant, Bellotti I, 428 U. S., at 151, it is worthy of note that enforcement 
of these statutes has been stayed pending the outcome of this litigation. 
The District Court would have been free to keep its stay in effect, in ex-
ercising its power to retain jurisdiction over the constitutional issue. See 
England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U. S. 411 (1964) . 
·J .. 
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JUSTICE BLACKMUN, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Ak-
ron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provi-
sions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy through abortion. I agree with the Court that 
Missouri's hospitalization requirement is invalid under the 
Akron analysis, and I join Parts I and II of the Court's opin-
ion in the present cases. I do not agree, however, that the 
remaining Missouri statutes challenged in these cases satisfy 
t ~·. 
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the constitutional standards set forth in Akron and the 
Court's prior decisions. 
I 
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is per-
formed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligi-
ble or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester 
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy. 
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abor-
tions during the first trimester must be left "'free of inter-
ference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in 
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching 
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting 
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on 
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by 
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see 
ante, at 8 . 
. Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justi-
fied by important health objectives. Although pathology 
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some 
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology 
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the 
examination be performed and the report prepared by a 
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the at-
tending physician. Contrary to the Court's assertion, ante, 
at 9, this requirement of a report by a pathologist is not in 
accord with "generally accepted medical standards." The 
routine and accepted medical practice is for the attending 
physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any tis-
sue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician de-
tects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to 
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination 
by a pathologist in every case: 
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"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, 
the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal 
parts can be identified, the products of elective interrup-
tions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for 
gross and microscopic examination. 
". . .. Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure 
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's 
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not 
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be 
sent for further pathologic examination .... " ACOG, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54 
(1982). 1 
Nor does the National Abortion Federation believe that such 
an examination is necessary: 
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the 
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant 
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of 
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power mi-
croscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is 
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest 
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examina-
tion." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) 
(emphasis deleted). 
The Court fails to distinguish between the medical practice 
' See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66 
(1982): 
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examina-
tion .. .. An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of 
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified. 
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross 
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the 
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pa-
thologist for gross and microscopic examination." 
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of performing a "tissue examination," ante, at 11, and Mis-
souri's requirement that this examination be performed by a 
pathologist. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was 
expert testimony at~ that a nonpath.Qlogist physician is as ....., 
capable or e~n an ade uate oss examin . as is 
pa ologist, and that the "abnormalities which are of con-
cern" are readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848, 
871, n. 37 (CA8 1981); see App. 135.2 While a pathologist 
may be better able to perform a microscopic examination, I 
Missouri law does not require a microscopic examination un- ? 
less "fetal parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo. 
Admin. Code § 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the 
Missouri statute is to require a pathologist to perform the ini-
tial gross examination, which is normally the responsibility of 
the attending physician and which will often make the pathol-
ogist's services unnecessary. 
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has 
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist re-
quirement] further[s] important health-related State con-
cerns." Akron, ante, at 12. There has been no showing 
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect 
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician. 
Moreover, I cannot agree with the Court that Missouri's pa-
thologist requirement has "no significant impact" ante, at 8, 
on a woman's exercise of her right to an abortion. It is un-
disputed that this requirement may increase the cost of a 
first-trimester abortion by as much as $40. See ante, at 10, 
n. 12; 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this increase 
may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable perspec-
tive, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to every 
woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on welfare or 
the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may well put 
2 The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that 
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done" 
for every abortion. 483 F. Supp. 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980). 
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the price of an abortion beyond reach. 3 Cf. Harper v. Vir-
ginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966) ($1.50 poll 
tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 
252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "foreclose[s] access" to 
appellate review for indigents). 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor record-
keeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps ap-
proach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have 
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that 
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions." 
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a 
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the 
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri ha'S not shown that 
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under 
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits 
have been exceeded. 
II 
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability 
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability 
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there 
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 
3 A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abor-
tion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester 
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim, 
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981) 
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185 
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure, 
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of 
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 1~19 
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester 
abortion). 
·'· 
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164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal 
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may jus-
tify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abor-
tions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health 
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability 
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must 
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." I d., at 165; 
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute 
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly 
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at 
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake"). 
A 
The Court upholds the second physician requirement on 
the basis that it "furthers the State's compelling interest in 
protecting the lives of viable fetuses." Ante, at 8. While I 
agree that a second physician indeed may aid in preserving 
the life of a fetus born alive, this type of aid is possible only J 
when the abortion method used is one that may result in a 
live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily requires a physi-
cian performing a post-viability abortion to use the abortion 
method most likely to preserve fetal life, this restriction 
does not apply when this method "would present a greater 
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.030.2 (1983). 
The District Court foun that the dilatation and evacuation 
(D&E) me o o a ortion entails no c~n~ of fetal survival, 
and that it will nevertheless be the me MOI"Cli"oice for some 
women who need post-viab1h y abortions. n some cases, in 
otlier words, maternal health considerations will preclude the 
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F. 
Supp., at 694. 4 When a D&E abortion is performed, the 
' The Court of Appeals upheld th~factual finding. 665 F. 2d, at 865. 
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second physician can do nothing to further the State's com-
pelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence 
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is 
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where 
tfie burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the 
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865--866. 
The Court reasons that the State's interest in preserving 
potential life "justifies the State in requiring a second physi-
cian at every third-trimester abortion" because "[ w ]e ... 
cannot assume that all third-trimester abortions will be D&E 
abortions, or that there will be no live births." Ante, at 7, 
n. 7 (emphasis added). But the fact that other methods of 
post-viability abortions may result in live births cannot jus-
tify requiring a second physician to attend an abortion at 
which the chance of a live birth is nonexistent. The choice of 
method presumably will be made in advance, 5 and any need 
for a second physician disappears when the woman's health 
requires that the choice be D&E. Because the statute is not 
tailored to protect the State's legitimate interests, I would 
hold it invalid. 6 
which the Court of Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 
507, 512, n. 6 (1980). 
' In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely 
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant 
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the avail-
able method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the 
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This 
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one. 
• The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified 
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted 
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more fre-
quently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a ·dead fetus, 
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or 
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetus-
destroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the 
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court 
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. Bol-
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In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to pro-
vide a clear exception for emergency situatio,ns renders it un-
constitutional. As the Court recognizes, ante, at 7, n. 8, an 
emergency may arise in which delay could be dangerous to 
the life or health of the woman. A second physician may not 
always be available in such a situation; yet the statute ap-
pears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, that a 
post-viability abortion "shall be performed . . . only when 
there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall take 
control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and it 
imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this sec-
tion to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 (em-
phasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second phy-
sician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to the 
health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly fails 
to make clear "that the woman's life and health must always 
prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict." 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979). 
The Court attempts to cure this defect by asserting that 
the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physicians to 
"take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and health 
of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not pose an 
increased risk to the life or health of the woman," could be 
construed to permit emergency post-viability abortions with-
out a second physician. Ante, at 7, n. 8. This construction 
is contrary to the plain language of the statute; the clause 
upon which the Court relies refers to the duties of both physi-
cians during the performance of the abortion, but it in no way 
suggests that the second physician may be dispensed with. 
ton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, he is 
recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical judg-
ment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his license 
are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has no 
rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on the phy-
sician's right to practice." 
'I 
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Moreover, since the Court's proposed construction is not 
binding on the courts of Missouri, 7 a physician performing an 
emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on it with any 
degree of confidence. The statute thus remains impermissi-
bly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether he may 
proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emergency, or 
whether he must wait for a second physician even if the wom-
an's life or health will be further imperiled by the delay. 
This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect on the 
physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-viability 
abortion. In C olautti v. Franklin, we considered a statute 
that failed to specify whether it "require[d] the physician to 
make a 'trade-off between the woman's health and additional 
percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 400. The 
Court held there that "where conflicting duties of this magni-
tude are involved, the State, at the least, must proceed with 
greater precision before it may subject a physician to possible 
criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 8 I would apply that 
reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-physician require-
ment invalid on this ground as well. 9 
7 "Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since 
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legisla-
tion."' Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United 
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971). 
8 A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician re-
quirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983). 
9 Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds, 
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician require-
ment impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I 
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second phy-
sician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There 
· was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a-nor-
mal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the wom-
an's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The indi-
vidual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery 
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty"). 
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
81-1255 & 81-1623--CONCUR & DISSENT 
10 PLANNED PARENTHOOD ASSN. v. ASHCROFT 
III 
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on 
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court 
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983). 
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of 
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 11. 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S., at 74, the Court invalidated a parental consent re-
quirement on the ground that "the State does not have the 
constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and 
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and 
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the con-
sent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II), 
eight Justices agreed that a Massachusetts statute permit-
ting a judicial veto of a mature minor's decision to have an 
abortion was unconstitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion 
ofPOWELL, J.); id., at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). Al-
though four Justices stated in Bellotti II that an appropri-
ately structured judicial consent requirement would be con-
stitutional, id., at 647-648 (opinion of PoWELL, J.), this 
statement was not necessary to the result of the case and did 
not command a majority. Four other Justices concluded 
that any judicial-consent statute would suffer from the same 
flaw the Court identified in Danforth: it would give a third 
party an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and 
his patient. I d., at 655-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE 
STEVENS in Bellotti II: 
"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision 
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny 
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a pa-
tient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician. 
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with 
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detri-
ment of both woman and child. 
t • .. 
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and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign 
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would 
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings 
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden 
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that im-
posed on the minor child by the need to obtain the con-
sent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met, 
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the 
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little 
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must neces-
sarily reflect personal and societal values and mores 
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly when 
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision-
is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underly-
ing the constitutional protection afforded to her deci-
sion." 443 U. S., at 655-656 (footnote omitted). 
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judi-
cial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would 
hold it unconstitutional. 
I ~ 
.. 
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TICE MARSHALL, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
The Court's decision today in Akron v. Akron Center for 
Reproductive Health, Inc., ante, invalidates the city of Ak-
ron's hospitalization requirement and a host of other provi-
sions that infringe on a woman's decision to terminate her 
pregnancy through abortion. I agree that Missouri's hos- I 
pitalization requirement is invalid under the Akron analysis, 
and I join Parts I and II of JusTICE PowELL's opinion in the j 
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Missouri statutes challenged in these cases _satisfy the con-
stitutional standards set forth in Akron and the Court's prior 
decisions. 
I 
Missouri law provides that whenever an abortion is per-
formed, a tissue sample must be submitted to a "board eligi-
ble or certified pathologist" for a report. Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.047 (1983). This requirement applies to first trimester 
abortions as well as to those performed later in pregnancy. 
Our past decisions establish that the performance of abor-
tions during the first trimester must be left "'free of inter-
ference by the State."' Akron, ante, at 12, quoting Roe 
v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 163 (1973). As we have noted in 
Akron, this does not mean that every regulation touching 
upon first-trimester abortions is constitutionally impermissi-
ble. But to pass constitutional muster, regulations affecting 
first-trimester abortions must "have no significant impact on 
the woman's exercise of her right" and must be "justified by 
important state health objectives." Akron, ante, at 11; see 
ante, at 13. 
Missouri's requirement of a pathologist's report is not justi-
fied by important health objectives. Although pathology 
examinations may be "useful and even necessary in some 
cases," ante, at 10, Missouri requires more than a pathology 
examination and a pathology report; it demands that the 
examination be performed and the report prepared by a 
"board eligible or certified pathologist" rather than by the at-
tending physician. Contrary to JuSTICE POWELL'S asser-
tion, ante, at 10, this requirement of a report by a pathologist 
is not in accord with "generally accepted medical standards." 
The routine and accepted medical practice is for the attend-
ing physician to perform a gross (visual) examination of any 
tissue removed during an abortion. Only if the physician de-
tects abnormalities is there a need to send a tissue sample to 
a pathologist. The American College of Obstetricians and 
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Gynecologists (ACOG) does not recommend an examination 
by a pathologist in every case: 
"In the situation of elective termination of pregnancy, 
the attending physician should record a description of 
the gross products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal 
parts can be identified, the products of elective interrup-
tions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pathologist for 
gross and microscopic examination. 
". . . . Aspirated tissue should be examined to ensure 
the presence of villi or fetal parts prior to the patient's 
release from the facility. If villi or fetal parts are not 
identified with certainty, the tissue specimen must be 
sent for further pathologic examination. . . . " ACOG, 
Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 52, 54 
(1982). 1 
Nor does the National Abortion Federation b~lieve that such 
an examination is necessary: 
"All tissue must be examined grossly at the time of the 
abortion procedure by a physician or trained assistant 
and the results recorded in the chart. In the absence of 
visible fetal parts or placenta upon gross examination, 
obtained tissue may be examined under a low power mi-
croscope for the detection of villi. If this examination is 
inconclusive, the tissue should be sent to the nearest 
suitable pathology laboratory for microscopic examina-
'See also ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 66 
(1982): 
"Tissue removed should be submitted to a pathologist for examina-
tion .... An exception to the practice may be in elective terminations of 
pregnancy in which definitive embryonic or fetal parts can be identified. 
In such instances, the physician should record a description of the gross 
products. Unless definite embryonic or fetal parts can be identified, the 
products of elective interruptions of pregnancy must be submitted to a pa-
thologist for gross and microscopic examination." 
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tion." National Abortion Federation Standards 6 (1981) 
(emphasis deleted). 
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, there was expert tes-
timony at trial that a nonpathologist physician is as capable of 
performing an adequate gross examination as is a patholo-
gist, and that the "abnormalities which are of concern" are 
readily detectable by a physician. 655 F. 2d 848, 871, n. 37 
(CA8 1981); see App. 135.2 While a pathologist may be bet-
ter able to perform a microscopic examination, Missouri law 
does not require a microscopic examination unless "fetal 
parts or placenta are not identified." 13 Mo. Admin. Code 
§ 50-151.030(1) (1981). Thus, the effect of the Missouri stat-
ute is to require a pathologist to perform the initial gross 
examination, which is normally the responsibility of the at-
tending physician and which will often make the pathologist's 
services unnecessary. 
On the record before us, I must conclude that the State has 
not "met its burden of demonstrating that [the pathologist re-
quirement] further[s] important health-related State con-
cerns." Akron, ante, at 12.3 There has been no showing 
that tissue examinations by a pathologist do more to protect 
health than examinations by a nonpathologist physician. 
Missouri does not require pathologists' reports for any other 
surgical procedures performed in clinics, or for minor sur-
gery performed in hospitals. 13 Mo. Admin. Code §50-
20.030(3)(A)(7) (1977). Moreover, I cannot agree with Jus-
TICE POWELL that Missouri's pathologist requirement has 
"no significant impact" ante, at 13, on a woman's exercise of 
2 The District Court made no findings on this point, noting only that 
some witnesses for the State had testified that "pathology should be done" 
for every abortion. 483 F . Supp: 679, 700, n. 49 (WD Mo. 1980). 
3 JUSTICE POWELL appears to draw support from the facts that "ques-
tionable practices" occur at some abortion clinics, while at others "the 
standards of medical practice . .. may not be the highest." Ante, at 12, n. 
12. There is no evidence, however, that such questionable practices occur 
in Missouri. 
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her right to an abortion. It is undisputed that this require-
ment may increase the cost of a first-trimester abortion by as 
much as $40. See 483 F. Supp., at 700, n. 48. Although this 
increase may seem insignificant from the Court's comfortable 
perspective, I cannot say that it is equally insignificant to 
every woman seeking an abortion. For the woman on wel-
fare or the unemployed teenager, this additional cost may 
well put the price of an abortion beyond reach. 4 Cf. Harper 
v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U. S. 663, 668 (1966) 
($1.50 poll tax "excludes those unable to pay"); Burns v. 
Ohio, 360 U. S. 252, 255, 257 (1959) ($20 docket fee "fore-
close[s] access" to appellate review for indigents). 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S. 52, 81 (1976), the Court warned that the minor record-
keeping requirements upheld in that case "perhaps ap-
proach[ed] impermissible limits." Today in Akron, we have 
struck down restrictions on first-trimester abortions that 
"may in some cases add to the cost of providing abortions." 
Ante, at 30; see ante, at 31-32. Missouri's requirement of a 
pathologist's report unquestionably adds significantly to the 
cost of providing abortions, and Missouri has not shown that 
it serves any substantial health-related purpose. Under 
these circumstances, I would hold that constitutional limits 
have been exceeded. 
II 
In Missouri, an abortion may be performed after viability 
only if necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman. 
'A $40 pathologist's fee may increase the price of a first-trimester abor-
tion by 20% or more. See 655 F. 2d, at 869, n. 35 (cost of first-trimester 
abortion at Reproductive Health Services is $170); F. Jaffe, B. Lindheim, 
and P. Lee, Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy 36 (1981) 
(cost of first-trimester clinic abortion ranges from approximately $185 
to $235); Henshaw, Freestanding Abortion Clinics: Services, Structure, 
Fees, 14 Family Planning Perspectives 248, 255 (1982) (average cost of 
first-trimester clinic abortion is $190); NAF Membership Directory 18-19 
(1982/1983) (NAF clinics in Missouri charge $180 to $225 for first-trimester 
abortion). 
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.1 (1983). When a post-viability 
abortion is performed, Missouri law provides that "there 
[must be] in attendance a [second] physician ... who shall 
take control of and provide immediate medical care for a child 
born as a result of the abortion." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 
(1983). The Court recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S., at 
164-165, that a State's interests in preserving maternal 
health and protecting the potentiality of human life may jus-
tify regulation and even prohibition of post-viability abor-
tions, except those necessary to preserve the life and health 
of the mother. But regulations governing post-viability 
abortions, like those at any other stage of pregnancy, must 
be "tailored to the recognized state interests." !d., at 165; 
see H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U. S. 398, 413 (1981) ("statute 
plainly serves important state interests, [and] is narrowly 
drawn to protect only those interests"); Roe, 410 U. S., at 
155 ("legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to ex-
press only the legitimate state interests at stake"). 
A 
The second physician requirement is upheld in t · s.-case-~ 
the basis that it "reasonably furthers the State's I 
compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses." 
Ante, at 9. While I agree that a second physician indeed 
may aid in preserving the life of a fetus born alive, this type 
of aid is possible only when the abortion method used is one 
that may result in a live birth. Although Missouri ordinarily 
requires a physician performing a post-viability abortion to 
use the abortion method most likely to preserve fetal life, this 
restriction 
oes no apply when this method "would present a greater 
risk to the life and health of the woman." Mo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 188.030.2 (1983). 
The District Court found that the dilatation and evacuation 
(D&E) method of abortion entails no chance of fetal survival, 
and that it will nevertheless be the method of choice for some 
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women who need post-viability abortions. In some cases, in 
other words, maternal health considerations will preclude the 
use of procedures that might result in a live birth. 483 F. 
Supp., at 694.5 When a D&E abortion is performed, the 
second physician can do nothing to further the State's com-
pelling interest in protecting potential life. His presence 
is superfluous. The second-physician requirement thus is 
overbroad and "imposes a burden on women in cases where 
the burden is not justified by any possibility of survival of the 
fetus." 655 F. 2d, at 865-866. 
JusTICE POWELL apparently believes that the State's in-
terest in preserving potential life justifies the State in requir-
ing a second physician at all post-viability abortions because 
some methods other than D&E may result in live births. 
But this fact cannot justify requiring a second physician to at-
tend an abortion at which the chance of a live birth is nonexis-
tent. The choice of method presumably will be made in ad-
5 The District Court relied on the testimony of Doctors Robert Crist and 
Richard Schmidt. Doctor Crist testified that in some instances abortion 
methods other than D&E would be "absolutely contraindicated" by the 
woman's health condition, 2 Record 438-439, giving the example of a recent 
patient with hemolytic anemia that would have been aggravated by the use 
of prostaglandins or other labor-inducing abortion methods, id., at 428. 
Doctor Schmidt testified that "[t]here very well may be" situations in 
which D&E would be used because other methods were contraindicated. 
4 Record 836. Although Doctor Schmidt previously had testified that a 
post-viability D&E abortion was "almost inconceivable," this was in re-
sponse to a question by the State's attorney regarding whether D&E 
would be used "[a]bsent the possibility that there is extreme contraindica-
tion for the use of prostaglandins or saline, or of hysterotomy." I d., at 
787. Any inconsistencies in Doctor Schmidt's testimony apparently were 
resolved by the District Court in the plaintiffs' favor. 
The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's factual finding that 
health reasons sometimes would require the use of D&E for post-viability 
abortions. 665 F. 2d, at 865. Absent the most exceptional circum-
stances, ~ 
cweaonDt review a District Court's factual findings in which the Court of 
Appeals has concurred. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U. S. 507, 512, n. 6 (1980). 
.. 
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vance,6 and any need for a second physician disappears when 
the woman's health requires that the choice be D&E. Be-
cause the statute is not tailored to protect the State's legiti-
mate interests, I would hold it invalid. 7 
B 
In addition, I would hold that the statute's failure to pro-
vide a clear exception for emergency situations renders it un-
constitutional. As JUSTICE POWELL recognizes, ante, at 8, 
n. 8, an emergency may arise in which delay could be danger-
ous to the life or health of the woman. A second physician 
may not always be available in such a situation; yet the stat-
ute appears to require one. It states, in unqualified terms, 
that a post-viability abortion "shall be performed ... only 
when there is in attendance" a second physician who "shall 
take control of' any child born as a result of the abortion, and 
it imposes certain duties on "the physician required by this 
6 In addition to requiring the physician to select the method most likely 
to preserve fetal life, so long as it presents no greater risk to the pregnant 
woman, Missouri requires that the physician "certify in writing the avail-
able method or techniques considered and the reasons for choosing the 
method or technique employed." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.2 (1983). This 
ensures that the choice of method will be a reasoned one. 
7 The State argues that its second-physician requirement is justified 
even when D&E is used, because "[i]f the statute specifically excepted 
D&E procedures, abortionists would be encouraged to use it more fre-
quently to avoid the expense of a second physician, to ensure a dead fetus, 
to prevent the presence of a second professional to observe malpractice or 
the choice of a questionable procedure from a safety viewpoint, a fetus-
destroying procedure, or to avoid their own awakening to concern for the 
newborn." Brief for Cross-Petitioners in No. 81-1623, p. 44. The Court 
rejected this purported justification for a second physician in Doe v. 
Bolton, 410 U. S. 179, 199 (1973): "If a physician is licensed by the State, 
he is recognized by the State as capable of exercising acceptable clinical 
judgment. If he fails in this, professional censure and deprivation of his 
license are available remedies. Required acquiescence by co-practitioners 
has no rational connection with a patient's needs and unduly infringes on 
the physician's right to practice." 
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section to be in attendance." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.030.3 
(emphasis added). By requiring the attendance of a second 
physician even when the resulting delay may be harmful to 
the health of the pregnant woman, the statute impermissibly 
fails to make clear "that the woman's life and health must al-
ways prevail over the fetus' life and health when they con-
flict." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 400 (1979). 
JUSTICE POWELL attempts to cure this defect by asserting 
that the final clause of the statute, requiring the two physi-
cians to "take all reasonable steps . . . to preserve the life and 
health of the viable unborn child; provided that it does not 
pose an increased risk to the life or health of the woman," 
could be construed to permit emergency post-viability abor-
tions without a second physician. Ante, at 8, n. 8. This 
construction is contrary to the plain language of the statute; } 
the clause upon which JusTICE PowELL relies refers to the 
duties of both physicians during the performance of the abor-
tion, but it in no way suggests that the second physician may 
be dispensed with. 
Moreover, since JUSTICE POWELL's proposed construction 
is not binding on the courts of Missouri, 8 a physician per-
forming an emergency post-viability abortion cannot rely on 
it with any degree of confidence. The statute thus remains 
impermissibly vague; it fails to inform the physician whether 
he may proceed with a post-viability abortion in an emer-
gency, or whether he must wait for a second physician even if 
the woman's life or health will be further imperiled by the de-
lay. This vagueness may well have a severe chilling effect 
on the physician who perceives the patient's need for a post-
viability abortion. In Colautti v. Franklin, we considered a 
statute that failed to specify whether it "require[ d) the physi-
8 "Only the [Missouri] courts can supply the requisite construction, since 
of course 'we lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legisla-
tion.'" Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 520 (1972), quoting United 
States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U. S. 363, 369 (1971). 
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cian to make a 'trade-off' between the woman's health and ad-
ditional percentage points of fetal survival." 439 U. S., at 
400. The Court held there that "where conflicting duties of 
this magnitude are involved, the State, at the least, must 
proceed with greater precision before it may subject a physi-
cian to possible criminal sanctions." I d., at 400-401. 9 I 
would apply that reasoning here, and hold Missouri's second-
physician requirement invalid on this ground as well. 10 
III 
Missouri law prohibits the performance of an abortion on 
an unemancipated minor absent parental consent or a court 
order. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 (1983). 
Until today, the Court has never upheld "a requirement of 
a consent substitute, either parental or judicial," ante, at 14. 
In Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U. S., at 74, the Court invalidated a parental consent re-
quirement on the ground that "the State does not have the 
9 A physician who fails to comply with Missouri's second-physician re-
quirement faces criminal penalties and the loss of his license. Mo. Rev. 
Stat. §§ 188.065, 188.075 (1983). 
10 Because I would hold the statute unconstitutional on these grounds, 
I do not reach the question whether Missouri's second-physician require-
ment impermissibly interferes with the doctor-patient relationship. I 
note, however, that Missouri does not require attendance of a second phy-
sician at any other medical procedure, including a premature birth. There 
was testimony at trial that a newborn infant, whether the product of a nor-
mal birth or an abortion, ordinarily remains the responsibility of the wom-
an's physician until he turns its care over to another. App. 133; see 
ACOG, Standards for Obstetric-Gynecologic Services 31 (1982) ("The indi-
vidual who delivers the baby is responsible for the immediate post-delivery 
care of the newborn until another person assumes this duty"). 
This allocation of responsibility makes sense. Consultation and team-
work are fundamental in medical practice, but in an operating room a pa-
tient's life or health may depend on split-second decisions by the physician. 
If responsibility and control must be shared between two physicians with 
the lines of authority unclear, precious moments may be lost to the detri-
ment of both woman and child. 
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constitutional authority to give a third party an absolute, and 
possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and 
his patient, regardless of the reason for withholding the con-
sent." In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U. S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II), 
eight Justices agreed that a Massachusetts statute permit-
ting a judicial veto of a mature minor's decision to have an 
abortion was unconstitutional. See id., at 649-650 (opinion 
of POWELL, J. ); id., at 654-656 (opinion of STEVENS, J. ). Al-
though four Justices stated in Bellotti II that an appropri-
ately structured judicial consent requirement would be con-
stitutional, id., at 647-648 (opinion of POWELL, J.), this 
statement was not necessary to the result of the case and did 
not command a majority. Four other Justices concluded 
that any judicial-consent statute would suffer from the same 
flaw the Court identified in Danforth: it would give a third 
party an absolute veto over the decision of the physician and 
his patient. Id., at 655--656 (opinion of STEVENS, J.). 
I continue to adhere to the views expressed by JUSTICE 
STEVENS in Bellotti II: 
"It is inherent in the right to make the abortion decision 
that the right may be exercised without public scrutiny 
and in defiance of the contrary opinion of the sovereign 
or other third parties .... As a practical matter, I would 
suppose that the need to commence judicial proceedings 
in order to obtain a legal abortion would impose a burden 
at least as great as, and probably greater than, that im-
posed on the minor child by the need to obtain the con-
sent of the parent. Moreover, once this burden is met, 
the only standard provided for the judge's decision is the 
best interest of the minor. That standard provides little 
real guidance to the judge, and his decision must neces-
sarily reflect personal and societal values and mores 
whose enforcement upon the minor-particularly when 
contrary to her own informed and reasonable decision-
is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underly-
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ing the constitutional protection afforded to her deci-
sion." 443 U. S., at 655-656 (footnote omitted). 
Because Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.028 permits a parental or judi-
cial veto of a minor's decision to obtain an abortion, I would 
hold it unconstitutional. 
